The Royals: Under attack (The “Gough Whitlam” papers)

Posted in Law, Political History, Politics by earthling on July 14, 2020

I wrote about this debacle in 2011 never anticipating it would be on mainstream media in a few years.
The Monarchy is being attacked and that is one of the main pillars of the Communist Manifesto and the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.
There’s too much happening on the monarchy front to be ignored these days – Meghan and Harry; Andrew; now the Queen herself.

This COULD put intense scrutiny on the way the Crown works, who IS “The Crown”? And just who has what power and how?

I am anti monarchy however I know my enemy is also anti monarchy but for different reasons.

I wonder how many people recognise just how big this is?
If you want detail, read my blog on it.


It is imperative that we have an answer to this question: WHO IS THE CROWN? Because it is as clear as day that any elected government does not run this country either!

Don’t talk to me about “Democracy”!

Posted in Law, Politics by earthling on September 27, 2014

Not that democracy is perfect anyhow but we, in the west and in the UK do not have it!

So if anyone talks to you about our “great democracy” and “Who are you voting for?” or “What are you voting for?” please, do me a favour, laugh in their face! They’re just ignorant bastards.


Royal Prerogative

HC Deb 21 April 1993 vol 223 cc485-92 485
§Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Arbuthnot.]

2.20 am
§Mr. John Garrett (Norwich, South) I wish briefly to explore the scope and limits of the royal prerogative and its present-day usage by the Government, and to put a number of questions to the hapless Minister who has the duty of answering the debate. I want to ask him about the profoundly undemocratic practice that allows a Government to act with royal absolutism.
As I understand it, the royal prerogative denotes what remains of the monarch’s power to legislate without the authority of Parliament. As the monarch acts on the advice of Government, the procedure enables a Government to produce primary legislation without parliamentary consent—legislation which, as was made clear by the GCHQ case, may not be challenged in the courts.

Blackstone’s 18th century “Commentaries on the Laws of England” referred to the prerogative as that special pre-eminence which the King hath, over and above all other persons, and out of the course of the common law, in right of his royal dignity”— an arrangement that Blackstone described as in its nature singular and eccentrical”. In the past 10 years, some 1,400 orders have been made under the prerogative. Ministers usually imply that such orders relate to such quaint and innocuous matters as the grant and amendment of charters, and the appointment of visitors and governors of universities. Many do; but the prerogative is also applied to important international obligations and, in particular, to citizens’ rights.

The prerogative is used for the making of international treaties—which may be why from time to time, when it suits them, Ministers tell us that any Commons vote on the Maastricht treaty can be disregarded by the Government. It is also used for the declaration of war and blockade. The Government used it to commit British military forces in the Gulf war—prompting my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) to observe: this is the first time in the history of this country that British troops have been sent into battle under foreign command, using the royal prerogative of war-making to do so, without the House having had an opportunity to express its view on any motion other than that we adjourn”.—[Official Report, 14 January 1991; Vol. 183, c. 616.] My right hon. Friend contrasted the handling of the matter in the House of Commons with the way in which both Houses of the United States Congress had debated and voted on a resolution on military action.

The Government used prerogative powers to enable the United States military to bomb Libya from bases in England. That was a matter of awesome political importance, in which—once again—the House of Commons had no status. The prerogative is used for the control and organisation of the armed forces. In the matter of civil liberties, under the royal prerogative the Government can refuse or withdraw a passport, and can forbid a citizen to leave the country. There is no legal obligation on the Government to provide a passport, which I should have thought was a fundamental right of any citizen of this country.

Jury vetting guidelines and telephone tapping are authorised by royal prerogative, apparently under an ancient royal right to intercept communications between 486 subjects. The criminal injuries compensation scheme was established by royal prerogative without statutory authority.

Most notoriously in recent times, the royal prerogative was used in 1984 to ban from membership of trades unions the staff of the Government intelligence establishment GCHQ. In a subsequent court case on that subject, the Government argued successfully that not only were their powers not open to judicial review, but that instructions given in exercising them enjoyed the same immunity. This situation derived from the fact that the legal relationship between the Crown and civil or Crown servants is governed by the prerogative, and is unlike any normal contractual relationship between employer and employee. That explains why we in this country have yet to resolve the crucial issue whether the duty of a civil servant is to the national interest or to the Government, and why there is no protection for whistleblowers in the civil service.

In any other country, the civil service would be regulated by a civil service Act that set out in law the rights, duties and constitutional position of civil servants. Here, the civil service is subject to the monarchical whims of some Minister. My first question to the Minister is, why cannot the civil service be governed by a civil service Act, and are the Clerks of this House also governed by the royal prerogative, rather than by legislation passed by the House?

The royal prerogative is used for literally thousands of appointments in the public sector, and it is the fount of Government patronage. In 1965, Lord Reid observed: it is not easy to discover and decide the law relating to the royal prerogative and the consequences of its exercise. He noted that there had been “practically no authority” on the matter since 1688.

The most extensive discussion recently of the royal prerogative was by Professor Colin Munro in a publication in 1987. He wrote: In practice … the supervision of prerogative powers does seem to be attended by greater than average difficulty. The very nature of these powers makes them less readily subject to challenge. He tells us that the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, or ombudsman, has no power to examine decisions under the royal prerogative and says: the exercise of prerogatives by the Attorney General may not be reviewed. He also says: The correlation between the matters excluded from the Commissioner’s jurisdiction and the spheres of activity in which governments exercise prerogative powers is striking. We also learn from Munro that the manner of the exercise of prerogative powers lies outside the scope of judicial review, so we are inevitably brought to the conclusion that a British subject may be deported, or refused a passport, or have his or her telephone tapped or mail opened by the state without legislative authority, and that neither Parliament nor the judiciary is entitled to examine the matter.

The Minister will also know that subsidiary powers flow from the royal prerogative. The Crown’s right to have admissible evidence withheld from a court when it claims that the public interest so demands has been known as Crown privilege although nowadays its existence is disputed. Does it exist, I ask the Minister, and what does it cover? Is there still such a concept in British law as Crown privilege which exempts the Crown from justiciable matters?

487 Crown immunity is certainly alive and kicking. The sovereign—and, therefore, the Government—still enjoy a number of immunities derived from the ancient “prerogative of perfection”—that is, “The King can do no wrong.” What it means today is that Government Departments and many public bodies are not bound by a huge range of protective legislation, such as health and safety, food hygiene laws and planning and environmental regulations. I understand that that legislation does not, for example, protect those who work in the parliamentary precincts, let alone the hundreds of thousands of people in other public organisations. Therefore, to be employed in a public building means that one cannot be protected by a wide range of legislation.

Munro concludes: Behind the phrase “royal prerogative” lie hidden some issues of great constitutional importance, which are insufficiently recognised. It seems that the prerogative could be dispensed with almost entirely. The civil service and the military could be governed by Acts of Parliament, as in other countries. Telephone tapping, mail interception, deportation and entitlement to travel should be justiciable. Senior public appointments could be supervised by Select Committee. The Speaker could take over some prerogative powers, such as the dissolution of Parliament and the invitation to the leader of the party with the largest majority to form a Government.

In a recent written answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen), the Prime Minister said: It is for individual Ministers to decide on a particular occasion whether and how to report to Parliament on the exercise of prerogative powers.”—[Official Report, 1 March 1993; Vol. 220, c. 19.] It is nothing less than a constitutional outrage that Ministers should decide whether to withhold matters from Parliament. It should be the Speaker’s job to decide how the exercise of prerogative powers should be reported to the House. It should also be up to the Speaker to judge whether a Minister should answer to the House for the use of extra-statutory power.

The royal prerogative is an anachronism—an example of the overweening and authoritarian power of Government over Parliament. In truth, the purpose of our Parliament is to provide a Government and to scrutinise their actions and decisions, but only to the extent that Government will allow. That is not good enough. The royal prerogative is a chilling manifestation of the way in which our democracy is deficient, and it should be mapped by the Select Committee on Procedure as soon as possible, and then largely ended.

I am keen to hear what the Minister has to say about the boundaries of the royal prerogative and the extent to which as, I hope, a democrat he thinks that government by proclamation and diktat could be replaced by a proper legislative process.


Tony Benn BBC quote



HC Deb 17 January 1989 vol 145 cc180-238

Mr. Benn The amendments touch on the nub of the Bill—what is subversion and what is national security and who should decide what is national security and who 193 should decide what is subversion? Having the Bill means that we have probably had more meaningful discussion on the Security Service than we have had in recent years.
For a long time the general public have been persuaded that it is in their interests that foreign spies and domestic terrorists should be under careful scrutiny. Communists were automatically identified with foreign spies. I imagine that if the Soviet Union had wanted spies in Britain it would not have picked members of the Communist party. However, that was one of the foolish ideas that was current. The whole thing had to be covered by the tightest security and secrecy and judges capitulated whenever they heard the magic word “security”.

The amendment is important because the definition of subversion is a political decision. Who is the enemy is a political question. We do not say that the chief of staff will announce which enemy country he intends to attack. That too is a political question. After all, security is a part of defence. We have an annual defence White Paper in which we are told what resources we have at out disposal and where they are deployed. We have an annual Army order. When I was first in Parliament an Act went through every year. Now it is an annual order. If the House does not endorse that order, the discipline of the armed forces disappears on the day that the old order expires. Why does that procedure not apply to the Security Service?

What is it about the Security Service’s political objectives that makes them different from the defence forces’ political objectives? The answer is that the decision about what is subversive has been taken by MI5, sometimes upon the intervention of Ministers. I say without any disrespect to the Home Secretary that I would be surprised if, like his predecessors, he really knew what was going on. Certainly some of my colleagues who were his predecessors did not know what was going on, because what was going on was an attempt to get the Labour Government out of office. I cannot believe that Lord Jenkins of Hillhead or my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) was in charge of such an operation.

If one pursues the matter more fully, one finds that if pressed the Security Service would say that it is responsible not to the Home Secretary but to the Crown, a concept that I tried to explore on Second Reading. The Crown is a mysterious idea which implies a continuity of activity. The security services have really been protecting the status quo, which is not the same as parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary democracy is supposed to allow one to change the status quo by political action. If one cannot change the status quo by voting, why vote? Immediately we come to the relationship between what is called national security, which is defined as the political and economic status quo, and subversion, which, in the case of parliamentary democracy, is a legal form of trying to change the status quo. The Home Secretary knows that, or his draftsmen have worked on that basis. If one then says that parliamentary democracy is trying to change the status quo by political means, one is caught by the Bill. If one is trying to undermine parliamentary democracy by political actions, one is a subversive. The Home Secretary has put his finger on that. If one interprets parliamentary democracy as meaning that one wants to change anything, one is covered by the Bill because one is trying to undermine parliamentary democracy by political action.

194 The Home Secretary may smile and may give as many assurances as he likes, but I am defining how the Bill will work and that is how the system has worked until now.

Another aspect of the matter, which I have raised before, is that the condition under which the Americans allow us to borrow nuclear weapons is that American intelligence supervises British intelligence. The Americans have to check procedures and, for many purposes, they have to check people who are engaged in activities in which they take an interest. In a strange way, the definition in amendment No. 47 covers the Americans. It refers to the activities of agents of foreign powers that are detrimental to the interests of the United Kingdom and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person”. That would deal with James Angleton immediately, but no British Government who wished to retain nuclear weapons could implement such an amendment.

It is not only the theory of the matter that is interesting but the practice. In Field Marshal Lord Carver’s television broadcast after his resignation as chief of the general staff, he said that for most of history Britain’s armed forces were concerned with domestic security. He pointed out—and this point was interesting to me—that there have not been many foreign wars in which the British Army has been engaged. We fought the French and, a couple of times, the Germans, but for most of our history the armed forces have performed the function of security forces. That is why Parliament, in 1688, resolved that it did not want a standing army. That domestic function has been far greater, in the mind of the security services, over a long period. We have been told that the Russians were planning to invade. I do not know how many people now believe that Mr. Gorbachev is planning an attack on London. According to opinion polls, only 2 per cent. think that a Russian attack is very likely.

The concept of the “enemy within” is central to the issue. The present Prime Minister has made it explicit that the “enemy within” became the dominant consideration of the security services at the time when there was a Socialist challenge to the status quo. Trade unions are, by definition, considered to be potentially subversive by the security services. I know that because my private secretary in one of my Departments tried to take advantage of the scheme for interchange with industry. He said that he did not want an interchange with industry, but that he wanted to go to a trade union for a time. He was warned off because, in the eyes of the establishment that still runs the security services, trade unionism was subversive in itself. I am saying not that the security services believe that every trade unionist is subversive, but that the purpose of trade unionism is subversive.

I want to deal next with the peace movement. The right hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine), when he was Secretary of State for Defence, was able to instruct MI5 to bug the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament—the Cathy Massiter case. That shows that anyone whose view of the world differs from the view that peace has been retained by nuclear weapons against the Red Army is a subversive—and that view is still held. No one should imagine that Peter Wright’s story ended with his retirement or with the acquisition of power by the present Government.


Mr. Benn The hon. Member may have more knowledge of these matters than I have, as he speaks with such confidence about what happened, and that illustrates my point. We should have known the information to which, apparently, the hon. Gentleman is privy and we should have had a chance to test the matter. I do not believe for a moment what he has said, but I cannot prove that, and he cannot prove the validity of his remarks, because the whole matter is covered by secrecy.
The next category of people who are considered to be subversive are the various types of Socialists. It is funny that the Communist party is held to be subversive now. As far as I can make out, it is advocating electoral pacts, so the security services do not seem to be up to date. But the people in the security services are not politically clever. I was once invited, as a Minister, to attend a conference of the Socialist International, a respectable body which was then presided over by Willy Brandt. My private secretary said to me that MI5 would not let me go. He said that the reason was that the International Socialists were on our list. He did not know the difference between the International Socialists and the Socialist International. That does not show a high level of political intelligence. There may be a need for more chemists in MI5. Perhaps it would not be a bad idea if MI5 were also to employ people who understand Socialism and realise that there are many varieties of Socialism.

I remember the case of a woman who was refused employment by the Civil Service because her father read The Daily Worker. We should not deceive ourselves that the amendment will be passed, but we can use Parliament to make available through Hansard—the only publicly owned newspaper that has not yet been acquired by Rupert Murdoch—to those who bother to read our speeches the truth about what is happening.


Mr. Winnick Will my right hon. Friend give way?

§Mr. Benn I shall just finish this point.
The security services go to universities and ask teachers about the political activities of particular students who may have applied for a job in the defence industry or the Civil Service. Lecturers have told me that MI5 was sniffing around to find out whether Mr. Jones or Mr. Smith was reliable. If one has a friend who is keen to join the Civil Service, the first advice to give such a young man is, “Don’t go to political meetings, my friend, because if you do, you may not get into the Civil Service.” One reason why the security services and the Civil Service are so ignorant about political argument is that, to join the security services, one must have an unblemished record. One must not even read Campaign Group News or Tribune because that might suggest that one wanted to change the status quo.

§Mr. Norman Buchan (Paisley, South) Will my right hon. Friend give way?
§Mr. Benn Let me finish going through the categories of subversives.
Another category is those who are known to be politically active on an issue that may appear to be harmless. People may be against vivisection, for example, but it is always possible, in the minds of those who sniff around, that such people might take part in other activities that could be threatening. What is misleading is to pretend that the activities of the security services in the past, or the way in which they will operate in future, has anything to do with protecting the people’s democratic rights. They are designed to protect the status quo.


Mr. Benn That is absolutely right. We have not yet discussed the question of vetting. The employees of the BBC are vetted. One cannot get a senior job at the BBC until one has been cleared by the security services. Do they imagine that a lot of terrorists are about to be made head of news and current affairs? The Clerks in this House are vetted. I know that from the evidence given to the Committee of Privileges. Members’ research assistants are vetted. What has that to do with terrorism or espionage?
§Mr. Tony Banks Will my right hon. Friend give way?
§Mr. Benn I do not want to detain the House. I am merely trying to put a few fruits on the harvest festival altar so that people may observe them later.
The next question is, “What is parliamentary democracy?” It has been defined in many different ways. Last summer, we celebrated the tercentenary of 1688—apparently the year of the birth of parliamentary democracy. I should have thought that William of Orange would have been regarded as one of these foreigners trying to disturb parliamentary democracy, but it turns out that he was in at its birth. I am reminded of the saying Why does treason never prosper?

Here’s the reason:

For if it prosper, none dare call it treason. The other day I went through the Second Reading of the Reform Bill. The Conservatives of the time were opposed to the Reform Bill because they thought that it would undermine parliamentary democracy. Mr. Asquith, the great Liberal leader, opposed votes for women on the ground that that proposal would upset parliamentary democracy.

Parliamentary democracy has been defined to mean the status quo at the time. What is it in practice? The Crown in Parliament is sovereign and the powers of the Crown—except for the power to dissolve Parliament or to ask someone to form a Government—are not personal to the 197 sovereign. Every Prime Minister—I do not differentiate between the present Prime Minister and her predecessors in this respect—uses the powers of the Crown to do all sorts of things that have nothing to do with Parliament and nothing to do with democracy. The Prime Minister appoints the Archbishop of Canterbury. What has that to do with Parliament or democracy? The Prime Minister appoints the judges and the chairman of the BBC. She appoints Lord Chalfont to the IBA. The Prime Minister can go to war without consulting Parliament or sign treaties without consulting Parliament. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) signed the treaty of accession to the Common Market before it was even published. All such activities are undertaken under the Crown prerogative.

Suppose that we say that we do not like the use of that prerogative. Is that an attempt to undermine parliamentary democracy by political action? I have long been a republican and I believe that the Queen should be the head of the Commonwealth. Is that subversive? Is it subversive to want to abolish the House of Lords, which has no democratic base in society? Many Liberals have argued for a single Chamber or two elected Chambers. Is that subversive? Is it subversive if I say that the Church should not be established? The other day, I looked up the coronation oath and found that the only pledge that the Queen gives is that she will uphold the rights of the bishops. That is most interesting. It was clearly not applied in the Viraj Mendis case, but that is another matter. There is no democracy in the sense that in a democracy the electorate has the final say. The truth is that the status quo covers a semi-feudal system which is not subject to normal public means of accountability under the Bill.

In a democracy, the ultimate responsibility for deciding the interests of the state lies with the electorate. That is what democracy means. If the electorate is to decide what is in the interests of national security and what is subversive, the electorate must know enough to know what goes on. This Bill tries to entrench in statute a rotten little directive of Maxwell Fyfe, who told them to get on with it and not bother him and a rotten definition by Lord Harris of Greenwich, who used virtually the same phrase as appears in clause 1. On that basis, the Home Secretary hopes to entrench in statute powers that have been exercised under the Crown prerogative for years, and dress it up as the entrenchment of the protection of parliamentary democracy against subversion.

The Home Secretary will not be affected by my arguments, but I hope that people outside will realise when they read them that the Bill is not what it is made out to be. It is not an advance. It is the entrenchment in statute of powers that no democratic Government have the right to exercise.



on behalf of


Salmond fishing


They can only debate from within the “box”

Posted in "Climate Change", Law, Politics, The Corrupt SOB's by earthling on March 20, 2014

When you challenge them and confront them, they don’t know what to do. They are like animals caught in the headlights. Just as you saw with Bill and Sonia in the previous blogpost “BASTARDS!”

How do they get away with it all? By the majority’s ignorance and care-less attitude AND, of course, fear and having sufficient strength within themselves to realise that they are every bit as good – if not better – and smarter than these fools!

People who get paid for being an MP (seemingly to represent us) and yet, in addition to their approx £60K per annum (plus expenses etc etc and did I mention “donations”?) even as a lowly backbencher, they work for people like N.M Rothschild, Water companies, in fact any companies that will pay them money to lobby either overtly or covertly for them.

Here’s Oliver Letwin for example. A tory who has been in Rothschild’s backpocket for years and years….

And don’t get this wrong. This is just for 6 months out of one year. There was the rest of the 6 months and there’s been years of it. So, in addition to his MP salary, he gets more in a year from Rothschild at a rate of £145 PER HOUR! And that was 2009!

Oliver Letwin Rothschild

Mervyn King. Oliver Letwin. Evelyn de Rothschild. Jacob Rothschild.
GRAY, Emma (
To: ‘Earthling’
Picture of GRAY, Emma

Dear Earthling,


I can assure you that Mr Letwin does indeed see your e-mails.  He then dictates a response to me for me to send out to the person concerned.


Yours sincerely,


Emma Gray



Emma Gray

Correspondence Secretary

Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP

From: Earthling
Sent: 02 November 2009 11:23
To: GRAY, Emma
Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.

Dear Emma,

If you don’t mind me saying so (which I’m sure you will) that was hilarious.
Mr Letwin has read my email with great interest while I sent it less than 20 minutes ago? I very much doubt it. I would consider that to even read through it would take 20 minutes in itself and I doubt that it has even come close to Mr Letwin’s attention as yet and if ever, nevermind him having read it.
I’ve had, once before, the exact same response from “Mr. Letwin” months ago, on which I followed up and never heard a thing from him since.
PLEASE do not throw such inane responses to your electorate. It does you FAR more harm than good.


To: Earthling
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2009 11:00:37 +0000
Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.

From Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP



Dear Earthling,


Thank you for your e-mail, which I have read with great interest.


Best wishes.


Yours sincerely,


Oliver Letwin

—– Original Message —–
From: Earthling
To: Letwin, Oliver
Sent: Mon Nov 02 10:34:48 2009
Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.

Dear Mr Dowell,

Thank you very much for taking the time necessary to respond to my email. I would, however, hope you would now offer me the right to reply?

You/Nick say that the Liberal Democrats only “believe” sovereignty “should” rest with the people and that, in Law, it remains with the Crown in Parliament.

Two questions for now:

1. Which “Law” actually states that sovereignty remains with the Crown in Parliament? I would wish to read this Law document.
2. Can you summarise please, very simply, whether – when you speak of “the Crown”, you are speaking of the actual Monarchy or, better still, can you define precisely what “the Crown” is?

For the problem lies here in what are entirely conflicting statements from the Parliamentary website:

Along with the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the Crown is an integral part of the institution of Parliament. The Queen plays an essential role in opening and dissolving Parliament and approving Bills before they become law.


The highest legislative authority in the United Kingdom. Made up of the House of Commons, House of Lords and the Queen (who is the UK’s current hereditary monarch).


This is another way of referring to the monarchy – which is the oldest part of the system of government in this country. Time has reduced the power of the monarchy, and today it is broadly ceremonial. The current UK monarch is Queen Elizabeth II.

You see, my confusion re the Crown is this: “The Queen plays an essential role….approving Bills before they become law” And treaties it seems. The operative word here being ESSENTIAL. Then it is stated, quite clearly again, that the highest legislative authority includes the Queen. Yet it then goes on to dilute this importance entirely by saying the power of the Monarch has been reduced and is, broadly (not entirely?) ceremonial. We could then delve into the Royal Prerogative but even much of that is now held within the Executive branch of government and the PM himself. Much of the Royal Prerogative issues being handled by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. But then, it is collectively known as HM Government. The Queen STILL retaining the power to dissolve government if she should ever wish to do so.

One also has “Royal Assent”:

When a Bill has been approved by a majority in the House of Commons and the House of Lords it is formally agreed to by the Crown. This is known as the Royal Assent. This turns a Bill into an Act of Parliament, allowing it to become law in the UK.

So before ANY Bill becomes law it must pass Royal Assent. If the Queen literally has such power then, without any argument, the Queen has the highest authority in the United Kingdom bar none. Therefore, to suggest, alternatively, that such Royal Assent is purely ceremonial would be stating that such assent is, in fact, entirely redundant.

So, do you see my confusion here?

Now, referring back to the core issue of sovereignty and where it lies:

You are stating that the national Sovereignty of the United Kingdom does NOT, in law, lie with the Monarch. Is that correct?

You are also stating that the national Sovereignty of the United Kingdom does NOT, in law, lie with the people. Is that correct?

You have stated that the Sovereignty of the United Kingdom, in law, lies with Parliament. Therefore, the above must be correct.

Therefore, it cannot be argued that, at this present time, the United Kingdom is NOT a free democracy (democracy being an over-used and wrongly used term) but, in fact, a Dictatorship. Bear with me on this point please.

Why a Dictatorship? You will argue, I am sure, that it is not because the government/Parliament is “democratically” elected by the people (which, in of itself clearly points to where Sovereignty lies). With that argument, however, we then go around in circles because the people elect a UK government to GOVERN the UK. The people DID NOT at anytime present ANY government with a mandate to transfer NATIONAL sovereignty to a FOREIGN POWER.

Would you agree that each successive government/Parliament that the people elect, are simply caretakers and, in fact, work FOR and ON BEHALF OF the people? If not, then why have elections? Why offer such “power” to the population of this nation to elect “THEIR” government?
If you DO agree with such, then it is patently obvious that, inasmuch as the people did not present this mandate to government for transference of sovereignty, then the government has and is acting, with each and every treaty, outwith it’s remit.

You will then come back to Parliamentary Sovereignty giving the Government/Parliament of the day it’s authority to do as it wishes. You have it so very wrong. The people elected a UK parliament for the UK nation. That is all.

The Dictatorship comes in when, as you have said, Parliament has Sovereignty and therefore Parliament may then do exactly as it pleases once elected. There are between 300 and 400 members of parliament. Even within that number, there are many members who do not agree with the transference of sovereignty and power which is inherent within the Lisbon Treaty. But let us, for now, assume that there are 400 people within Parliament etc who are in agreement with such a treaty and willing to ignore the voice of the people, the electorate, the population of this country which they are MEANT to represent (that word REPRESENTATION again pointing toward the reality of where the sovereignty of the nation lies).

Then what we have are 400 people DICTATING to a population of over 60 million people. THAT is quite simply a Dictatorship.

Meanwhile, the present Labour Party Government is making such clearer and clearer while you and the Conservatives allow it. The reason for this being that you and the Conservatives are simply (at the Executive level of your respective parties) just three separate legs of an establishment tripod ensuring the status quo. Ensuring no matter which of you gains office, the establishment remains.

Now, as for the European Communities Act of 1972, the Heath Government of the time had the entire British Public understand/believe that the EEC was just that, an Economic Trading Agreement within Europe. No more, no less. To point to that Act now as the formal legal basis of our membership of the European Union then clearly exposes the Heath Government for the fraud (and Treason) that such an Act was based upon.

I can assure you, meanwhile, that the EU WILL abolish British Sovereignty whether by the Lisbon Treaty itself or by the sheer apathy of the people through time and further legislation once it is ratified.
The establishment parties can offer NO guarantees or assurances to the British electorate for each and every successive government since 1972 (and particularly the Heath Government, the Major Government and then to cap it all, the Bliar/Brown Government) have outright lied to the people. Liberal Democrats cannot  even consider suggesting that because they have never been in power they cannot be blamed. Nick Clegg and previous incumbents have stood idly (and even supported) each government whilst the party in power have gone ahead with their plans. LibDem, being EU friendly as you have said, supported Labour in their stance of reneging on their promise of a referendum to the electorate, hiding behind the suggestion that the Lisbon Treaty is not an EU Constitution. An EU Council (unelected), an EU Parliament with no power, an EU Court and an EU President. Please point to another region of the world which is not a nation or a state which has a President and every other aspect of Statehood as just listed.

Please do not treat the UK electorate as fools. It is exactly this that is losing you all the electorate’s confidence. From MPs expenses to the sheer corruption and corruption of the Laws of this country.
As for EU legislation requiring the consent of our own government, can you please point to any and all EU legislation (which impacts significantly upon the people of this nation) which has not been imposed upon us? It must be understood that while the majority of people do not wish for the EU, it can also be stated categorically, that those who understand and take the time to reflect upon our politics in this country, no longer wish for a Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat Government either.

Twenty Seven member states are stronger than one? In which sense may I ask? Mr. Dowell, I do not know who’s words these are – whether yours or Mr Cleggs – but if you consider the world outside of this conditioned “ideal” you have re the EU, you might find that there are nations which do particularly well for themselves within World Trade. For example: South Korea, China, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan. The UK and Europe buy massively from such countries and will continue to do so whether there are EU tariffs or not. So tell me the REAL argument for UK membership?
These countries are sovereign nations of various sizes. Yet what do they have in common? What makes them so successful? Banking? No!

It’s called INDUSTRY.

Where is OUR industry Mr. Dowell? It matters not a jot whether we are in some EU superstate or not. A country does not exist on having a banking industry with the majority of people having no career or job to allow them to use it!!

The government is currently allowing a Bank of England to use Quantitative Easing to pay itself to buy up this country’s tangible assets (REAL ASSETS) to pay off debt (to who?) because there is insufficient GDP being generated. The government is then planning on further tax increases and privatisation of the road system to pay this debt because, again, there is insufficient GDP growth. The country is being “raped” of its wealth and taxed to death because there is no wealth generation through INDUSTRY.

How blind are our government and opposition parties? I would say not blind at all. “You” know exactly what the game is.

In ending, may I request, again, that you furnish me with the answers to the questions I have posed in this email. It would be most appreciated.


Now, just to break in here before we carry on with this series of communications, to make it quite clear (once more) where sovereignty lies. Quite clear – AS CLEAR AS DAY IN FACT – because you have our current Prime Minister actually stating it! So, for any of you out there who have problems believing anything a “blogger” says, well take your disbelief and put it all directly in front of one DAVID CAMERON!


To: Earthling
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2009 12:06:38 +0000
Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.Dear Earthling,

Many thanks for your letter to Nick Clegg MP regarding the European Union.  Nick has asked me to reply to you on his behalf.

Liberal Democrats believe that sovereignty should rest with the people of the United Kingdom.  At present, in law, it remains with the Crown in Parliament; we would wish, in the long term, to see a written constitution vesting it in the people themselves.  With respect to the role of the European Union, I think it’s important to highlight that the UK’s participation in the EU is based upon British Acts of Parliament so far as British law is concerned and that the EU’s treaties are clear that E.  The European Communities Act 1972, as amended, provides the legal basis for our membership – and this could, of course, be repealed by a future British Parliament.  Indeed, if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, there will be a formal mechanism for countries to the leave the EU.  As a party, we firmly support membership, but I hope this helps to assure you that the EU is not abolishing or removing British sovereignty.

Liberal Democrats remain in favour of active British participation and cooperation in the EU. We want the United Kingdom to play a full role in the European Union.  We are not uncritical Europeans and we believe that there are many areas where the EU badly needs to improve its performance – but the best way to achieve this is by persuading our partners of the merits of our arguments.  In general, we believe that the government’s failure to make the case for European co-operation has done great damage to the British national interest.

It is crucial to understand how the EU works when making laws.  The Union does not operate as a superstate imposing law on Britain – national governments are involved at all stages of the process. EU legislation requires the consent of national governments in the Council of Ministers without exception, and usually elected MEPs in the European Parliament, before it becomes law.  There are no circumstances in which the EU can ‘impose’ law without a British government voting on it, and I hope this may be of some reassurance on the question of its powers and the manner in which British sovereignty is retained.

This means that the EU, far from being an institution which takes powers away from Britain, is a crucial means by which our voice is made louder in the world at large – for the simple reason that twenty-seven member states are stronger than one.  In the future, the European Union will be critical as we grasp the challenges of climate change, globalisation and international terrorism.  Only by working in the EU can we get strong, global action to cut carbon emissions, secure fair trade deals, deliver effective burden-sharing for asylum policy and help the developing world and make areas like the Balkans more stable.

Thank you once again for emailing.

Best wishes,

Douglas Dowell

Office of Nick Clegg MP


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From: Earthling
Sent: 05 October 2009 12:00
To: LAZAROWICZ, Mark; CLARKE, Kenneth; MILTON, Anne; CLEGG, Nick; CAMERON, David;; LETWIN, Oliver
Subject: FW: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.

Dear All,

Since I have had ZERO answers from my MP, Mr Lazarowicz, to any of the questions put to him below, I shall make this extremely simple for you.

ONE question for you ALL to answer: to whom, ultimately, does the sovereignty of this nation, the United Kingdom, belong?

Simple question. No complex answer necessary for it has a very simple one.

So what is it?




From: Earthling
Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2009 18:27:19 +0000

I’m still scratching my head wondering what on earth this “lot of constituents” must be looking for Mark. From what I’ve just faced I can’t honestly say that you’d be first on my list in terms of actually getting any sense or anything done. But then, after 12 years of abject misery by this government called the Labour Party (not that I’m suggesting any significant change will be seen with David Cameron in charge and his “army”) what would one expect?

Do you recognise that you, like Mr Clarke before you, have elected to answer NOTHING – not a single point – regarding the questions put to you? Now why would that be I wonder?

Let me tell you Mr Lazarowicz, the deafening silence from you people speaks volumes. When there are no answers to give just shut the hell up right?

If and when this country wakes up Mr Lazarowicz and they fully recognise the enormity of what successive governments have done, the lies they have told and still telling, the outright corruption within, the establishment cronyism within the tri-party system to ensure the status quo and the people who knew it but would not stand up and say it, plus the big one which is there is a government above government, there will, I hope, be suitable spaces within our jail system for such. For we have a Constitution, much of it written, and it does not take a Constitutional lawyer to see what’s happening here and the illegality of the EU – a FOREIGN STATE. It’s very simple and straightforward issue no matter how complex our esteemed government would wish to make it.

Treason is treason no matter what spin the establishment try to put on it. The only issue is that the vast majority of the population are simple and apathetic enough not to quite grasp it (for now).

If you know of any MP Mark (since my own can’t/won’t answer these issues) who will answer them/discuss them/take the time with a member of the electorate which you seem entirely unwilling to do (10-15 mins of your time is hardly worth my travel time to your “surgery”), please let me know.

Meanwhile, any o the so silent copied individuals who would like to comment/answer, I’d be more than pleased, yet shocked, to hear from you.



> From:
> To: Earthling
> Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2009 11:38:07 +0100
> Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
> Sorry you have declined the offer, but I do get lots of constituents seeing me every Friday.
> Mark Lazarowicz
> —–Original Message—–
> From: Earthling
> To: “LAZAROWICZ, Mark” <>
> Cc: “DARLING, Alistair” <>; “CLARKE, Kenneth” <>; “MILTON, Anne” <>; “CLEGG, Nick” <>; “CAMERON, David” <>; “” <>; “LETWIN, Oliver” <>
> Sent: 30/09/09 23:40
> Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
> Well Mark, if you believe you can cover all of this sufficiently within 10 or 15 minutes you’re quite a guy so I’ll tip my hat to you and decline the invite.
> Continue working on the bicycle tax issue Mark. It’s going to change the world and I’m sure it will have a hefty impact on Climate change. Will there be a graduated tax dependent upon whether the bike is classed as a road bike or a mountain bike? Will the number of gears be considered do you think?
> Regards,
> Earthling
> > From:
> > To: Earthling
> > Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 21:44:53 +0100
> > Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
> >
> > Probably 10 – 15 minutes depending on how busy the surgeries are.
> >
> > Mark Lazarowicz
> >
> > —–Original Message—–
> > From: Earthling
> > To: “LAZAROWICZ, Mark” <>
> > Cc: “DARLING, Alistair” <>; “CLARKE, Kenneth” <>; “MILTON, Anne” <>; “CLEGG, Nick” <>; “CAMERON, David” <>; “” <>
> > Sent: 30/09/09 18:35
> > Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
> >
> > Mark,
> >
> > I’ll certainly take you up on that offer. Perhaps next friday if that is suitable? Can you let me know how much time we shall have to go through a few things?
> > Meanwhile, they are not so much “arguments” Mark but very sincere concerns after much research. The big picture however is so big that for one person to throw illumination upon it to another while that other is stuck in their “left/right” paradigm of politics is quite a task and one that many – especially if they have risen to a certain level within that paradigm – are simply not willing to accept.
> >
> > The facts however, support that the globalisation we are currently experiencing (and have been for many decades) is a very definite form of treason for it simply is the collaboration of high level politicians within each nation, with the globalist corporate agenda. To collaborate with it is in direct contravention of the nation’s Constitution. A fact that those who are collaborating know only too well.
> >
> > The individuals and Corporations/Banking involved in such may well be, in some cases, British nationals but they are collaborating with non-British nationals also within these sectors, to achieve, ultimately, the “One World Government” or “New World Order” they aspire to.
> >
> > To achieve this, it is clear (and it has impact all the way to street level) that there is a usurpation of sovereignty within each of the nations it already has influence over. Those nations which do not follow the edicts of the “One Worlders” or “Globalists”, are then faced with the “Iron fist” while also faced with propaganda as the Leaders of the Western nations already under the control of the globalists try to suggest such nations are a serious threat to world peace and that they are “negotiating politically” with them while what is actually happening is that these nations are being pressured into accepting the global monetary system and the “rape” of their nations by the Western Corporations and IMF/Central Banking system.
> > Once the research is carried out Mark, it becomes painfully clear what is going on. Those individuals who have done the research and conclude this however, are simply then brushed aside with impertinent claims and ad hominem attacks. The last bastion of “defence” being such attacks.
> >
> > You personally – and your political colleagues – may think you see some gain to playing this game BUT you are ignoring the impact on later generations of your OWN nevermind anyone else’s. So I would suggest that, while many in the political arena care less about the general electorate and how it impacts them, they may wish to think more selfishly as to how, ultimately, their greed and corruption will impact their OWN. We all have children and, perhaps grandchildren. It’s whether we think of them or not. The Climate Change group have been promoting the impact of what we do today on those that come after us – a noble and considerate cause. However, the reality is that such is NOT the goal for the globalists nor the Climate Change propagandists. Their goal is simply to ensure an ever increasing centralisation of power and a world which is “protected” for their offspring and their benefit. But their mass of networking and control mechanisms are lost on the general public and even, possibly, to the majority of our politicians who just work within their little box and are “whipped” by the party whips to fall into line.
> >
> > You all really need to get to grips with something and that appreciation starts with this:
> >
> > In 2002 Rockefeller authored his autobiography “Memoirs” wherein, on page 405,” Mr. Rockefeller writes: “For more than a century ideological extremists at either end of the political spectrum have seized upon well-publicized incidents such as my encounter with Castro to attack the Rockefeller family for the inordinate influence they claim we wield over American political and economic institutions. Some even believe we are part of a secret cabal working against the best interests of the United States, characterizing my family and me as “internationalists” and of conspiring with others around the world to build a more integrated global political and economic structure – one world, if you will. If that’s the charge, I stand guilty, and I am proud of it.”
> >
> >
> > Now, I can throw literally hundreds of quotes at you to further support this but one after another those quotes and additional absolute factual evidence will fall on deaf ears UNTIL you were to have the motivation to research it all for yourself.
> >
> > The EU is another long considered and planned step toward this and while a One World Government, together with the peoples of all nations finally getting their act together and recognising that one world is all we are and are united by that fact, SOUNDS a noble idea, I can assure you that such a “United World” for all is NOT the agenda progressed by the proponents of such.
> >
> > Our politicians need to step back from their tunnel visioned outlook and step out of their “box” and fully recognise what is going on here. I’m aware many do but they simply do not give a damn. You are leading this country (and the world) into a very dark century and you simply cannot see past your personal aspirations.
> >
> > There is a little island called Guernsey off the British South coast which simply does not have a penny of debt. Now that island may only have 60,000 or so inhabitants but one cannot ignore that, prior to 1913, the United States basically had very very little debt UNTIL the Federal Reserve Act was introduced in that year. The United State, at that time, having a population of circa 92 million. Do you see what I’m getting at?
> >
> >
> > Let me share something with you regarding the Constitutional Law of the United Kingdom and I shall be pleased to have your considered response on this:
> >
> > EU Directive Consultation Response,
> > Government Equalities Office,
> > 9th Floor,Eland House,
> > Bressenden Place,
> > London,SW1 5DU.
> >
> > HRH Queen Elizabeth,at her coronation in 1953,swore on oath before Almighty God to govern the British people according to Gods Law and customs per the Bible.Likewise it is in$%^&bent on all politicians including the prime minister to obey those laws in support of the Oath sworn by our Queen.
> >
> > Further,in accordance with the Declaration of Rights 1688,they are required to resist the encroachment of a foreign power(e.g the European Union),and all Directives emanating from the EU are in contradiction of those laws and have no jurisdiction in this realm of the British Isles.
> >
> > The Declaration of Rights of 1688 is a settlement treaty and NOT an Act of Parliament and therefore cannot be repealed by Parliament.
> >
> > Therefore it is imperative that the present Prime Minister and Parliament repeal the European Communities Act of 1972,from which the EU derives all its authority,and stop trying to enforce those Directives on the British people,or else the Parliament should be dissolved and the British people given the chance to re-elect a Government which will truly represent them,without any European influence.
> >
> > So the aforementioned EU Directive consultation is therefore null and void and a waste of public money,therefore any person or Parliamentary candidate is guilty of TREASON in trying to implement it.
> >
> > I also advise you,that you personally who are involved in this consultation,are considered to be a party to an act of treason and traitors to your countrymen,and therefore should also be tried for participating in an act of Treason.
> >
> > Yours Sincerely.
> >
> > A loyal British Voter.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Now, I’ve considered this and given it some thought myself. Meanwhile Gordon Brown and others speak about needing a British Bill of Rights as if we do not have one (and to many of the British Public, this is lost on them) and also amending elements of the Act of Settlement.
> >
> >
> > I’d be interested in your comments re the following:
> >
> >
> > What is Sovereignty and where does it lie in the UK?
> >
> > What is Sovereignty?
> >
> > ” Sovereignty is the legitimate and exclusive right to exercise power within a given area”
> >
> > In other words – Sovereignty is Supreme Power.
> >
> > Different types of sovereignty exist:
> >
> > ~ Legal Sovereignty: where Supreme Power lies according to the law
> >
> > ~ Political Sovereignty: where Supreme Power lies in reality
> >
> > ~ Pooled Sovereignty (In the EU, a supranational organisation, decisions are made by European Institutions on which all members are represented, but none has a overall say)
> >
> > Most democratic political systems have both the separation of powers and checks and balances to prevent a single institution becoming omnipotent although, in practice, when the Executive Branch of government – the Cabinet – can plant who they wish within the judiciary, then that separation is lost.
> >
> > So, ok, what is Parliamentary Sovereignty?
> >
> > Parliamentary Sovereignty is regarded as the main principle of the British Constitution. In other words, Parliament holds the supreme authority in the UK.
> >
> > In what ways is Parliament sovereign?
> >
> > – Parliament has the ultimate political authority. Most key decisions (but not all, as some military and foreign decisions are in the hands of the PM) must be approved by Parliament.
> >
> > – All powers exercised by ministers (except for the prerogative powers of the PM), devolved governments, local governments and other public bodies are granted by parliament and can be removed by Parliament.
> >
> > – All new primary legislation must be passed by parliament and secondary legislation made by ministers can be overruled by Parliament.
> >
> > – Parliament is not bound by its predecessors (i.e. past Parliaments cannot control the actions of the current Parliament).
> >
> > – Parliament cannot bind its successors (i.e. it cannot pass laws that cannot be repealed or amended by future Parliaments).
> >
> > So, is Parliament really Sovereign?
> >
> > Parliamentary sovereignty has been undermined in a number of areas:
> >
> > – Political Parties:
> >
> > Since the reductions in the power of the House of Lords in 1911 and 1949, the balance of power has shifted to the House of Commons. Combined with the dominance of political parties in elections since the start of the C20, this has led to tight party control over MP’s and disciplined parliamentary groups that make the business of the House of Commons very predictable.
> >
> > – Executive:
> >
> > Practical reality dictates that the British Government is the majority party in the House of Commons. Strong party discipline makes this majority reliable and almost guarantees the Government victory in Commons votes – an ‘Elective Dictatorship’. Also backed by the Civil Service ‘machine’ it is easy to argue that sovereignty actually lies with the executive not Parliament. However, Prime Ministers who systematically repress the powers of party and parliament tend to meet their fate – Margaret Thatcher is a classic example of this. Although this hasn’t happened yet with Brown and doesn’t look to be on the cards for some strange reason (But I won’t get into that for the moment).
> >
> > – Public:
> >
> > At least once every five years the House of Commons is re-elected, and so at that point sovereignty really lies with the people. However, after the general election sovereignty returns to Parliament for the next five years. VERY BIG ONE!!!
> >
> > ~ European Union:
> > When Britain signed the Treaty of Rome in 1973 (an Act of treason by Edward Heath supported by the FCO and BBC amonst others) it accepted that the status of European law is superior to British law. This has given British courts the power of judicial review over Acts of Parliament. Therefore courts can scrutinise Acts of Parliament, refer them to the European Court of Justice and even suspend those Acts. However, Parliament is free to withdraw Britain from the EU at any time, so technically sovereignty still lies with Parliament.
> >
> >
> > So, upshot? Yes Sovereignty lies with Parliament/Executive Branch of government.
> >
> > BUT, as you can see, at the point of elections, Sovereignty actually lies with the people. It always truly has and that’s exactly why “Theyworkforyou”. So let’s say the people woke up one day and realised that the three main parties simply were 3 legs of the same establishment tripod (which they are). And let’s even assume that this happened sometime after the Lisbon Treaty was fully ratified.
> >
> > IF we elected a brand new party into power who we KNEW would remove us from the EU and, because we had awakened to the con of the false left/right paradigm so we were “on the government’s case and ensured they did as WE THE PEOPLE DEMANDED OF THEM, then that government (whoever it was) because of the fact that “Parliament cannot bind its successors”, could repeal ALL of the laws and the EU policy within the UK and restore our sovereignty WHICH IS OURS.
> >
> > What could it do after that? It could re-instate laws which had been repealed such as the TREASON LAWS and we could do what was necessary and just to those who had been elected to office BY the people previously and committed such treason.
> >
> >
> > Now, you may ask, how can I be sure I’m right? Here’s why:
> >
> >
> >
> > So it would seem from this taken from the UK Parliament website:
> >
> >
> > In this Chapter, we consider those features of the Lisbon Treaty that appear to have direct implications for the UK constitution.
> >
> >
> > 92. We now consider whether the Lisbon Treaty would change the relationship between EU law and the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Like the current treaties, the Lisbon Treaty contains no express provision about the principle, enunciated by the ECJ since 1963, that European law takes priority over any inconsistent national law. Under this principle, any national court or tribunal (from a bench of lay magistrates to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords) must immediately set aside any statutory provision or other rule of national law which is determined to be incompatible with EU law. However, Declaration 17 appended to the Lisbon Treaty does state that “in accordance with well settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case law”. Dr Anthony commented, though, that “the questionable legal status of such Declarations may mean that the doctrine can only ever continue to lack an agreed basis” (p 11).
> >
> > 93. The Government told us that the principle of the primacy of EU law-whether formally articulated or not-does not have implications for parliamentary sovereignty:
> >
> > “Parliament exercised its sovereignty in passing the European Communities Act 1972 and has continued to do so in passing the legislation necessary to ratify subsequent EU Treaties. The UK Parliament could repeal the European Communities Act 1972 at any time. The consequence of such repeal is that the United Kingdom would not be able to comply with its international and EU obligations and would have to withdraw from the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty does not change that and indeed for the first time includes a provision explicitly confirming Member States’ right to withdraw from the European Union” (p 21).
> >
> > 94. Dr Anthony told us that it “is highly unlikely that the new Treaty will add anything to debates on the effects of EU membership” on parliamentary sovereignty (p 11). Professor Chalmers agreed (p 14), as did Professor Dashwood who explained that primacy of European Union law “remains a principle developed in the case law of the ECJ” (p 17). We agree with this analysis.
> >
> > 95. We conclude that the Lisbon Treaty would make no alteration to the current relationship between the principles of primacy of European Union law and parliamentary sovereignty. The introduction of a provision explicitly confirming Member States’ right to withdraw from the European Union underlines the point that the United Kingdom only remains bound by European Union law as long as Parliament chooses to remain in the Union.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Here is ANOTHER issue which I picked up on with this “so called” new Bill of Rights:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Recognise the deception in this. Recognise the “one way street” being proposed under the “flag” of Human Rights/Bill of Rights. And remember also that the establishment want you to forget about out existing 1688 Bill of Rights.
> >
> >
> > The Joint Committee on Human Rights
> >
> > Background to proposals for a British Bill of
> > Rights and Duties
> > Standard Note: SN/PC/04559
> > Last updated: 3 February 2009
> >
> > The Joint Committee on Human Rights announced in May 2007 that they would hold an inquiry into a British Bill of Rights. Their report, A Bill of Rights for the UK?, was published on 10 August 2008.
> >
> > In short, the Committee recommended that the UK should adopt a Bill of Rights and Freedoms “in order to provide necessary protection to all, and to marginalized and vulnerable people in particular”.
> >
> > They stated that:
> > Adopting a Bill of Rights provides a moment when society can define itself. We recommend that a Bill of Rights and Freedoms should set out a shared vision of a desirable future society: it should be aspirational in nature as well as protecting those human rights which already exist. We suggest that a Bill of Rights should give lasting
> > effect to values shared by the people of the United Kingdom: we include liberty, democracy, fairness, civic duty, and the rule of law.
> >
> > Just ONE thing. Note: “and the rule of law”
> >
> > The Committee recommended that some additional rights, such as the right to trial by jury and the right to administrative justice should be included in a Bill of Rights. They also considered the inclusion of environmental rights (or ‘third generation’ rights as they are known). The Committee did not recommend fully justiciable social or economic rights but a situation where the Government would have a duty to progress towards realising certain rights of this kind:
> >
> > We suggest that the Bill of Rights and Freedoms should initially include the rights to education, health, housing and an adequate standard of living. Government would have a duty to progress towards realising these rights and would need to report that progress to Parliament. Individuals would not be able to enforce these rights through the courts, but the courts would have a role in reviewing the measures taken by Government.
> >
> > Now, do you see it? Do you see the outright deception here? How the Government will PROMOTE “Human Rights” and a “Bill of Rights” BUT, ultimately, it is total nonsense?
> >
> > No? Then let me explain:
> >
> > “The Committee did not recommend fully justiciable social or economic rights”
> >
> > What does that mean? As follows:
> > Justiciability concerns the limits upon legal issues over which a court can exercise its judicial authority.
> > Essentially, justiciability seeks to address whether a court possesses the ability to provide adequate resolution of the dispute; where a court feels it cannot offer such a final determination, the matter is not justiciable.
> >
> > Upshot? If your Human Rights under a Bill of Rights is breached in any way, you don’t have recourse to complain. There’s NOTHING you can do because the matter is not “justiciable”.
> >
> > You could be beaten to a pulp and thrown in jail because you were a vocal dissenter with ANYTHING the government did and you would have NO comeback.
> >
> > Therefore bottom line: YOU HAVE NO RIGHTS.
> >
> >
> > Yet, Mr. Lazarowicz, how would you respond to this: “A Human being is born free and with unalienable rights. As long as a human being causes no harm, loss or injury to another human being then there is no higher authority which has power over that “person” (be careful with the word “person”). Statutory Legislation (Statute law) is NOT law, in fact, but is given the force of law by the governed. Statute law is, in fact, a form of commercial law and, as such, is a form of contract. In being such, it requires an actual contractual agreement between both parties and, therefore, the “person” must accept to contract with the organisation wishing to enforce such statute law upon him”.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Now, finally, why do I speak the word Treason so often?
> >
> >
> > Comments welcome.
> >
> >
> > The basis for the coronation oath, which forms part of the coronation ceremony, is enshrined in statute in the Coronation Oath Act 1689. This Act required the King William and Queen Mary, as joint monarchs, to swear an oath during the coronation ceremony. The Act of Settlement 1701 and the Accession Declaration Act 1910 make a statutory requirement on the monarch to take the coronation oath.
> > The legal obligations surrounding the oath are set out in Halsbury’s Laws:
> >
> > 28. The Crown’s duty towards the subject. The essential duties of the Crown towards the subject are now to be found expressed in the terms of the oaths which every monarch is required to take before or at the coronation. The duties imposed by the coronation oath are:
> > (1) to govern the peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the dominions etc belonging or pertaining to them according to their respective laws and customs;
> > (2) to cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all judgments, to the monarch’s power;
> > (3) to maintain the laws of god, the true profession of the Gospel, and the protestant
> > reformed religion established by law, to the utmost of the Sovereign’s power;
> >
> > By the Act of Settlement s 4, it is declared that ‘whereas the laws of England are the birthright of the people thereof and all the kings and queens who shall ascend the throne of this realm ought to administer the government of the same according to the said laws and all their officers and ministers ought to serve them respectively according to the same…the same are….ratified and confirmed accordingly.
> >
> > On 12 February 1688 a declaration was drawn up affirming the rights and liberties of the people and conferring the crown upon William and Mary, then Mary’s children, and, failing any heirs, Princess Anne and her heirs; and failing also that, William’s heirs. Once the declaration had been accepted by William and Mary, it was published as a proclamation. The declaration was subsequently enacted with some additions in the form of the Bill of Rights 1688, and the Acts of the Convention Parliament were subsequently ratified and confirmed by the Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689 which also acknowledged the King and Queen. In this way, the Bill of Rights was confirmed by a Parliament summoned in a constitutional manner and thereby acquired the force of a legal statute and appears as such on the statute book.
> >
> > I won’t bother copying the Bill of Rights WE HAVE here since you can all look them up quite easily.
> >
> > What I WILL say is this however:
> >
> > There is a working document in Parliament named “The Governance of Britain”.
> >
> > July 2007 Green Paper on constitutional reform, “The Governance of Britain”. The note sets out each proposal and progress made since the publication of the Green Paper, including the contents of the Constitutional Renewal White Paper and draft Bill published in March 2008. The Government has said that it will bring forward legislation “when time allows”.
> >
> > One of the FOUR major proposals in it is as follows:
> >
> > Britain’s Future: the citizen and the state – this included a discussion of the need to develop a British Statement of Values, and perhaps a British Bill of Rights.
> >
> > No British Constitution and Bill of Rights huh? You hear Parliament and Government today talking and the news covering it “A British Bill of Rights” WHEN WE ACTUALLY HAVE ONE!!
> >
> > But that’s hushed up! Ever wondered why?
> >
> > On 25 March 2008 the Government published a White Paper and Draft Bill, The Governance of Britain: Constitutional Renewal.
> >
> > Speaking in the debate on the Queen’s Speech, Jack Straw responded to questions on the status of the constitutional renewal proposals as follows:
> > …The constitutional reform Bill is specified in the Gracious Speech. Everyone knows that what has changed since then is the overriding imperative of dealing with the world economic downturn, but the Bill will require parliamentary time. The Queen’s Speech states: “”My Government will continue to take forward proposals on constitutional renewal, including strengthening the role of Parliament and other measures.””
> > As ever, Her Majesty meant what she said-and that is my intention, too.
> >
> > Now pardon me, but I just find that last sentence by Straw making me raise my eyebrows. Was it necessary to say this? Does he speaketh too much? Who’s he trying to convince?
> >
> > The Governance of Britain Green Paper was published by the Government a matter of days after Gordon Brown became Prime Minister. The Labour administrations of 1997-2007 oversaw major changes to the constitutional structures and systems of the United Kingdom including the establishment of devolved administrations in Scotland Wales and Northern Ireland and the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law.
> >
> > And THAT is what this is all about. The entire Constitutional debate and the promotion of “a British Bill of Rights” (when we already have one) and a change of the monarchy/Act of Settlement allowing for catholics to marry into monarchy etc etc etc, is to have us slot into Europe NOT to think first of the rights of British Citizens. It’s got nothing whatsoever to do with us and the government AGAIN are pulling the wool over our eyes.
> >
> > One last point:
> >
> > The Green Paper echoes several proposals for constitutional change by the Liberal Democrats in their 2007 paper Real Democracy for Britain, and by the Conservative Party’s Democracy Task Force, chaired by Kenneth Clarke.
> >
> > Ken Clarke: MR. BILDERBERG.
> >
> > And as Mr Bilderberg, he works alongside Mr. Blair and Mr. Brown to ACHIEVE what they are trying to achieve BECAUSE before these people work for the British people and British Government THEY WORK FOR THE AGENDA OF BILDERBERG AND THE BANKERS WHO “OWN” them. Once the goals are achieved, they personally do pretty well for themselves.
> >
> > It is transparent.
> >
> >
> >
> > Someone once asked the question –
> >
> > “And since the treason laws apply to all who take the oath of allegiance, how can the Sovereign commit treason when they don’t take that oath? No one takes an oath to themselves surely?”
> >
> >
> > Answer:
> >
> > What is an Oath? It is to swear one shall carry out responsibilities.
> > The CORONATION OATH is just that.
> >
> > Meanwhile, the QUEEN is NOT the MONARCHY. That is the flesh and blood person of the Queen is NOT the MONARCHY.
> >
> > The flesh and blood person of the Queen takes on the RESPONSIBILITY of the MONARCHY and is therefore the MONARCH.
> >
> > The MONARCH is there to uphold the LAWS of this country. OUR SOVEREIGNTY has been established by our having it held FOR US by the MONARCHY.
> >
> > Think of the Queen (and all those monarchs before her) as simply the CEO of a CORPORATION.
> >
> > IF the CEO of a Corporation was found to be guilty of not performing their duties and actually, perhaps, working against (embezzlement for instance) the LAWS/POLICIES of the Corporation, they would be sacked and very possibly jailed. They have, in effect, committed a treason of sorts.
> >
> > Now, the Queen (the human being) is JUST that! She swears an oath. To who?
> >
> > Meanwhile, it gets a little more complex because of the Sovereignty of PARLIAMENT.
> >
> > The Queen actually holds the sovereignty of the PEOPLE of the UK. The PARLIAMENT work against this (actually the Executive Branch of the Government) to strip away the sovereignty of the PEOPLE FROM Her Majesty. They promote such as giving more “power” to Parliament and Parliament being elected by the people etc….
> >
> > The PROBLEM lies in the fact that the people, generally, are apathetic, disinterested etc. So what happens is that the government hype the “benefits” of Constitutional change while what they are actually doing is subverting it to allow accession to the EU.
> >
> > So then: “if a man do levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King’s enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere”; comes into play doesn’t it?
> >
> > The Queen (the human being) by acquiescing to the government’s agenda is in breach of her Constitutional DUTY and she is NOT protecting the subjects of “her” Kingdom.
> >
> > She has signed ALL EU treaties. She is allowing the sovereignty of the nation to be passed into the hands of a subvertive government who are then passing OUR sovereignty to a FOREIGN POWER.
> >
> > The Privy Council is an ancient and dignified institution of government, which has its origins in the earliest days of the monarchy.
> > The Privy Council goes back to the earliest days of the monarchy, when it comprised those appointed by the King or Queen to advise on matters of state.
> > 1 Monarchs would rule through the Privy Council without turning to Parliament, and under Edward I it was difficult to identify whether legislative acts emanated form the King-in-Parliament or the King-in- Council.
> > 2 Throughout the 14th century, however, there was a great deal of friction between the Council and Parliament, and in the reigns of Henry IV and Henry V there is evidence of the Commons petitioning the King against the jurisdiction seized by the Council. By this time the Council was exercising judicial powers in relation to both criminal and civil litigation with enforcement of the criminal law (where offences against the State were alleged or officers of State were involved) carried out by the Court of Star Chamber. Parliament therefore objected that the Star Chamber was usurping the function of the common law courts.
> >
> > With the rise of the Cabinet system of government in the 18th century, the Privy Council gradually lost much of its powers.
> >
> > Membership of the Privy Council is today a titular honour, with the office recognised as a reward for public and political service. Appointments are made by the Sovereign on ministerial advice and are for life – there are no fixed numbers of Members. By convention, all present and past Cabinet Members are appointed to the Privy Council. Also included in the membership are members of the royal family, senior judges, two Archbishops, British Ambassadors, the Speaker of the House of Commons, Prime Minister and Cabinet Members, present and former leaders of the Opposition, and leading Commonwealth spokesmen and judges. The Council now numbers about 420 members, and members are entitled to the prefix ‘Right Honourable.’
> >
> > NOW, THEIR OATH is as follows (in part):
> >
> > “You will to your uttermost bear Faith and Allegiance to the Queen’s Majesty; and will assist and defend all civil and temporal Jurisdictions, Pre-eminences, and Authorities, granted to Her Majesty and annexed to the Crown by Acts of Parliament, or otherwise, against all Foreign Princes, Persons, Prelates, States, or Potentates.”
> >
> >
> >
> > It requires those taking it to ‘keep secret all matters…treated of in Council.’ The Oath (or solemn affirmation for those who cannot take an Oath) is still administered, and is still binding, but it is only in very special circumstances nowadays that matters will come to a Privy Counsellor on “Privy Council terms”. These will mostly concern matters of the national interest where it is important for senior members of Opposition parties to have access to Government information.
> >
> > Despite the many powers conferred by statutes on individual ministers, the Order in Council remains a principal method of giving the force of law to acts of the government, especially
> > the more important executive orders.
> >
> > The Judicial Committee has also in the past examined and reported on matters of constitutional importance, such as the legal basis of the practice of telephone tapping and matters affecting state security. A committee of six Privy Counsellors reviewed British policy towards the Falkland Islands leading up to Argentina’s invasion in 1982; after the Prime Minster had consulted with five former Prime Ministers to secure their consent, the committee had access to the papers of previous governments and secret intelligence assessments.
> >
> > Now you MIGHT just be interested in taking a look at the list of members today….
> >
> > And you MIGHT just be interested (and surprised?) at who the present Lord President of the Council is (if you didn’t already know).
> >
> > <>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > So Mark, unless someone (anyone) can actually refute the above content and what I am convinced 100% is the situation here (without simply attempting the evasion of Ken Clarke that is), I would put to you this very firmly: The sovereignty of the United Kingdom is being attacked from without and such individuals, Banks and Corporations involved in this attack are being collaborated with from within.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Regards,
> > Earthling
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
> > > Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2009 12:31:10 +0100
> > > From:
> > > To: Earthling
> > >
> > > Thankyou for your email. Given you now raise a number of other issues, I don’t think I could do justice in a short response to the arguments you put forward.
> > >
> > > Could I suggest therefore you might like to come to one of my MP advice surgeries (every Friday, no appointment necessary, details on my website) if you would like to discuss these issues in more detail with me?
> > >
> > > Regards
> > >
> > > Mark Lazarowicz
> > >
> > > —–Original Message—–
> > > From: Earthling
> > > To: “LAZAROWICZ, Mark” <>
> > > Cc: “DARLING, Alistair” <>; “CLARKE, Kenneth” <>; “MILTON, Anne” <>; “CLEGG, Nick” <>; “CAMERON, David” <>; “” <>
> > > Sent: 27/09/09 22:56
> > > Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
> > >
> > >
> > > Mark,
> > > I am not asking for your agreement. I am simply stating a fact that, in MY assessment, the jury is out yet this government (of which you are a part) arrogantly, as always (and with an agenda which results in the following) puts in place policy based upon bad, unsound and unproven science and DICTATES according to what group allow it to impose taxes and policy on a country who’s GDP has fallen dramatically and the International bankers, to whom this country provides the monopoly of lending our currency to us on the basis of an associated interest or debt attached, are looking for MORE revenue from the population!!
> > > My background is in Physics and the Sciences Mr Lazarowicz yet I make no suggestion that I, personally, know whether there is any REAL Climate Change going on. So, I wonder who’s “non – scientific” assessment carries more weight? Yours as my parliamentary REPRESENTATIVE or mine? You see, I see a great deal of scientific disagreement whereas you just see the one side even though you have stated clearly you do not claim to be a scientist. So therefore, I ask you, why is your opinion given more weight? I see no reason for it. What I DO see is a political and economic agenda for you could not honestly say you would know who to believe: The “yes” or the “no” camp. You don’t have the background to make that judgement BUT the government listens to the scientists the government PICKS to do the research which they are FUNDED for BY the government!
> > > I enjoy logic Mr Lazarowicz. Logic cuts through all the veils of deceit.
> > > Interesting to note recently the “proposal” by N.M. Rothschild to the British Government for privatising the road system.
> > > As for the bike tax – that doesn’t even warrant a debate!! It’s plainly ridiculous and blatantly criminal on the part of this government.
> > > This United Kingdom is falling apart at the seams and whilst I hate to be so blunt (but I must) it is down to a government and entire parliament who have shown they are “above the law”, are corrupt and are desperate to trade the UK into an EU for their own personal agendas. Politicians in high office who only need say “Sorry” after being caught red handed with either their snout in the trough OR employing illegal aliens while the illegal alien is under threat of being jailed while the dear Barroness is fined a miniscule amount, slapped wrists and says “Sorry”. Let’s see how many people can get away with that in the Crown’s Court system today shall we?
> > > As I said and as I’ll repeat – there is no coincidence that Tony Blair left Downing Street and walked into a sweet job with J.P.Morgan Chase having been “pimped” by Lynn Forrester (Rothschild) and her spouse to the International Banking cartel and has become an “overnight” millionaire. I am sure many hold out the hope of following in his footsteps. This is so incredibly transparent (as are so many other issues) and if the population of this country were less apathetic about their politics there would be a form of revolution and every last person in parliament today would be out looking for jobs or, alternatively for some, be locked up!
> > > There are a MASS of issues I could bring to your attention but you would evade the issues time and again because there are no answers but the true answers yet, to give them, would expose every last con and deception of this government and governments before them along with the existing and prior American administrations.
> > > Your world, Mr Lazarowicz is corrupt to the core. That is the point I’m making and it is a point that the UK population are slowly (too slowly) coming to recognise.
> > > I’ve been abroad for about 10 years and I come back to a country that is unrecognisable from the one I left. A country that is being consistently lied to and propagandized to and a burgeoning Police state and I wonder whenever will come the time that the politicians in this country finally recognise that they are every bit as manipulated as the general population and that they wake up to the fact that the country they are allowing to be built (or more correctly, destroyed) will be the country their children and their children’s children will be living in and it will be nightmarish because of the corruption which has been allowed to take over not just on a national scale but a global one.Even before I return to the UK I find out how hypocritical and disinterested in their own promoted principles our own Foreign and Commonwealth office are such that they would leave a British Citizen to be incarcerated overseas when they have been alerted to the corruption he faced BY a Court System!
> > >
> > > You just do not seem to recognise or appreciate what you and your colleagues are doing by allowing this corruption to continue and for that I feel for you.
> > > But you will take this email and, again, disregard it. You will either be sublimely unaware of what I am trying to bring to your attention or you are fully aware and to seriously and honestly comment on it would mean, or could mean, your job – your career. And that seems more important than anything else YET, if this country had a single individual who truly warranted the position of leader through absolute integrity, then that person would face up to what is truly behind ALL of our issues and have the country back him 100%.
> > > But that shall never happen. We don’t possess such integrity in our political system. If we did, the money angle would be sorted out by now but no-one will step up to the plate.
> > > Let me leave you with this. Give you something to think about for one minute and you will STILL not be able to answer HOW this was reported (unless you already know, as I do):
> > > From the Asia Times May 2003:
> > > “An influential Jewish European banker reveals that the ruling elite in Europe is now telling their minions that the West is on the brink of total financial meltdown; so the only way to save their precious investments is to bet on the new global crisis centered around the Middle East, which replaced the crisis evolving around the Cold War.” (ignore the reference to Jewish for that is NOT my purpose here, that is simply how it was reported).
> > > Full article:
> > > Now, remember, this was May 2003. 6 years ago and 5 years before our Chancellor or our PM have admitted to know what was going to occur regarding the financial fiasco we are now faced with. So there could be no agenda in this report. It was a report and unless they had a crystal ball…….
> > > To support the above further:
> > > “To make matters worse, the assembled company generally agreed that America and Britain, would soon be threatened by the new bubbles in the property markets……..”
> > > Full Article:
> > > Interesting quote from a report written in the Times after a meeting in September 2002!! Another “crystal ball”??
> > > So here we have TWO separate reports stating clearly and categorically that the Banking establishment KNEW what was coming as far back as 2002 and, in fact, it is just as clear they were not saying it MIGHT happen they were saying it WILL happen. No discussion of how they were going to deal with it. It was a foregone conclusion and the reason it was is obvious. They DECIDED to make it happen.
> > > Now ONE person who attended that 2003 conference in Versailles (and is a Steering Committee member of the group and, as such, I will state quite openly, I would consider this a potential case for treason and, by all means, if you wish to debate that with me I will happily do so) was Kenneth Clarke. Of course there are others.
> > > I have put this to Mr. Clarke already but, like so many of your esteemed political colleagues, he evades answering. You can’t argue a fact which then exposes you Mr Lazarowicz now can you? You’re a lawyer, you will be well aware of this tactic.
> > > Finally,
> > > A Hedge Fund outfit then makes the biggest single year profit in history in 2008 by SHORTING the Subprime mortgage market.Just lucky I guess huh?Then from early 2009, this Hedge fund company start to buy up the same investments at cents on the dollar that they had previously shorted!! How about that? Ring any historical bells for you??
> > > It’s pure “in the know” Insider trading. Soros, Paulson etc aren’t “Gods” at timing market and currency crashes as we thought they were. They’re all insiders part of the same game. They rig the table and when the time’s right, they place their bets. But it’s not betting when the table’s rigged]
> > >
> > > “Next up, we have John Paulson’s Paulson & Co. Paulson & Co is famous for making a fortune by betting against sub-prime when this whole mess began to unfold. And, it appears as if Paulson is still up to his fortune-making ways. One of his funds has generated a 589% return, which could easily be up there amongst the largest returns by a single hedge fund in a year.”
> > >
> > > Then…..
> > >
> > > “Paulson’s bet against sub-prime has paid off and he has recently reversed course on that bet and has started to buy the assets he was previously short.”
> > >
> > > Read the entire page here:
> > > So how did they get it so right?
> > > Introducing Mr Alan Greenspan.
> > > NEW YORK, Jan. 15 /PRNewswire/ — Paulson & Co. (Bloomberg: 573991Z US) Inc., a New York-based investment management firm, today announced its retention of Dr. Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, as a member of its advisory board. Dr. Greenspan will provide ongoing advice to Paulson’s investment management team by sharing his perspective on issues affecting the financial markets.
> > >
> > > So, the ex Chairman of the Federal Reserve (a Private Bank as is the IMF and the BofE controlled by the same ultimate persons) joins a hedge fund outfit who basically win hands down in their profits over ALL other hedge funds in 2008 due to their SHORTING the Subprime market which caused the financial crisis. They made $BILLIONS!
> > > Greenspan had presided over the entire American financial system from August 1987 to Jan 2006.
> > >
> > > He becomes advisor to Paulson & Co in Jan 2008 and look how well they did!!
> > > I could go on all day Mr Lazarowicz on a great number of topics. The transparency of what is transpiring is such that you need only do a little searching. The problem is that most do not.
> > >
> > >
> > > Now, I ask you, would you care to comment on ANY of this? Or do you simply wish to evade such?
> > > If this country were a sick patient then this Government and political system would be the “Doctor” taken to task for malpractice.
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Earthling
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > > Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
> > > > Date: Sun, 27 Sep 2009 11:41:57 +0100
> > > > From:
> > > > To: Earthling
> > > >
> > > > Thank you. Clearly I do not claim to be a scientist: but equally, it is not wrong (and indeed necessary) for non-scientists, to make the best assessment they can of different scientific views, and that is what I have tried to do.
> > > >
> > > > I am afraid I still can’t agree with you on the issue – although I note you do appear to share my opposition to any proposed ‘bike tax’!
> > > >
> > > > Mark Lazarowicz MP
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > —–Original Message—–
> > > > From: Earthling
> > > > Sent: Fri 25/09/2009 15:38
> > > > To: LAZAROWICZ, Mark
> > > > Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Dear Mr Lazarowicz,
> > > > Thank you for your email. Apologies for the delay in response. I am glad to hear you have read so widely on this issue and, having done so, I would take from that that you have a significant background in the sciences which allows you to be, quote: “prepared to accept what appears to me to be overwhelming scientific consensus”. Such assurance fills me joy knowing our Parliamentary representatives know exactly what they’re doing while they preach about climate change and the need to tax cars due to CO2 emissions while they now propose taxing CYCLISTS for what? Dare I say gas emissions?
> > > > Sorry Mr Lazarowicz but our “government” are getting WAY out of hand. Climate change is nothing more than the globalists gaining taxes out of the population of each nation. You know it and I know it. I had asked for a considered response to all my points but you feel it suffices to say that you’ve read all the evidence and therefore YOU disagree? Democracy in its element I see. Similar to dear Mr. Kenneth Clarke and his evasion tactics when put to task.
> > > > Now, sticking to the science for now, rather than the politics which dictate other issues your response below brought to mind:
> > > > I would also mention to you Mr. Lazarowicz that Lord Lawson’s evidence MAY have been at variance with most of the other evidence received by the Joint Committee which you (your profession being a lawyer NOT a scientist) found more persuasive, yet there are at least another 30 THOUSAND scientists “at variance” with the IPCC. The IPCC being a group of scientists picked by governments and FUNDED by governments and other Corporate interests.
> > > > Let me bring your attention to another issue which, I believe, you having been so widely read on the subject of Climate Change and understand the science (I would have to assume from what you say) will be able to explain quite easily:
> > > > “The Carboniferous Period and the Ordovician Period were the only geological periods during the Paleozoic Era when global temperatures were as low as they are today. To the consternation of global warming proponents, the Late Ordovician Period was also an Ice Age while at the same time CO2 concentrations then were nearly 12 times higher than today– 4400 ppm. According to greenhouse theory, Earth should have been exceedingly hot. Instead, global temperatures were no warmer than today. Clearly, other factors besides atmospheric carbon influence earth temperatures and global warming.”
> > > >
> > > > I do look forward to your explanation of this because it has me somewhat confused to be honest. It seems to me to present some fundamental contradiction.
> > > > You may also wish to comment on the following:The United Nations IPCC also publishes a research review in the form of a voluminous, occasionally-updated report on the subject of climate change, which the United Nations asserts is “authored” by approximately 600 scientists. These “authors” are not, however – as is ordinarily the custom in science – permitted power of approval the published review of which they are putative authors. They are permitted to comment on the draft text, but the final text neither conforms to nor includes many of their comments. The final text conforms instead to the United Nations objective of building support for world taxation and rationing of industrially-useful energy.
> > > > There are over 30,000 scientists (over 9000 PhDs) who have petitioned against Climate Change, have constantly requested debate and have been ignored. Very much like the way our government ignore the population of this country. Posed with significant, far reaching questions and supporting evidence, the government simply shrugs its shoulders and evades. By doing so Mr Lazarowicz, Fabian or not, you build up serious issues for your party, the government and this country.The 30,000 scientists have had peer reviewed papers written to support their conclusions. Yet, again, the hand picked IPCC “authors” are preferred.
> > > > Perhaps ANOTHER bunch of scientists may convince you of the error of your ways as politicians (but I won’t hold my breath):
> > > > Friday, Feb 27th, 2009
> > > >
> > > > A major scientific report by leading Japanese academics concludes that global warming is not man-made and that the overall warming trend from the mid-part of the 20th Century onwards has now stopped.
> > > >
> > > > Unsurprisingly the report, which was released last month, has been completely ignored by the Western corporate media.
> > > >
> > > > The report was undertaken by Japan Society of Energy and Resources (JSER), the academic society representing scientists from the energy and resource fields.
> > > >
> > > > The JSER acts as a government advisory panel, much like the International Panel on Climate Change did for the UN.
> > > >
> > > > The JSER’s findings provide a stark contrast to the IPCC’s, however, with only one out of five top researchers agreeing with the claim that recent warming has been accelerated by man-made carbon emissions.
> > > >
> > > > The government commissioned report criticizes computer climate modeling and also says that the US ground temperature data set, used to back up the man-made warming claims, is too myopic.
> > > >
> > > > In the last month, no major Western media outlet has covered the report, which prompted British based sci-tech website The Register to commission a translation of the do$%^&ent.
> > > >
> > > > Section one highlights the fact that Global Warming has ceased, noting that since 2001, the increase in global temperatures has halted, despite a continuing increase in CO2 emissions.
> > > >
> > > > The report then states that the recent warming the planet has experienced is primarily a recovery from the so called “Little Ice Age” that occurred from around 1400 through to 1800, and is part of a natural cycle.
> > > >
> > > > The researchers also conclude that global warming and the halting of the temperature rise are related to solar activity, a notion previously dismissed by the IPCC.
> > > >
> > > > “The hypothesis that the majority of global warming can be ascribed to the Greenhouse Effect is mistaken.” the report’s introduction states.
> > > >
> > > > Kanya Kusano, Program Director and Group Leader for the Earth Simulator at the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science & Technology (JAMSTEC) reiterates this point:
> > > >
> > > > “[The IPCC’s] conclusion that from now on atmospheric temperatures are likely to show a continuous, monotonic increase, should be perceived as an unprovable hypothesis,”
> > > >
> > > > Shunichi Akasofu, head of the International Arctic Research Center in Alaska, cites historical data to challenge the claim that very recent temperatures represent an anomaly:
> > > >
> > > > “We should be cautious, IPCC’s theory that atmospheric temperature has risen since 2000 in correspondence with CO2 is nothing but a hypothesis. ”
> > > >
> > > > “Before anyone noticed, this hypothesis has been substituted for truth. The opinion that great disaster will really happen must be broken.” Akasofu concludes.
> > > >
> > > > The conclusions within the report dovetail with those of hundreds of Western scientists, who have been derided and even compared with holocaust deniers for challenging the so called “consensus” on global warming.
> > > >
> > > > The total lack of exposure that this major report has received is another example of how skewed coverage of climate change is toward one set of hypotheses.
> > > >
> > > > This serves the agenda to deliberately whip up mass hysteria on behalf of governments who are all too eager to introduce draconian taxation and control measures that won’t do anything to combat any form of warming, whether you believe it to be natural or man-made.

Subject: RE: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.> Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 21:22:48 +0100
> > > > > From:
> > > > > To: Earthling
> > > > >
> > > > > Dear Earthling
> > > > >
> > > > > Thankyou for copying me your email. I can assure you that I have read widely on this issue. Having done so, I am prepared to accept what appears to me to be the overwhelming scientific consensus as reflected in the IPCC. I also believe that countries like China will in due course accept binding caps on emissions, although clearly there will be a lot of negotiation and lobbying to be done before we get to that position.
> > > > >
> > > > > I would also mention that Lord Lawson’s evidence was at variance with most of the other evidence received by the Joint Committee, which I found more persuasive. I am afraid, therefore, that we will have to disagree on this issue; but I appreciate you taking the time to let me have your detailed views on this issue.
> > > > >
> > > > > Yours sincerely
> > > > >
> > > > > Mark Lazarowicz
> > > > >
> > > > > —–Original Message—–
> > > > > From: Earthling
> > > > > To: “” <>; “LAZAROWICZ, Mark” <>
> > > > > Sent: 01/09/09 19:08
> > > > > Subject: Radio 4 Propaganda you seem to support.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Dear Mr. Hulme.
> > > > > The Radio 4 propaganda piece (9pm Thursday 27th August) regarding Climate Change was exceptionally staged. Richard Black did a wonderful job of making sure the populace did not even question the basic science, while people such as yourself and Jonathan Porrit (the Population Reduction Bilderberger) supported the piece 100%.
> > > > > Let me then ask you: Prove the basic science.
> > > > > And while you chew on that idea, please have a read of the following:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Excerpts:
> > > > > Joint Committee on the Draft Climate Change Bill – Minutes of Evidence
> > > > > Oral evidence. Taken before the Joint Committee on the Draft Climate Change Bill on Wednesday 16 May 2007
> > > > > Lord Lawson of Blaby: “Well, thank you very much, my Lord Chairman, it is very good of you to have invited me to help you with this impossible task with which you have been entrusted. Perhaps it might help if I say a few words because it is a very, very complex issue and impossible to do justice to in a few words; but nevertheless, to put the thing in perspective, if you read the latest IPPC report, that is the Summary for Policymakers which they produced in their Fourth Assessment Report, you see that they are suggesting for the next 100 years (on the basis of what they believe to be the best science they can get, although the scientists are divided) that there will probably be an increase in global mean temperature of between 1.8 and four degrees centigrade.
> > > > >
> > > > > So, straight off the cuff: The scientists are divided even on what the IPCC describe as “the best science they can get” which clearly is stating it’s the best they can do but is entirely unproven. Yet, our government and the media propaganda is in over-drive hyping the Climate Change “monster” while it’s all about Carbon Credits, Economics and Trade.”
> > > > >
> > > > > “We then get the Government’s quaint proposal in this draft Bill which, even if you thought this was a path on which it was worth embarking, is dangerous in two ways. First of all, it seems (but it is not clear) to put the emphasis on carbon trading. Carbon trading is a very poor second best method even if you did want to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 60 per cent by 2050. Even if you did want to do that, it is a very second best way of doing it, for two reasons. One is that it is not really a market system at all because it is essentially a system of rationing and it is not a true market system so you do not get the efficiencies of the market. The other way it is a second best is that of course, as the Financial Times interestingly pointed out in a couple of articles about ten days ago, the carbon trading systems as we know them are a huge scam for the most part and they are bound to be a scam.”
> > > > > “However, we alone say we are going to go to a 60 per cent reduction by 2050 and will make it legally binding regardless of what happens. The idea is that we will give a lead and then everybody else will follow. The Chinese have made it quite clear that they not going to follow and our lead will be the equivalent of the lead of the Earl of Cardigan in the Charge of the Light Brigade.”
> > > > >
> > > > > Therefore, even IF Climate Change were real, do we have borders which rise from ground level to above the stratosphere and into space? If not then there is no logical argument for the UK implementing a Climate Change bill when others, such as China won’t. It’s plainly ridiculous even forgetting the sheer numbers of Chinese as opposed to the UK population!Perhaps we should ask Jonathan Porrit regarding his ideas to reduce the UK population to 30 million shall we?
> > > > > Perhaps we can gain carbon credits by closing our doors to further immigration, telling the Chinese that, where they suggest they would have had another 450 million chinese if not for the one child per family rule, the UK was going to allow another 20 million immigrants within the next 5 years who would then have, we estimate 2.2 children per family over the next 10 years…….
> > > > > Are you beginning to appreciate the garbage which surrounds this entire subject?
> > > > >
> > > > > Q38 Mr Chaytor: Lord Lawson, are you accepting that human beings can live with a temperature rise of possibly four degrees and, if so, why would it be necessary to impose a carbon tax? [Note: In the document it makes perfectly clear that ANY rise in temp is ENTIRELY unproven AND, in fact, unfounded and they are ASSUMING IF during this part of the discussion]
> > > > >
> > > > > Lord Lawson of Blaby: I do not believe it is necessary to impose a carbon tax.
> > > > >
> > > > > Q39 Mr Chaytor: But you said that the imposition of a carbon tax was the only way to deal with the consequences of climate change?
> > > > >
> > > > > Lord Lawson of Blaby: No I did not. I said the imposition of a carbon tax is the only sensible way if you want to cut back carbon dioxide emissions. If that is what you want to do, then the only sensible way is to put on a carbon tax.
> > > > >
> > > > > Q40 Mr Chaytor: But if your argument is there is no need to cut back on carbon dioxide emissions because human beings are sufficiently adaptable to cope with a temperature rise of up to four degrees, then there is no argument whatsoever for a carbon tax.
> > > > >
> > > > > Lord Lawson of Blaby: NO, THERE IS NO ARGUMENT FOR A CARBON TAX EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE GOT TO HAVE TAXATION [My emphasis] and, bluntly, chancellors of the exchequer have to finance public expenditure and up to a certain point, if a carbon tax is more acceptable to the public than some other forms of taxation, then it is perfectly reasonable for there to be a carbon tax, but in my judgment there is no necessity to put on a carbon tax.
> > > > >
> > > > > Lord Lawson of Blaby: …….. It is also worth pointing out, talking about these reports, that there are great benefits from warming. Indeed, the IPPC reports themselves say that with a temperature rise of up to three degrees centigrade globally agriculture will be improved, there will be no disadvantage, it will be an advantage, and in fact the picture is much more disparate than that because there are some advantages and some disadvantages, and if you adopt the approach that I am advocating you pocket all the advantages and then you mitigate the disadvantages.
> > > > > “Incidentally over this century as a whole, the 21st century so far, there has been virtually no further global warming. It does not feel like that here because we are very conscious that there has been some slight further warming in the northern hemisphere and a continuation of the trend of the last quarter of the 20th century, but in the southern hemisphere there has been a slight cooling over the first few years of this century, which none of the models have predicted and none of the models can explain. Nobody knows why that is so, but it means that the average of the northern and southern hemisphere is for this century so far little change, so it is a hugely uncertain area.”
> > > > >
> > > > > You will note I have copied Mark Lazarowicz on this email since:
> > > > > 1. He is my local MP in Edinburgh2. He was directly involved in this Bill and this evidence.
> > > > > I would, therefore, also wish to ask Mark for an explanation and ask you both to provide the incontrovertible evidence that Climate Change is a real phenomenon.
> > > > > By asking you both to do this, it is simply not sufficient to point at the IPCC studies and conclusions and ignore, as Richard Black did in the Radio 4 piece, that there is a vast body of scientists who entirely disagree with such results and who have also pointed to manipulated data.
> > > > >
> > > > > I look forward to a considered response.
> > > > >
> > > > > Regards,
> > > > > Earthling
> > > > >
> > > > > PS: Perhaps we should have been seeing an average temperature in the uk of about 30 degrees C by now if this article from 1922 had been a harbinger of global warming. The IPPC, I’m sure, would have had a field day and Al Gore would have been in his element! 
> > > > > PPS: Alternatively, by now, according to the thinking in 1975, we should have been killing Polar Bears for their skins rather than trying to protect them? What do YOU think?
> > > > > The ONLY reason we have “Global Warming” (or since they’ve been unable to show the reality of warming, “Climate Change”) is because there are massively influential Corporate and Global Banking interests steering this and other countries governments. Ours, as others, have sold out. Corrupt and criminal.
> > > > > Tony Blair – Multi millionaire having been paid well for his services to the Bankers and given the position at J.P. Morgan Chase. Peter Mandelson – How’s his friendship going with Jacob Rothschild? Ken Clarke – When’s he going to own up about his support of Blair’s policies and their dual support for the Bilderberg crew?
> > > > > Work it all out. It isn’t difficult.________________________________
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Diego Garcia: How it works

HC Deb 21 June 2004 vol 422 cc1221-2W1221W

§Jeremy CorbynTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations have been received from the US concerning the depopulation of the civilian population of Diego Garcia and the Chagos Islands that lie within the British Indian Ocean Territories. [179700]

§Mr. RammellThe US authorities have in the past made clear their concerns about the presence of a settled civilian population in the British Indian Ocean Territory. However, I have received no recent representations from them on the subject.

§Sir Menzies CampbellTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what facilities exist on Diego Garcia for holding human beings against their will; and if he will make a statement. [178580]

§Mr. StrawIn exercise of powers conferred on him by the Prisons Ordinance 1981 of the British Indian Ocean Territory, the Commissioner for the Territory has declared certain specified premises in Diego Garcia to be a prison. This was done by orders made in February 1986 (which replaced an earlier order made in July 1982), July 1993 and December 2001. Under various provisions of the law of the Territory, persons may be arrested in execution of a warrant of arrest issued by a Court or a Magistrate, or in certain circumstances without such a warrant, and any person so arrested may then be detained in such a prison until he is brought before a Court or a Magistrate. Persons who are ordered by a Court or a Magistrate to be remanded in custody or committed to prison are detained in such a prison as also, of course, are persons who are sentenced by a Court to imprisonment following their conviction of a criminal offence.

§Sir Menzies CampbellTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many detainees, and how many shipments of detainees, have passed through Diego Garcia, or the territorial waters off it, while in transit between other destinations; whether any detainees have been disembarked at Diego Garcia, and for how long; and if he will make a statement. [178581]

§Mr. StrawThe United States authorities have repeatedly assured us that no detainees have at any time passed in transit through Diego Garcia or its territorial waters or have disembarked there and that the allegations to that effect are totally without foundation. The Government are satisfied that their assurances are correct.

HC Deb 24 September 2002 vol 390 cc26-156

Mr. DalyellThe right hon. Gentleman has used the words “overwhelming force” three times already. Does “overwhelming force” include the use of B61–11s? Those are the earth-penetrating nuclear weapons which, we are told, are based in the British Indian ocean territory of Diego Garcia. If there is to be overwhelming force, and if it is to involve nuclear weapons, with the B2 bombers that are based in the hangars at Diego Garcia, ought not the House of Commons to be told about it?

§Mr. AncramThe force that will be required is that which is appropriate and most effective in achieving the objective. I am certainly not going to speculate at this stage on what that force will be. Indeed, at this particular stage we need to make it clear that the United Nations resolution is the first objective to be fulfilled: only if Saddam breaches that will we consider the second option.




HC Deb 15 October 2002 vol 390 cc528-9W

Jeremy Corbyn 

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what applications he has received from the USA to construct new aircraft hangars on Diego Garcia; and if he will make a statement. [74654]


§Mr. Mike O’BrienThe issue of possible upgrades to facilities at Diego Garcia has been discussed at annual talks between the UK and US governments. The details of these governmental talks are confidential and exempt under section la of The Code of practice on Access to Government Information, “Information whose disclosure would harm national security or defence”.



HC Deb 07 July 2004 vol 423 cc271-96WH271WH§2 pm

§Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North (Lab)I welcome the opportunity to debate what I consider to be a very serious issue. It touches on honesty in politics and in government, and it touches on issues of constitution and law and the way in which a group of people have been grievously treated by this country and, to some extent, the United States for more than 40 years.

The people who lived for hundreds of years on the Chagos Islands were descendents of its first inhabitants who had been dropped off there as slaves and traders or had settled there. They lived a settled existence, fishing and producing copra, and they inhabited an idyllic and pristine environment. Their problem was their location—the Indian ocean. The United States was eyeing it up in the 1950s and 1960s as a potential base, and subsequently decided to build what they euphemistically called a “communications facility” on the island of Diego Garcia. The communications facility turned out to be two of the longest runways that the world had seen and a base from which 4,000 US troops could operate. The base is now routinely used for the bombing of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the United States ‘considers it to be a crucial communications facility.

Prime Minister Wilson and President Johnson discussed the matter in the 1960s and decided to do a deal and evacuate the population of Diego Garcia to make way for the American communications facility. The Americans insisted on the evacuation of not only Diego Garcia, but the entire archipelago, despite the fact that its other islands were some distance from the putative communications facility.

The language used by the then Colonial Office was outrageous beyond belief. Simon Winchester wrote a wonderful piece on the subject in Granta magazine in which he quoted the then permanent secretary in the Colonial Office who described the population inhabiting the islands as a group of “Man Fridays” and stated that it would be simple and easy enough to move them out of the way. The deal subsequently went through and, to make ready for the American base, the British authorities proceeded to remove people from the islands. However, it was never done openly.

Only two days ago outside the Foreign Office, I met a man who was part of a demonstration there. He told me that he had left the islands in 1966 and that he was not allowed to go back, as many others were not. When they went to Mauritius or the Seychelles—mainly Mauritius—for medical treatment or education, they suddenly found that they could not go back.

When the time came for the British to remove the population in earnest, they did so —putting them on a ship, taking them to Port Louis in Mauritius and simply dumping them on the quayside. When my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) speaks, I am sure that he will describe the conditions that he saw when he went to Mauritius at the time. The people were dumped there in terrible destitution. To ensure that nothing was left on the islands, the British commissioner had the problem of what to do with the islanders’ domestic animals and pets. The dogs were rounded up 272WHand gassed, all the animals were killed and the islands were left empty and uninhabited to make way for the American base.

The poor islanders were forced to eke out an existence in terrible poverty in Mauritius and the Seychelles. Ignored by everybody, they managed to survive and they never gave up two things: first, the hope, determination and desperation for the right of return; and secondly, the hope that one day, somebody, somewhere would recognise the fundamental injustice of their treatment.

Time has moved on and it is 48 years since the original and disgraceful deal was done between Wilson and Johnson, but the injustice has not gone away. I visited Mauritius a couple of years ago to meet the Chagos islanders and to see the conditions in which they live. They are very poor indeed. We have to remember, and we should remember, that the compensation that they finally won, some 15 years after the original removal from the islands had begun, was mainly eaten up by debt collectors and land agents. No one was given sufficient compensation and no one was made rich or wealthy by the process. This has been the subject of a court case that is still going on, so I cannot comment on anything more than the original facts of the case. However, it seems that the islanders were cajoled into signing what they did not believe to be a full and final settlement, and were told to accept it as such. The injustice and the poverty go on.

When I was in Mauritius, I spent a week visiting as many Chagossian families as I could. I talked to them about their lives on the Chagos Islands, when they lived there, and their lives now. They described their sustainable form of living, the type of community, religion and schools that they had and their lives in general. It was fascinating to talk to them, but one could see the hurt in their eyes at the way that they were taken from the islands and dumped on the quayside at Port Louis. Many of those families still live in desperate poverty in metal huts with outside toilets and little furniture. Although the current Mauritius Government have been kinder to them than previous ones, they are still very poor people.

Those people, however, were always going to campaign for their hope of a right of return; they would never give up. Eventually, a case was lodged in the British legal system and, in a court order of 2000, they were granted the right to return under British immigration law. It was ruled that they had the right of return. The following year, a further step forward was taken when theBritish Overseas Territories Bill was introduced in Parliament. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow and I raised the question of the eligibility of the Chagos islanders for British citizenship, on the basis that they would be entitled to British citizenship like everyone else in overseas territories had they not been removed from the British Indian Ocean Territory. To their credit, the Government accepted the thrust of our argument, and a Government amendment was tabled and accepted in Committee. Therefore, the islanders were given the right to British citizenship. There is, unfortunately, a grey area in which I hope ministerial discretion will be used to deal with the small number of those who have fallen outside the provisions of that law.

273WHThings looked quite good in 2000 and 2001, and a compensation claim was lodged to re-open the issue. In meetings we had at the Foreign Office with the Minister’s predecessor, Baroness Amos, on the right of return and the possibility of a visit, we thought that things were going very well. Indeed, in the Commons, Ministers have asserted two things. One is that there is a right to return, and the second is that there was no impediment to anyone going back at any time. Things were looking good, and we had hope, as did the islanders.

On 10 June this year, which everyone will remember as election day, staff at the Foreign Office were not out ensuring that people were voting. Instead, they were at the palace asking the Queen to sign an Order in Council. When I was told that an Order in Council had been signed, I misheard or misunderstood. I thought that it was a statutory instrument that I would be able to pray against, as I assumed other hon. Members would, so that decisions made by Ministers would be subject to some form of democratic accountability. I had to reconsider, and I spoke to Sheridans’ Richard Gifford, the excellent solicitor who has represented the Chagossians for many years. He calmly explained to me that I had misunderstood, and that an Order in Council signed by her Majesty was law. It overrides everything in which we believe about the democratic accountability of the Government.

There are two orders: one is the British Indian Ocean Territory (Constitution) Order and the second is the British Indian Ocean Territory (Immigration) Order. I shall just quote a little of one, to give the Chamber a flavour of it: Subject to the provisions of this Order, the Commissionerappointed under the constitution order— may make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Territory”. The order then goes on to declare, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)”, that the commissioner in effect becomes the supreme Governor of everything in the territory. The order says: All laws made by the Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) shall be published in the Gazette in such manner as the Commissioner may direct. Every law made by the Commissioner under subsection (1) shall come into force on the date on which it is published”. We have handed power over to a commissioner. Never mind the fact that there were islanders living there and that several thousand people until that point had every right to live there; apparently, they now have no rights whatever. So much for the constitution order.

The immigration order was the second one passed, and I shall quote just two of its sections. Article 7 says: An immigration officer, acting in his entire discretion, may issue or renew a permit or may cancel a permit before the expiration, subject to the right of appeal provided in section 10. That is for people who wish to visit the Chagos Islands. Article 10 says: A person aggrieved by any decision of an immigration officer may appeal to the Commissioner, whose decision shall be final and conclusive. 274WHSo the only person to whom one can appeal if one does not agree with a decision to prevent Chagos islanders going to their own islands is a commissioner appointed specifically to control the Chagos Islands in every way for evermore.

The Minister made a written statement to the House on 10 June, although frankly it should have been an oral statement and made at a time when he could have been cross-questioned about it. At least, however, we are debating the subject here in Westminster Hall today. His statement said: Following the departure of the Chagossians in the late 60s and early 70s, the economic conditions and infrastructure that had supported the community of plantation workers ceased to exist. While the judicial review proceedings were still pending, the Government therefore commissioned a feasibility study by independent experts to examine and report on the prospects for re-establishing a viable community”.—[Official Report, 10 June 2004; Vol. 422, c. 33WS.] I have some comments to make on that. The Chagossians did not depart from the islands in the 1960s and 1970s; they were rounded up, taken away and thrown off the islands. Let us not beat about the bush: that was a disgraceful, immoral act. It is time that a Minister stood up and apologised for that act committed by the Government of the time and for the treatment of the Chagos islanders by succeeding Governments.

I was kindly given the three volumes of the feasibility study by the Foreign Office when it came out in November 2000, and it said that there were problems with water supply, periodic flooding, storms, seismic activity and so on, as the Minister points out. However, it did not say that no one could live there or that life was impossible on the islands. When pressed on the matter, the Foreign Office retreats into arguments about the potential cost of resettling the Chagos islanders. I have two points on that. First, they have a moral right to return. Secondly, would any Minister stand up in the House and say that the cost of keeping the population on Pitcairn, St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha or the Falkland Islands was such that we were going to withdraw the entire population? They would not dare.

§Mr. Kelvin Hopkins (Luton, North) (Lab)My hon. Friend mentioned the Falkland Islands. Has he made any comparisons between the costs that he is talking about and the amount of money spent on defending the Falkland islanders when the Argentines invaded?

§Jeremy CorbynIndeed, the costs are on two completely different scales. The costs involved in administering the Chagos Islands are very small. At the current time, all the income from fishing licences—about £50,000 a year—is taken up by administration, and other money is paid to continue that administration. Were the islands to be resettled, however, and were there to be serious discussions with the islanders about resettling them, there would be an economy on the islands. There is fishing there, and the possibility of ecotourism or copra. Quite a lot of activities could take place on the islands. However, I do not get the feeling that there is any wish, desire, hope or intention of going down that road. The whole desire is to put the issue to one side and forget about it. That is because of an American base on Diego Garcia, for 275WHwhich I suspect nothing is paid, and because the Americans have said that they do not want anyone anywhere near their base owing to security concerns.

I think that we have every right to ensure the settlement of the outer islands—at least—and that we have a right to know exactly what is happening on Diego Garcia, which is, under the terms of the colonial order, sovereign British territory. Are there any prisoners on Diego Garcia? Is it being used for the sort of vortex of American justice such as occurs in Guantanamo Bay? I am assured that it is not. I want to hear that assurance again today and it would be much better if there were an independent inspection of what is going on.

I will make only a couple more points because I want to make sure that other Members get a chance to speak. On Tuesday, a group of Chagos islanders went to the Foreign Office to demonstrate. They handed in a petition signed by a substantial number of Chagos islanders who are living in this country legally. The petition demands:  

  1. “1. Restoration of our right of abode in the outer islands of the territory.
  2. 2. Restoration of our fundamental rights as British Overseas Territories Citizens.
  3. 3. The immediate payment of compensation.
  4. 4. The setting up of a pilot resettlement in the outer islands.
  5. 5. The setting up of a social survey in Mauritius and the Seychelles with recommendations to support the vulnerable group of our community.
  6. 6. The organising of a visit to the ancestral sites in the British Indian Ocean Territory for the Chagossians living in Mauritius, Seychelles and the UK”

—and, presumably, anywhere else in the world. It seems to me that that is a minimal demand. I had a response from the Minister today and I hope that he will be able to give us further positive news on the possibility of a visit and a return to it.

Mr. HopkinsIt strikes me that there is something of a parallel between what has happened to the Chagos islanders and the highland clearances in Scotland, when the rich and powerful drove the poor and weak from the land. That has scarred and informed Scottish politics ever since. Is it not significant that two of the three speakers here today are Scots?

§Mr. SalmondI am glad that the hon. Gentleman raised that point, because I was about to come to it. One of the first and better acts of the Scottish Parliament when it came back into existence on the mound was in a debate such as this when it apologised collectively for the historic injustice of the highland clearances. They were not the responsibility of any Scottish Parliament, but it was felt none the less by all parties in that Parliament that such an apology should be offered, and that was done by representatives of all the parties. I very much hope that the Minister will do exactly what the hon. Gentleman suggested and proffer some sort of apology to the few thousand Chagos islanders who deserve not just an apology but some sign that future action and policy will be different from that in the past.

The islanders won the High Court judgment in 2000, which was in the days of ethical foreign policy. I shared the hopes that were expressed earlier that at last something would be done to rectify the historical 278WHgrievance and injustice. I accepted, as I think did many islanders, that there was an American base of long standing on Diego Garcia and that it might not be possible for all the islands to be reinhabited. However, basic rights—such as the right to visit the graves of ancestors, to occupy the outer islands and to receive reasonable compensation, and the right of the duty of care that any Government and the Crown should have over these people—should have been respected as de minimis compensation for the wrongs and injustices of the past. In fact, none of that occurred, and instead the Government, in a sneaky, underhand way, passed two Orders in Council on European election day to prohibit debate, to remove what little rights had been won and to rectify loopholes in legislation that allowed the assertion of the human rights of the islanders and their descendants.

The analysis that the islands are no longer capable of sustaining occupation because of global warming must be pretty bad news for the American military base—perhaps the runway is about to disappear under water. I have an overwhelming feeling that if Mauritius could be persuaded to send just one gunboat to the outer islands to establish the Mauritian flag again in what is arguably its territory anyway, we would decide that the islands were worth reclaiming on behalf of the Crown and dispatch a taskforce to the Indian ocean.

Global warming is an interesting concept, because it conflicts rather dramatically with what is on the US navy website. In a welcoming introduction to “The Footprint of Freedom” and Camp Justice, Diego Garcia is described as a paradise on earth and it is said that one of the best stationings that any US serviceman can have is on Diego Garcia. The website states: Although it is a British Territory, there are fewer than 50 British personnel (or Brits as they are commonly known) on the island. The Minister had better explain how the Government claim to know better than many respectable outlets of the US press. The Washington Post, for example, claims that prisoners are held on Diego Garcia for “rendering” before being transferred to Camp X-Ray. How confident is the Foreign Office in the information that the US authorities have offered it on what is happening on Diego Garcia, given that the Prime Minister seems to be revising his previous confidence in judgments that he has made about the international situation? Ultimately, the Minister should accept the collective responsibility of this and previous Governments for what has been done to the islanders. An apology should be proffered, but above all there should be a change of approach and of policy by the Government, who should offer some justice and some compensation to the islanders.

It may be thought that because of indolence or lack of concern among most Members of Parliament—there are a few honourable exceptions, who are here today such an issue is of no great moment, but it is precisely such issues that are of great political moment, because no member of the public could hear and understand what has happened to the islanders without having an overwhelming sense of injustice. If the Government cannot rectify the wrongs of the past for these few thousand people, what hope is there for their having any moral compass on the great issues of the day? Unless the Government are prepared to act and rectify the wrongs of the past, they are, in a moral sense, every bit as homeless as the islanders of Diego Garcia.

Mr. Tam Dalyell(Linlithgow) (Lab)

Let none of us suppose that there is a complete lack of interest in this country on this issue. When the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) had the opportunity to put a question to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, I was in company in Scotland. However, I subsequently heard, not only in university circles but more widely, that it was an important question. Indeed, some people went so far as to observe that it was the most sensible question asked of the Prime Minister for some weeks.

My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) has inspired an important debate, but perhaps it comes 40 years too late. It was in 1964 that the Government began misdescribing the long-settled population as transitory workers in order to mislead the world into thinking that they had no obligations to that population. My clear recollection is that I raised the subject with the then Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker. Frankly, having been defeated at Smethwick and about to be defeated at Leyton, his mind was on other things. A later Foreign Secretary was George Brown. When the general problem of the British Indian Ocean Territory was raised with him, he told me, in colourful language, to mind my own business. Perhaps I was not as tough then as subsequently, but George Brown was a formidable operator in his heyday. I raised the subject on the prompting of the late Sir Ashley Miles, the biological secretary of the Royal Society. It was his concern about the Indian ocean that first raised my acute interest.

Article 73 of the United Nations casts a “sacred trust” on a sovereign power to promote the welfare and advancement of the people, but the Government surreptitiously deported the islanders and misled the world about their status. At the United Nations on 16 November 1965, the British representative Mr. F.D.W. Brown, acting on the instructions of the Foreign Office, misdescribed the islands as uninhabited when my government first acquired them”,misdescribed the population as labourers from Mauritius and Seychelles and misled the UN into stating that the new administrative arrangements had been freely worked out with the…elected representatives of the people concerned”. Instead, they bought the plantations, closed them down, forced the people to leave on boats, which incidentally were horribly overcrowded, and led them to exile, where they still remain. Their lives have been a tragedy of misery, poverty and despair, the only alleviation of which has been the heartfelt desire to return to their homeland, where their villages and ancestors lie.

In 1969, on my return from Australia, I stopped in Mauritius to stay the night with the former general secretary of the Labour party, Len Williams. Harold Wilson had wanted him out of Transport house and made him Governor-General of Mauritius. His wife Margaret Williams was a very intelligent and nice lady, and she decided that I should spend a morning with some Ilois people. It made a strong impression on me.

What is remarkable is that in the same speech by Mr. Brown representing the Foreign Office, he described the wishes of the Falkland islanders, whose 280WHrepresentatives were consulted. Here we return to a previous intervention and a proper comparison with the Falkland islanders, of whom Mr. Brown said: It has been suggested that this population is somehow irrelevant and that it has no claim to have its wishes taken into account …it would surely be fantastic to maintain that only indigenous inhabitants have any rights in the Country”. He then quoted Woodrow Wilson from 1918: Peoples and Provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were chattels or pawns in a game”. Within months, the Chagos Islands had been given to the United States and the destruction of the islanders’ homes and lives was soon to follow.

These days, we are all too familiar with conducting foreign policy on the basis of false or misleading facts. The historical record now revealed by the islanders’ legal struggle has after 30 years shown that a small and vulnerable population of British subjects can safely be written out of the history book on the pretext that they are not really a population at all. There is nothing new in deceiving the world while acting in breach of civilised standards of international and constitutional law. That point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North in his powerful speech.

When the islanders finally won their struggle to return in the High Court in November 2000, Lord Justice Laws stated: The people are to be governed, not removed. He also stated that the Immigration Ordinance 1971 was an “abject legal failure”, which had no colour of lawful authority. That is not my view but that of a distinguished Law Lord.

We are supposed to have an ethical foreign policy. The then Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook), accepted the Court’s judgment and said: I have decided to accept the Court’s ruling and the Government will not be appealing.The work we are doing on the feasibility of resettlement of Ilois now takes on a new importance. We started feasibility work a year ago and are now well under way with phase two of the study.Furthermore, we will put in place a new immigration ordinance which allows Ilois to return to the outer islands while observing our treaty obligations.The Government has not defended what was done or said 30 years ago. As Lord Justice Laws recognised, we made no attempt to conceal the gravity of what happened”. History is repeating itself with the same moral turpitude. This time, given that the islanders had already been promised that the Government’s policy was to move towards their resettlement on the islands, the new banishment is a cruel change to what has already been offered. Moreover, the reasons given are again based on inaccurate and misleading information.

The Foreign Office press statement claimed that it was the feasibility study that prevented resettlement. I am glad that this Minister is replying to the debate, and I thank him for his personal courtesy in seeing my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North and me in the Foreign Office. He cited a conclusion, supposedly made by the consultants in their executive summary, that the costs of maintaining long-term inhabitation are likely to 281WHbe prohibitive. However, that was not based on any work of the consultants, whose terms of reference precluded any consideration of cost. Even if he had read only the executive summary, he would know from page 3 that the consultants reported: This report has not been tasked with investigating the financial costs and benefits of resettlements”. I feel entitled to ask where the conclusion came from. It was certainly not from the consultants.

The Minister further stated that human interference within the Atolls…is likely to exacerbate the stress on the marine and terrestrial environment and will accelerate the effect of global warming. However, other things might accelerate global warming. Thus”, he continued,resettlement is likely to become less feasible over time”. Again, that judgment was not based on the work of the consultants, who stated in volume 3, paragraph 8.3: At the present time it is not possible to quantify the risk associated with climate change for the Chagos Islands. The Minister’s conclusion had crept in from somewhere else.

Finally, it is impossible to take seriously the suggestion that only a resettled population will face difficulties. Are we really to believe that the 64 islands offered back to the islanders by the then Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Livingston, are going to sink under the waves, while the one island occupied by the Americans is to provide defence facilities for generations to come? It is the biggest military base outside the continental United States.

Only yesterday, in the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Sedley referred to the shameful treatment to which the islanders were subjected: The deliberate misinterpretation of Ilois history and status, designed to deflect any investigation by the United Nations, the use of legal powers designed for the governance of the islands for the illicit purpose of depopulating them, the consequent uprooting of scores of families from the only way of life and means of subsistence that they knew, the failure to make anything like adequate provision for their resettlement, all of this and more is now part of the historical record. Moreover, he went so far as to compare those removals with the highland clearances of the second quarter of the 19th century. He stated:Defence may have replaced agricultural improvement as the reason, but the pauperisation and the expulsion of the weak in the interests of the powerful is the same. It gives little to be proud of. Now there has been a cruel new blow to this mistreated population. Their hopes, which were raised by this Government, have been dashed. Nothing in this game of cat and mouse is any less culpable than the lies and inhumanity that characterised the removal of the population.

It is not, however, too late to render justice. The right of the islanders to return to their homeland should now be recognised, and proper scientific studies should be undertaken, with proper, independent input from respected scientists whose conclusions ought to be binding on the Government.

HC Deb 24 September 2002 vol 390 cc26-156

Mr. Tam Dalyell(Linlithgow)I echo what the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said about the affront to democracy. I shall set an example by making a speech which is much shorter than 10 minutes. It is in the form of a question, and it is apposite that a Minister from the Ministry of Defence should be answering this debate.

My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) and I have been much involved in the case of the Chagos islanders. Their lawyers told us of a problem with the Ilois returning to Diego Garcia because of the building of six huge temperature-controlled hangars. We were asked what we would do to protest to the Government about that. We asked what the hangars were for. Apparently they are for B52 bombers and, particularly, B2 bombers that have to be repaired and maintained in a particular temperature. Why does one have B2 bombers? It is particularly to carry earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, specifically the B61–11.

My question, which I hope will be addressed in the reply, is this: we are talking about a British base, the British Indian Ocean Territory, of which Diego Garcia is a part and which is a House of Commons responsibility. The House of Commons should be told if nuclear weapons, albeit tactical, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons to destroy bunkers—one can understand why the American air force may wish to have this particular weapon in relation to Iraq—are to be launched from British soil, with or without agreement by the United States air force. We should be told in the winding-up speech tonight.

2.45 pm

§Mr. Francis Maude(Horsham)I have only a few points to make and I shall endeavour to be brief.

First, the issue is not about human rights in Iraq. The Foreign Secretary made great play of them and the dossier covers them. We need no persuading that Saddam Hussein’s regime is about the most evil in the world today. It has committed atrocities on a scale unseen almost anywhere else, but that does not justify armed intervention 52in Iraq. If I may say so, it is something of a red herring. The debate is about something wider, more important and of greater application to the world outside Iraq.

Secondly, there can be no controversy about the evidence that Saddam Hussein has developed, and is continuing to develop apace, weapons of mass destruction. The dossier, which puts forward the evidence in a calm and measured way, makes the case conclusively. Surely that can no longer be a matter of dispute.

Thirdly, does Saddam having and developing such weapons amount to a threat sufficient in immediacy and gravity to justify armed military intervention, even as a last resort? As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said in a powerful, lucid and cogent speech—I am afraid that I did not agree with much of it—the threat issue is a matter of judgment. Everyone has to make their judgment about the gravity and immediacy of that threat.

We must look at other countries that have developed weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and ask ourselves what it is that distinguishes Iraq from, for example, India, Pakistan or even Iran. The answer is that there is clear evidence from the history of the Saddam Hussein regime that it is fundamentally an aggressive regime. He has developed these weapons, not as an instrument of deterrence to deter attacks on Iraq, but as weapons of aggression. In the past 20 years, the regime has twice invaded its neighbours. On a number of occasions, it has launched ballistic missiles against neighbouring states. It is not a regime under external threat that has developed these weapons to create a mutual deterrence, as is the case with India and Pakistan—regrettably, perhaps, but one can understand the reason for them doing so. Those considerations do not apply to Iraq.

In my judgment, this threat is clear, serious and present enough to justify decisive intervention by the international community in whatever shape that takes to enforce a disarmament of the regime.

My fourth point is about the threat to the stability of the middle east and was raised by my right hon. and learned Friend and others. We should be very clear about this: the greatest threat to the stability of the middle east is Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. Quite apart from the actual attacks that he has mounted against his neighbours in the past 20 years, the fact that he consistently sponsors suicide attacks by Palestinians helps to prevent the peace process that we all yearn to be restarted from resuming. It is hard to see how the successful disarming and removal of Saddam Hussein can do anything other than contribute to the stability of the middle east.

Of course, the same concerns were expressed before the Gulf war, 12 years ago, but in fact the successful conclusion of the Gulf war was the trigger for the start of the Oslo process—

HL Deb 24 February 2004 vol 658 cc121-30

My Lords, first, I thank both noble Lords for the welcome that they have given the Statement. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, that we particularly welcome the context in which he started his comments. However, I think it is only fair to say that none of us envisaged the possibility of two armed aeroplanes being flown into buildings in the way that occurred on 11 September. That was a dramatic shock to the international community……

In relation to the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, about whether there are people being kept at Diego Garcia and elsewhere, the US has confirmed to us that there are no such detainees. Of course, we rely on that assurance.

Scotland’s “Crown”: Solid proof the Queen runs the show!

Posted in Political History, Politics by earthling on March 8, 2014
HC Deb 10 February 1998 vol 306 cc185-201185

§Mr. Dennis Canavan (Falkirk, West)I beg to move amendment No. 44, in page 18, line 11, leave out from `be’ to end of line 13 and insert `elected by the members of the Parliament’.

§The Chairman of Ways and Means (Sir Alan Haselhurst)With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 254, in page 18, leave out lines 19 to 27.

No. 313, in clause 43, page 18, line 36, leave out ‘or’.

No. 275, in page 18, line 38, at end insert ‘or— 

  1. (e) the First Minister being admitted to a hospital under the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, becoming subject to a guardianship order or having a curator bonis appointed on his estate’.

No. 76, in clause 44, page 19, line 9, leave out `with the approval of Her Majesty’. No. 276, in page 19, line 10, after ‘appoint’, insert `up to a total of ten’. No. 277, in page 19, leave out lines 11 and 12.

No. 87, in page 19, line 11, leave out `seek Her Majesty’s approval for’ and insert ‘make’.

No. 88, in page 19, leave out line 14.

No. 89, in clause 46, page 19, line 32, leave out `with the approval of Her Majesty’. No. 75, in page 19, line 35, at end insert— ‘(2A) The First Minister shall not make any appointment under this section without the agreement of the Parliament.’. 186No. 90, in page 19, leave out line 37.

§Mr. CanavanI shall speak to amendment No. 44 and the other amendments in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East (Mr. McAllion). Amendments Nos. 44, 76 and 75 are substantive and the others are consequential.

Amendment No. 44 proposes that the First Minister should be elected by Members of the Scottish Parliament rather than being appointed by the Queen and holding office at Her Majesty’s pleasure. As the First Minister will be primus in paribus, or first among equals, it is more appropriate that he or she is elected by his or her parliamentary colleagues than appointed by the Crown.

In the early stages of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, members of the convention signed a document referring to the sovereignty of the people of Scotland. It seems to me that the concepts of the sovereignty of the people of Scotland and of the sovereignty of a monarch are mutually exclusive. (Yes, indeed they are!) The amendments propose that, if the First Minister is not directly elected by the people of Scotland, he or she should be elected by the people’s representatives in the Scottish Parliament.

I dare say that Opposition Members, and perhaps the Minister, will argue that the role of the monarchy is a mere formality in respect of the governance of the country or the countries that used to be part of the British empire. However, not all that long ago a Labour Prime Minister was ousted from his job in Australia because of the interference of the Governor-General, the Queen’s representative. (And I have previously written about Gough Whitlam, the Australian PM and how all of it came about via the Queen’s mafia. Glad to see confirmation of it once more in parliament)

In 1974, there were two general elections, and the first resulted in a hung parliament. No party had an overall majority in Parliament, and Harold Wilson was the leader of the party with the largest number of Members. However, the Queen did not call Harold Wilson to the palace. In fact, she called the defeated Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath), to the palace and asked him to cobble up some kind of coalition agreement with Jeremy Thorpe, the then leader of the Liberal party. There was a long hiatus in which, in effect, there was no Government. Harold Wilson, who was the leader of the biggest party, had to wait in the wings until he was called to the palace to form a Government.

§Mr. WallaceI am following the hon. Gentleman’s argument and I am sure that he would not want there to be any inaccuracy. He will also agree that Jeremy Thorpe and his Liberal colleagues showed good sense by not supporting Edward Heath. Is not the point that Edward Heath had the advantage of incumbency—

§The ChairmanOrder. I remind the hon. and learned Gentleman that he is referring to a right hon. Member. (and paedophile)

§Mr. WallaceI apologise, Sir Alan. I was speaking from a sense of history, as I was just a boy at the time. It was actually my first vote.

The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath) was the incumbent Prime Minister at the time, so it was not a matter of the Queen sending for him. He had to tender his resignation. I am sure that even the 187hon. Member for Falkirk, West (Mr. Canavan) would have thought it an abuse if the sovereign had summoned the Prime Minister and demanded his resignation.

§Mr. CanavanThat is exactly what the Queen should have done after the February 1974 general election. Whatever the will of the British people, as expressed at the ballot box, it was quite clear that they no longer wanted the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to be their Prime Minister. The Queen should have summoned him to the palace and sacked him and then called Harold Wilson, but for reasons best known to herself, she did not do that. Sometimes I wonder about the so-called neutral role of the monarchy in respect of politics. (Do you really or are you just gently making the point?)

§Ms Roseanna CunninghamThe hon. Gentleman will know that I am very much in favour of reducing the work load of the monarch—preferably to zero. I was interested to hear the intervention of the hon. and learned Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Wallace). I do not know whether he knows what happened in Australia, but in contradiction to his point about 1974—which may be true, but I do not know as I was not here at the time—when the Australian Labour Government were sacked and a general election was called, the Liberals, or the Tories, were appointed in the interim and therefore were in government throughout the election. That is an interesting point as it illustrates the other side of the coin from that referred to by the hon. and learned Gentleman. I agree with the hon. Member for Falkirk, West (Mr. Canavan) about the monarch’s neutrality, which remains to be proved. (How is it, if we live in a true, free, open democratic country, that even our MPs and Lords question and do not know the exact position of our constitutional monarchy who, we are told, has no power?)

§Mr. CanavanI am grateful to the hon. Lady for that intervention as it shows the inconsistency of the monarchy or its representatives when they take a role in the running of Governments or Parliaments.

We have to bear in mind too that, if the political pundits are correct, there will be a much greater probability of a hung Parliament in the Scottish Parliament because of the system of proportional representation. The amendments would minimise—in fact remove—the possibility of any interference by the monarchy as to who should be the First Minister and form the Government.

My amendments Nos. 76 and 75 propose that Parliament’s agreement should be required in appointing not only the First Minister but other Ministers and that there should be no role for the monarchy in appointing other Ministers or junior Ministers.

Another anomaly in the Bill is that, under clause 46, the First Minister would require Parliament’s agreement before seeking the Crown’s approval of the appointment of a Minister, whereas the First Minister could appoint junior Ministers without seeking Parliament’s approval. I think that that would be a bad thing and that all ministerial appointments should be subject to Parliament’s approval. A Scottish Parliament should not simply ape the patronage system of this place, where the power of patronage is widely open to abuse. As I had started to say, the Crown is the very pinnacle of the patronage system, although in practice the Prime Minister exercises many of those powers.

We have witnessed many examples—and are perhaps witnessing current examples—of appointments that are made without any reference to Parliament or much democratic accountability. We must remember that the 188First Minister of Scotland will have tremendous patronage powers, because, presumably, he or she will inherit all the patronage powers currently held by the Secretary of State for Scotland, who is responsible for hundreds of public appointments across Scotland. We are talking not about the appointment of a mere coterie of Scottish Cabinet members and junior Ministers but about patronage over hundreds of public positions across Scotland. (So what this is saying is that, once Alex is in, he has total control of who he appoints to ensure he has all his buddies surrounding him to fully support his exploitation of Scotland and become a very very rich little fat bastard. With the Queen’s acceptance that is)

We should make the First Minister and the First Minister’s ministerial colleagues as accountable as possible to the people of Scotland through elected representatives.

§Mr. SalmondI am very sympathetic to many of the points that the hon. Gentleman is making. However, it seems that clause 43 is something of an advance on the current situation at Westminster, where someone is to be called to the palace—presumably the head of the leading party in the general election. The clause states that the Scottish Parliament will nominate one of its members for appointment as First Minister. That seems to go part of the way towards achieving the more satisfactory situation that the hon. Gentleman outlined, and away from the process of mystification that we could have in this place if there were a hung Parliament.

§Mr. CanavanI agree that the Bill proposes a ministerial appointment system that is better than our current system at Westminster, where Ministers can be appointed without any reference to Parliament. We once had a rule in the parliamentary Labour party that, if someone was an elected member of the shadow Cabinet, he or she would automatically become a Cabinet member when Labour was elected to government. In at least two cases that I know of, that did not happen after 1 May. Furthermore, I know of at least one Minister whose appointment might not have been accepted had it required parliamentary approval. [HON. MEMBERS: “Name him.”] I forget his constituency, but I believe that he has something to do with the millennium dome.[Interruption.] Yes, he is the Minister for the dome.

§Mr. SalmondIs the hon. Gentleman’s bleeper going off?

§Mr. CanavanI have it switched off.

As I said, the two concepts of sovereignty of the people and sovereignty of the monarch are mutually exclusive. If we really believe in sovereignty of the people, Members of the Scottish Parliament should—as proposed—be elected by the people and accountable to the people. Similarly, Ministers should be elected by the elected representatives of the people. In that way, the Scottish Government or the Scottish Executive would be more accountable to the people of Scotland.

(Notice, at this point, Alex Salmond keeps his powder dry and says nothing in response to this statement by Canavan. Now why do you think that would be? It’s because he is not going to agree to sovereignty of the people when he knows he must retain sovereignty for the Crown and Queen)
6.15 pm

§Dr. Liam Fox (Woodspring)I am rather sorry that the hon. Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Mr. Sedgemore)—who said that Labour Members are clones—was not in the Chamber to hear the speech of the hon. Member for Falkirk, West (Mr. Canavan). It is nice to know that he still shops for his speeches at Republicans—’R—Us, adding a bit of colour to the Labour Benches. (Liam Fox: Zionist ass licker of her majesty and liar who used depleted uranium against Libya)

189I shall speak to amendment No. 275, which deals with the important issue of the mental health of Members of Parliament, which is not a laughing matter but a serious issue that is important both for Members of Parliament and for the protection of their electorate—to ensure that representation of the electorate is maintained.

§Mr. McLeishJust for the record, is present company excepted from the deliberations?

§Dr. FoxThe Minister is asking me to give a professional opinion, which I do not think I want to stray into right now.

I wonder how many hon. Members realise that the Mental Health Act 1983 has special provisions for section orders for Members of Parliament. Should, for example, an hon. Member fall ill with a mental health problem, a complex procedure will come into play. First, the doctor signing a section order or the person who is in charge of the hospital where the Member is detained will notify the Speaker. Secondly, the Speaker will appoint someone from the Royal College of Psychiatrists to look after the Member. If that Member is still detained under a section order after six months, the seat will become vacant.

I do not know why there should be such a provision for hon. Members in this place, but not for those in the Scottish Parliament. I think that Ministers have simply overlooked the matter, and I look forward to the Minister bringing the Scottish Parliament into line on that point. It is quite a serious and important matter, which should not be belittled.

§Dr. Lynda ClarkCould the hon. Gentleman advise the Committee of the number of occasions when that provision has been used?

§Dr. FoxI do not think that it matters whether it has been used: the provision is there to protect the electorate should a Member of Parliament be absent for six months and unable to represent his or her constituents. One would hope that the provision would never have to be used and that hon. Members do not suffer in that way, but it is there to protect the electorate. It is, therefore, important.

In tabling amendment No. 276, we wanted to examine a different aspect of the Bill. Our amendment would limit the size of the Scottish Executive. “Erskine May”, for example, limits the Prime Minister’s freedom of manoeuvre in establishing the number of places in his Cabinet, yet this Bill places no limitation on the size of the Scottish Executive. The Bill provides for an unspecified number of Ministers plus an unspecified number of junior Ministers. The Scottish Office is currently run by the Secretary of State and five Ministers. One would not wish a situation to arise—which has occurred elsewhere—in which the number of Ministers was increased simply to keep Members quiet, by appointing more of them as Ministers. The hon. Member for Falkirk, West dealt with the matter of patronage in his speech.

When I was at the Foreign Office—although I do not suggest that it might happen in the Scottish Parliament—one of the Governments whom I dealt with was the Government of Nepal. As the coalition Government started to crumble, one side of the Parliament consisted of 130 Members, of whom 85 were Ministers. I see the hon. Member for Falkirk, West smiling—perhaps because 190he foresees the possible bonanza. However, it will happen only at the taxpayers’ expense. If we are to avoid “jobs for the boys” gibes, we shall have to ensure that we are not writing a blank cheque for Members of the Scottish Parliament or giving unlimited powers of patronage to the First Minister.

§Mr. Andrew Welsh (Angus)Not content with limiting the powers of a Scottish Parliament, the Tories want to limit the number of Scottish Ministers to fewer than those in a football team—and for ever more. Surely the size and shape of the Scottish Cabinet is up to the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament. It is again clear that the Tories have no trust or faith in the Scottish people or their democracy. (Nothing to do with trust in the scottish people. It is to do with there being no trust in politicians by another politician because he knows what a bunch of corrupt gits look like because he is one. Neither are YOU saying that such a call would be made by the scottish people themselves but by the scottish government ministers, so we’re back to square one asshole!)

§Dr. FoxQuite the reverse—the issue is about having less faith in politicians than in the people. (Hah! I hadn’t even read this before I made the above comment! How about that?! :-))‘t are concerned with the ability of politicians to rein themselves in when offered a blank cheque. We have tabled the amendments from the point of view of protecting the electorate from politicians. (This is Liam Fox saying this! How do these people say what they say without going red in the face? How about protecting us from you then you corrupt bastard!) When the people of Scotland voted in large numbers in favour of the proposals in the referendum, I do not think that they ever wanted to give such a blank cheque to the Parliament or for there to be an unspecified number of Ministers.

Given that in this House Ministers are appointed by the Prime Minister, and that the First Minister will have to have the Scottish Parliament’s approval, it would be excessive to stipulate that all Ministers had to be approved by the Scottish Parliament. To introduce an American style of approval of Ministers, such as that welcomed by the hon. Member for Falkirk, West, would be excessive control over the First Minister’s freedom. Such control does not apply in Westminster, and the case has not been made for it to apply in the Scottish Parliament. I hope that the Minister will reconsider.

Now we get into the “meat” of it all…..

§Mr. John McAllion (Dundee, East)I shall speak in support of the amendments tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk, West (Mr. Canavan). The amendments would delete the following phrases: appointed by Her Majesty from among the members of the Parliament and shall hold office at Her Majesty’s pleasure”, with the approval of Her Majesty”—in clauses 44 and 46— seek Her Majesty’s approval”, and shall hold office at Her Majesty’s pleasure”. in clauses 44 and 46.

I would not want the group of amendments to be represented as an attack on either Her Majesty or the monarchy. That would be a misreading of the intent behind them. It is true that my hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk, West and I hold certain views about the legitimacy of an hereditary institution exercising what should be democratic power in a democratic society. I for one have never understood those who argue for modernising the British constitution and who speak about sweeping away powers of hereditary peers, while at the same time talking about entrenching the powers of an hereditary monarch. (No mate, neither do I nor many of us)

191 I very much take to heart my hon. Friend’s arguments, particularly those on the 1974 election and what happened to Gough Whitlam in Australia. (Now, you SNP supporters out there: If you do not understand what happened in this case, for one, then you have no idea what this has to do with Scottish “independence” do you? And why you NEED to know!) The future role of the monarchy is not at the heart of the amendments. The amendments focus on the Scottish Parliament’s right democratically to elect Ministers who will hold office in the Scottish Government after 1999.

The Bill technically says that the First Minister shall be appointed by Her Majesty and hold office at Her Majesty’s approval. We know that that is a constitutional fiction. We know that the Queen will not in fact appoint anybody in the Scottish Parliament. She will do so only on the advice of the British Prime Minister and the British Cabinet of the day. (as you will see, this isn’t actually true and he may well have been playing “Devil’s advocate” here. On the face of it, she “takes advice” but she already tells her ministers what “advice” she wishes to take and they simply then tell her majesty what she wishes to hear) We are really talking about the right of the United Kingdom Government and Cabinet to appoint the First Minister, other Ministers and junior Ministers in a Scottish Parliament. Without the approval of the UK Cabinet, that could not go ahead—otherwise, the provision would not be in the Bill. Even the right to hold office is contingent on the continuing approval of the British Government and Cabinet.

There is danger in such a system. The hon. and learned Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Wallace) said in an earlier debate that we cannot always assume that the British Cabinet will be in sympathy with the Scottish Parliament and necessarily want it to stand on its own feet, as the Minister would like.

§Mr. Tim Collins (Westmorland and Lonsdale)I am following the hon. Gentleman’s argument most closely. He seems to be making a case for a separate Scottish Head of State. If that is so, why is he sitting on the Government Benches and not with the Scottish nationalists? (Interesting comment because, as you are aware, the SNP as “Scottish nationalists” do not make the case for a separate Head of state do they? At least not a change of who that Head of state is!)

§Mr. McAllionI do not think that I have referred to the Head of State. My opinion on the Head of State—which I presume the hon. Gentleman seriously wants to hear, or he would not have asked—is that the Queen could do a lot worse than put herself forward for a referendum to endorse whether she should be the Head of State. The legitimacy of the Queen’s role will always be questioned as long as she does not subject herself to the consent of the people.

If I were a monarchist—which I am not—I would be arguing for the Queen to call a referendum on her role in the British constitution. If, in such a referendum, she received the endorsement of a huge majority, as everybody says she would, I am sure that that would improve her situation. Others of us would also like a referendum so that we could vote for the kind of Head of State we wanted. It is not a matter of treason to want a democratically elected Head of State—although, judging from the Tories’ comments, it would sometimes seem so.

The heart of the problem is the relationship between the United Kingdom Parliament and the Scottish Parliament. All the phrases—which the amendments would delete—mean this: the Scottish Parliament would be allowed to appoint its own Ministers only so long as they met with the approval of the Westminster Parliament and Government. That lies at the heart of my objections.

§Mr. Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield)I think that the clauses about which the hon. Gentleman is complaining mean the complete opposite of what he is saying. The very reason why it is stipulated that the Scottish First 192Minister will hold office at Her Majesty’s pleasure is that that asserts absolutely and categorically that he has a direct link with the sovereign, which cannot be overridden by the United Kingdom Prime Minister in devolved matters. That is an essential protection under our present constitutional arrangements. (Question: Why does he need the link? ;-))

§Mr. McAllionThe hon. Gentleman is arguing as if the Queen had real constitutional powers. (Yes he is, because she does as is becoming obvious with every word) We have always been told that, of course, she does not have any real powers, because all constitutional power is exercised on the advice of the British Prime Minister. She would not dare to do anything on her own that a British Prime Minister would not allow her to do. (Of course not because that would give the game away. So, with the PM being a Crown Minister also, he keeps Her Majesty’s secrets, one of which is that he “advises” her rather than the reality which is she tells him what it is she wants him to advise her of! She gets rid of PMs she doesn’t like! Gough Whitlam being just one. I would posit that Maggie Thatcher was another due to her “No!” stance on Europe) Now, all of a sudden, the argument is very different. The hon. Gentleman is saying, “Yes, the Queen does have constitutional powers.” He is agreeing with my hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk, West, who is concerned about the powers that an unelected monarchy exercises in the British constitution. I am increasingly concerned about the hon. Gentleman’s tone and the way in which the argument is developing. (You know precisely what the “Crown” is mate so don’t play silly buggers!)

§Mr. John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings)The hon. Gentleman needs to consider the implications of what he is saying. As my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) suggested, it matters not whether in practical terms the Head of State uses the power, but it matters from where the power is derived. The practical exercise of power and the source of power are two quite different things. The hon. Gentleman misunderstands the clauses. (No they are not two different things. Only power can exercise power. The PM exercises that power delegated to him/her. This was a bullshit statement and transparent)

§Mr. McAllionThe hon. Gentleman, who goes to Scotland on holiday only occasionally, also totally misunderstands the situation. I will tell him where the source of the power of appointment in a Scottish Parliament is. It is the people who elect that Scottish Parliament. There is no need for any reference to the United Kingdom Government, Cabinet or heir to the Head of State. A Scottish Parliament will be democratically legitimate because it will be elected by the Scottish people; it should be allowed freely to appoint its Ministers. That is the bottom line for those of us who agree with the Claim of Right and who believe that sovereignty rests with the people and not with the institution in Westminster. (He’s right in his ideology but totally naive! Or, again, is he just playing a game here? Feigning ignorance?)

Worse than that, throughout the debates, there has been a tension between the UK Parliament wanting to keep control and a leash on what the Scottish Parliament might do, and those of us who want the Scottish Parliament to get on with the job of governing Scotland’s domestic affairs free from interference, control and any dependence on the British Parliament.

§Dr. FoxBut the logic of that position is to move to independence, not devolution. The hon. Gentleman is arguing for a separate Scottish Parliament. (Never Liam! Very observant of you!)

§Mr. McAllionThe Tories have a blanket approach to this debate. They envisage only two possibilities: either there is a toy town Parliament that is under the control of the British Parliament, or there is independence. They say that time and again, but they are wrong. There is a middle position, in which sovereignty is shared between the Scottish and United Kingdom Parliaments. The Scottish Parliament does not need to seek anyone’s approval for 193the appointment of Ministers—it has the approval of the Scottish people, which is all the sovereignty that is required. That is not to argue for independence. (Notice the word “sovereignty” in all of this and notice he makes the point that there is a difference between the words “sovereignty” and “independence”. This is why I ask Scottish nationalists what it is they want? You see, I have no interest in “Independence”. I want sovereignty! Yet, many nationalists can’t understand what I’m saying so they lambast me for being a unionist! Yet the reality is that I am WAY more “nationalist” than they are!)

Earlier, we debated whether, if the Scottish Parliament broke down and did not work, that would lead to independence or whether it would benefit the Tories and lead us back to a United Kingdom unitary state. I tend to agree with the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond): if the Scottish Parliament is a success, it will greatly increase the confidence among the Scottish people. Yes, the Scottish Parliament will argue for more and more powers to be devolved to it—there is nothing wrong with that. The real wreckers of the Scottish Parliament, who are sitting on the official Opposition Benches, do not want the Scottish Parliament to work, so they want the Bill to contain all these various control mechanisms.

6.30 pm

I have great sympathy with the idea that the number of Ministers should be restricted, not only in the Scottish Parliament but in this Parliament. The example of Nepal was cited, where of 130 Members 85 are Ministers. Everyone who is not a Minister wants to be one, so the Executive have complete control over the legislature, much as they have in this Parliament. As a point of principle, I want the Executive to be limited, but not to 10. I want a series of Departments to be set up under the Scottish Parliament, each with its own Minister, so that there are separate Departments for housing, health and local government. The Scottish Parliament should be able to decide on the number of Ministers and whether that number should be limited.

There is much to be said for Bank Benchers having the power to hold the Executive to account. Any Parliament that is worth its salt has to have a number of independent Back Benchers. The trouble with the Westminster Parliament is that there are not enough independent Back Benchers—the Executive tightly control the Back Benchers, which is the wrong way round. We could easily ensure that the Scottish Parliament gets things the right way round, but that will not happen if we check and limit its powers to get on with its own business.

The aim of the amendments is simple. It is for the Scottish Parliament—not for Westminster, the monarch of the United Kingdom state or anyone else—to decide who the Ministers are in the Government of the day in Scotland, as the Scottish Parliament alone will be elected by the Scottish people to fulfil that task.

§Mr. Donald Gorrie (Edinburgh, West)There is only one Liberal Democrat amendment in this group. It is a tidying-up amendment that relates to amendment No. 275, which was tabled by the Conservatives. We fully support that amendment, as it deals with the important issue of the mental health of the First Minister. There is a risk that the First Minister will suffer from megalomania. We already have a Secretary of State who single-handedly decides where the Parliament should be, so there is no knowing what may happen when power goes to people’s heads in the Scottish Parliament and they are corrupted, as all people in power always are. By the law of averages, Conservative Members must sometimes be right—on this occasion, we believe that they have a good point.

We do not agree with the two other points that Conservative Members have made. First, we do not see why there should be a limit on the number of Ministers 194in the Scottish Cabinet. The Scottish Parliament may decide to operate totally differently from Westminster—for example, there may be a flat structure rather than one that includes Secretaries of State and junior Ministers. It should have the scope to approach matters in a modern way and to organise its affairs as it wishes. The electorate will soon respond if there are jobs for the boys and girls, and will punish those responsible. Things can be left to the good sense not of the politicians, but of the electorate. (That’s what the US Constitution framers thought! Look what’s happened there! Are these people for real?)

Secondly, the Conservatives have moved against what we believe is one of the Bill’s best proposals—the introduction of the concept, which is new to Britain, that Parliament must approve all the Ministers. That is a great step towards democracy, and it is a pity that the Conservatives want to remove it.

I shall now deal with the points made by the hon. Members for Falkirk and for Dundee, East and West respectively, I think, although I never remember—

§Mr. John Home Robertson (East Lothian)There is a subtle difference.

§Mr. GorrieThe difference is not so subtle.

The hon. Members for Falkirk, West (Mr. Canavan) and for Dundee, East (Mr. McAllion) are two of the most refreshing hon. Members, and we have the greatest sympathy with the angle from which they are coming. On this occasion, however, although we understand their argument, we do not agree with it. We believe that the matter is covered in clause 43(1), which states: the Parliament shall within the period allowed nominate one of its members for appointment as First Minister”. That makes it clear that the Parliament chooses the First Minister. As I said, it also has the power to approve the Ministers.

There is a good argument for continuing to mention the Queen in this context. People may feel that there should be a different constitutional structure, but that is a debate for another day. Under the existing structure, the fact that the Queen has the same relationship to the Scottish premier as she does to the British premier gives legitimacy and status to the Scottish Parliament. It demonstrates that the Scottish Parliament is not a toy town Parliament, a parish council, a regional council or a city chambers—it is a Parliament with a direct relationship to the Queen. (Note: ONLY legitimacy IF a direct relationship with the Queen!)

The language may be archaic, but the point at issue is sound—the Scottish Parliament should choose the First Minister. The Parliament will meet to elect the First Minister; he or she will not have to drive in a horse and carriage across the road to Holyrood palace, although the Queen will do whatever she usually does and bless the premier, perhaps—I do not know, as I have never been present at such an occasion.

Clause 47 deals with civil servants. Liberal Democrats strongly believe that a new atmosphere should be created, in which the civil servants are responsible to the Parliament and do not work for the Government only. This is not the appropriate time to ensure that that happens, but when the Parliament’s methods of operation and Standing Orders are considered, we shall push strongly in that direction. Civil servants should continue 195to advise Ministers, but they should also give information to and have much more open discussions with Members from all parties in the Scottish Parliament.

§Mr. DalyellGiven the opening remarks of the hon. Member for Edinburgh, West (Mr. Gorrie), I have a sneaking suspicion that he has read the first leader in this morning’s The Scotsman.

I should like to ask my hon. Friend the Minister a question. If there is a conflict of opinion over a United Kingdom reserved matter, whose advice will the Queen take? Will she take the advice of the First Minister of the Scottish Parliament or that of the Prime Minister of the UK? If the matter is a devolved one, will the Queen take the advice of the Prime Minister or of the First Minister? Furthermore, if the matter is devolved but the UK Parliament is legislating under clause 27(7), whose advice will the Queen take—that of the Prime Minister or of the First Minister? (And here you have the strongest of evidence of the Queen’s ultimate power: The two PM’s -or, in this case, at the time, the PM of Great Britain and the First Minister of Scotland – have to COMPETE regarding who’s advice the Queen ultimately takes. It shows, then that it is not the Prime Minister’s advice to the Queen today which the queen just accepts in some form of acquiescence, but she CHOOSES which advice she wishes to take. That is, after all, what makes her and her Crown “SOVEREIGN”. No-one dictates to her, it is quite the opposite. If she decides on one of their “advices” then the other has to take it on the chin. SHE is the decision maker! And it is the decision maker who wields the power! Just as in the case of a board meeting with the CEO – the Directors can make their pitches and give their advice but once that CEO decides, that’s it. The Directors do his bidding or else)

§Mr. GrieveI broadly welcome clause 42. Its purpose is to emphasise the importance of the First Minister’s role and his direct relationship with the sovereign. I appreciate the fact that the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. McAllion) does not like the principles underlying that but, as has properly been said, unless there is a change in our constitutional arrangements, it will be wise to observe constitutional conventions, so as to ensure a good working relationship between Westminster and Edinburgh and to secure the status of the Edinburgh Parliament. The First Minister should be appointed by Her Majesty and hold office at her pleasure; that will be an important constitutional safeguard, which will be to the advantage of the Scots.

In tabling amendment No. 254, my concern was that, although clause 42 (1) to (3) properly sets out the First Minister’s role, subsections (4) and (5) go off the boil and refer to a curious hybrid entity. Subsection (4) mentions a person designated by the Presiding Officer in circumstances where, I infer, the Parliament has not nominated someone for appointment. I do not want to get involved in an exercise in semantics, but as the Secretary of State and the Minister for Home Affairs and Devolution are here, I ask them to consider carefully whether clause 42 is properly drafted. The references in it to the designation “by the Presiding Officer” of a First Minister ad interim, while Parliament makes up its mind, would be better transferred to clause 43.

Clause 42 should define simply and neatly what the First Minister is supposed to do. Some other part of the Bill should emphasise what the designated First Minister is supposed to be. I assume that he or she is to be the person appointed to stand in for the First Minister if the office is vacant, and so is supposed to have all the powers, rights and obligations that the First Minister has. If that is the case, it would be sensible not to leave the wording in this hybrid condition. The legislation should make it clear that we are talking about a First Minister ad interim, who holds office at Her Majesty’s pleasure exactly as any other Minister would do. As that is a non-party political issue, will the Minister for Home Affairs and Devolution look into it?

In conclusion, there has been some discussion of the role of the advice given by the First Minister and by the Prime Minister in the event of conflict—a matter 196raised by the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). It is obvious that that is a real live issue. In defining the role of the First Minister, it is important that his status should be emphasised and that his direct position as the adviser of the Queen on matters relating to devolved issues should be at the forefront. In so far as clause 42 does not do so, I ask the Minister to look at it again and consider whether there should be some rejigging along the lines I have suggested in amendment No. 254 and the associated amendment, No. 255, which has not been selected because it relates to clause 43.

§Mr. SalmondI am surprised that there was not more enthusiasm from the hon. Members for Dundee, East (Mr. McAllion) and for Falkirk, West (Mr. Canavan) for limiting the number of Ministers. If the Minister of the dome has any say in the appointments, I suspect that neither of those hon. Gentlemen is knocking at the door of ministerial office at present. Indeed, if the Minister of the dome has anything to do with it, the public gallery is the nearest that they may get to the Scottish Parliament. We all hope that that will not be the case and that more democratic processes will be allowed to be carried forward. However, we should be grateful to those two hon. Gentlemen for enabling us to have an important debate.

Tory Members should not misunderstand the position that has been put forward in the amendments. It is not an attack on the monarchy, or the Queen as Head of State, but an attack on one aspect of the royal prerogative, particularly as it applies to the choice of Ministers. That is a legitimate argument. If the amendments were successful, the Queen would remain Head of State, but one aspect of the royal prerogative as regards the appointment of Ministers in a Scottish Parliament would have been removed.

Certainly, it is difficult to argue with the logic of the argument of the hon. Member for Falkirk, West that the position of the First Minister, and indeed other Ministers, should depend on the approval and appointment of the Scottish Parliament as opposed to an aspect of the royal prerogative.

6.45 pm

We heard a fascinating interchange between the hon. Members for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and for Dundee, East. The latter argued that because the Queen normally takes advice from her first Minister, the Prime Minister, and therefore exercises the functions of the royal prerogative on the advice of that person, it could be a dangerous intervention in the ability of a Scottish Parliament to choose its own Ministers. On the other hand, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield says that the clause is some form of entrenchment because it would give the First Minister of a Scottish Parliament a direct line to the head of state and therefore would put that person as a Prime Minister inter pares with the United Kingdom Prime Minister in terms of the relationship with their Head of State.

The interchange was fascinating and not one to which I had paid close attention before this debate. (Bloody lying toad. He’d have given every thought to it. He’s playing ignorant) The question has to be resolved one way or the other and the Minister for Home Affairs and Devolution would do the Committee a service if he could adjudicate and tell us whether the interpretation of the hon. Member for 197Beaconsfield or that of the hon. Member for Dundee, East was correct. The logic of the hon. Member for Falkirk, West is impeccable in the amendments and I am sympathetic to them, but that issue, which determines in practical terms the position of the Scottish Parliament and its standing with regard to the sovereign and her advisers, needs to be clarified.

Finally and briefly, Conservative Members seemed concerned about protecting the people from the Scottish Parliament, but many people in Scotland voted for that Parliament to protect them from the Conservative party. (Because they’re ignorant enough Alex, to vote for the lesser of two evils rather than work on a real workable solution to both of you) The need to box in the Scottish Parliament’s powers, as opposed to leaving them for the Standing Orders of a Scottish Parliament, betrays an underlying attitude that is not reconciled to the reality of that Scottish Parliament. The Conservative Front-Bench spokesmen, although perhaps not some of the Back Benchers, are still in a process of denial as far as the Scottish Parliament is concerned. They may not like hearing this, but the Conservative recovery will not start until that process of denial in Westminster comes to an end.

§Mr. McLeishFirst, on the point made by the hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) about mental health issues, I have consulted the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, my hon. Friend the Member for Strathkelvin and Bearsden (Mr. Galbraith) who is a neuro-surgeon, but he did not want to offer any suggestions to the Committee at this point. However, he suggested that the Scots are slightly better at differentiating between those who have a mental health problem and those who do not. I shall leave that as a question for the Committee. (haha! Cracking. Talk about a put down!) Interestingly, paragraph 9 of schedule 7 amends the Mental Health Act 1983, so the procedures to which the hon. Member for Woodspring referred will apply in a modified way to the Scottish Parliament. I will touch on some of the more serious issues when I refer to the amendments.

To answer my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East (Mr. McAllion) who made a point about this—I do not know whether it was a slip—the Bill provides no role for the United Kingdom Government in the selection of the First Minister, the Scottish Ministers and junior Ministers, so there is no locus for this Parliament or this Government in that regard. I do not know whether that was his point.

§Mr. McAllionCan my hon. Friend make clear the distinction to which the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) referred? If the Scottish Parliament chooses a First Minister and proffers that choice to the Queen for appointment, but the advice of the British Prime Minister is not to accept the choice, whose advice would the Queen follow? (So. Repeated. And the fact that she chooses who to follow is the proof of her power. If, as the government continuously wishes to tell us, she must follow the advice of her Prime Minister, then how could it possibly be that a PM would end up putting himself in the position where he has competition? Logic, my friends, logic! They give the entire game away with this debate.)

§Mr. McLeishThe British Prime Minister would have no locus in that appointment.

§Mr. McAllionMy hon. Friend is clearly stating that the Queen would take the side of the Scottish Parliament, as set out in the Bill, against the British Prime Minister. Therefore, the British Prime Minister does not exercise sovereign control over the affairs of this country. (Absolutely correct! BINGO!)

§Mr. McLeishThe Scottish Parliament would approve the appointment of the First Minister. The Presiding Officer would submit that appointment to the Queen and that would be it. We are talking about a substantial 198devolution of power and responsibility to the Scottish Parliament. Devolution means devolution. It will be up to the Scottish Parliament to approve the First Minister, the Scottish Ministers and the junior Ministers. Of course, those appointments will then be approved by the Queen. It is straightforward and there are no complications.

§Mr. DalyellI will not ask my hon. Friend for an answer off the top of his head, but will he write to me, because this question is not as simple as he makes out? Clause 27(7) states: This section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland. In the light of that, I think that my hon. Friend should give me a considered answer in a letter.

§Mr. McLeishI shall be happy to write to my hon. Friend, but we should make it clear that clause 27(7), and the debate on it, is about sovereignty and the ability of the Westminster Parliament to make laws in any area, devolved or reserved. This evening, we are talking about the First Minister, and I repeat that he or she will be selected by the Parliament after the election and the choice will be passed to the Queen by the Presiding Officer. That is the process.

§Mr. SalmondThe point made by the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) is wrong, because it relates to legislation, not to appointments. However, is it not correct that, under clause 27(7), the UK Parliament could legislate to change the method of appointing the Scottish First Minister?

§Mr. McLeishWe have debated the issue and points have been exchanged across the Committee; the view taken depends on one’s political perspective. We have made the point that this measure devolves substantial powers to Scotland—it is about devolution, not separation or independence.

The Government cannot agree to amendments Nos. 44, 76 and 87 to 90, which were tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Falkirk, West (Mr. Canavan) and for Dundee, East. The amendments would remove the involvement of Her Majesty in the appointment of the First Minister, other Scottish Ministers appointed under clause 44 and junior Ministers appointed under clause 46.

The Scottish Ministers, headed by the First Minister and assisted by the junior Scottish Ministers, will exercise, on behalf of Her Majesty, her prerogative and other executive functions in relation to devolved matters. (They are DELEGATED her power. It is exercised on BEHALF of her. It is not THEIR power) They will, in effect, be Her Majesty’s Government in Scotland (not a scottish sovereign government. Not even under independence with the Queen as Head of state) in relation to devolved matters. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate that the Queen should appoint the First Minister; that she should approve the appointment of other Ministers and junior Ministers to the Scottish administration; and that each of those appointees should hold office at her pleasure.

The involvement of Her Majesty does not, of course, exclude the involvement of the Parliament. On the contrary, in line with the White Paper, the Bill provides a significant role for the Scottish Parliament in the appointment of the Scottish Executive. It is a point worth making that in this place, Ministers are not approved or, selected by the House, but the Scottish First Minister and the other Scottish Ministers will be approved and voted on by the Scottish Parliament.

199That is a significant step forward in the scrutiny of the Executive. It starts at the foundation: the people will have spoken in electing Members of the Scottish Parliament who then, for the first time and unlike here, will have the ability to influence who represents the people of Scotland in ministerial posts. The significance of that step should not be lost on the Committee this evening. We see no need to amend the Bill in the way proposed, and I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk, West withdraw the amendment.

I have listened carefully to the arguments put forward by my hon. Friends the Members for Falkirk, West and for Dundee, East in support of amendment No. 75. The nature of the post of junior Scottish Minister will differ from that of a member of the Scottish Executive. The nature of their task will be to assist the Scottish Ministers in the exercise of their functions. With that in mind, the Bill proposes a simpler mechanism for their appointment. Nevertheless, I am also aware that the Scottish Constitutional Convention recommended that all Ministers should require to be confirmed by simple majority of the full Parliament.

I am therefore happy to accept the intention behind amendment No. 75 that the Parliament should be involved in the appointment of junior Scottish Ministers. I therefore undertake to bring forward an appropriate Government amendment on Report. With that undertaking, I invite my hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk, West not to press the amendment.

The Government cannot agree to amendment No. 254. The provisions in the Bill are intended to ensure that there is always someone able to perform the functions of the First Minister and act as head of the Scottish Administration. In practice, it is expected that each First Minister will hold office until replaced by his or her successor. However, circumstances could arise where the post falls vacant, for example on the death of the First Minister or if the First Minister is temporarily unable to act—that may fall partly into the definition proposed by the hon. Member for Woodspring. In such an event, a caretaker can be appointed to fulfil the role, pending the nomination and appointment of a new First Minister.

§Mr. GrieveI understand that point, but the clause as it stands conveys the impression—it may be no more than an impression—that the person who is acting is somehow a different animal from the First Minister, whereas my understanding is that an acting First Minister would still hold office at the Queen’s pleasure and have all the First Minister’s powers. That is the point that is opaque in the clause as it stands.

§Mr. McLeishThat is a reasonable reflection, but I must get on and cover some more of the points raised in the debate.

The mechanism for appointment of such a caretaker reflects the exceptional and transitory nature of the appointment. It lacks the formalities of the appointment of the First Minister precisely so as to avoid conveying the impression that the person is the First Minister rather than a temporary incumbent. On balance, the Government believe that the arrangements should be kept as simple as possible. The Presiding Officer is well placed to be able 200to judge which Member of the Scottish Parliament has the capacity and political credibility to fulfil that important role and I believe that it should be left to the Presiding Officer’s discretion.

The Government do not accept amendments Nos. 276 and 277. Amendment No. 276 would restrict the number of Scottish Ministers whom the First Minister can appoint. It would be inappropriate to do that, for a variety of reasons. The First Minister will have to seek the agreement of the Scottish Parliament; therefore, within the group of 129 MSPs, there is accountability and a chance to make a judgment on the number of Scottish Ministers. The Parliament will be able to withhold its approval if it thinks that there are too many nominations. In addition, through its control of salaries and allowances, the Parliament will be able to limit to a reasonable sum the expenditure on ministerial salaries.

There is a feeling on both sides of the Committee that the matter should be left to the Parliament. It is a question of maturity and of adopting a sensible perspective. Ultimately, the First Minister and the Scottish Parliament will be accountable to the people of Scotland for their actions. That will, in our view, provide the proper means of ensuring that the size of the membership of the Scottish Executive is truly appropriate.

§Dr. FoxWe are missing a great opportunity. Such a self-denying ordinance would have sent a signal to the Scottish electorate that a blank cheque is not being handed over. I am sorry that the Minister cannot accept the amendment, but we shall press it to a Division.

§Mr. McLeishThe Committee is not offering a blank cheque to anyone. We are setting up a mature, serious and responsible Parliament, and it will be up to the Members of that Parliament to decide what Ministers are required to carry out the functions and represent the interests of the Scottish people. That is appropriate and proper. We do not share the Opposition’s concerns, and I hope that they will not press the amendment.

The Government cannot accept amendments Nos. 275 and 313, which are both unnecessary and inappropriate. The circumstances described are unlikely to arise in practice, and if they did, there are mechanisms in the Bill to deal with the problem. If at any time it appeared to the Presiding Officer that the First Minister was unable to act for whatever reason, including mental illness, it would be open to him or her under clause 42(4) to designate an MSP to exercise the functions of the First Minister.

Should it become clear that the First Minister’s inability to carry out his functions was not going to be merely temporary, he would be expected to resign. In the unlikely event of his being unwilling to resign, the Scottish Parliament could effectively remove him and his Executive through a vote of no confidence. That would require the First Minister to resign and would, in turn, lead to the appointment of a new First Minister. That may seem a drastic course of action, but the likely political reality is that there would be a general recognition of the need to address the problem and the Parliament could act to ensure that the matter was resolved without delay. In any case, I submit that clauses 42(4) and 43 provide a serious process to deal with a potential problem. First, there is a temporary acceptance and accommodation of the fact that the First Minister is unable to do the job; then there is a proper procedure to repair the situation.

201The Government cannot accept amendment No. 278, which would remove from the First Minister some valuable flexibility to tailor the structure of the Scottish Administration to the demands upon it. In view of the time, I shall now sit down.

§Mr. CanavanThis is a somewhat historic occasion, as it has been many years since I last tabled an amendment that was accepted in principle by the Government. I thank my hon. Friend the Minister for that. I am pleased that the appointment of all Scottish Ministers, whether the First Minister, other Scottish Ministers or junior Ministers, will be subject to the approval of the Scottish Parliament. I am not convinced of the arguments for the role of the monarchy in the appointment of Ministers, but I shall not press that point. I shall seek to withdraw amendment No. 44 at the end of the debate and I look forward to the Government tabling an amendment similar to my amendment No. 75 on Report.

§Mr. WallaceJunior Ministers will not be members of the Scottish Executive under the terms of clause 41. Will the Minister explain why?

§Mr. McLeishThe simple answer is that we shall have the First Minister and the Scottish Ministers, and we hope that the junior Ministers will have a supportive role in the work carried out by the other Ministers.

§Mr. CanavanI beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

§Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

§Clause 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

§Clause 43 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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The Crown: “We apply the law when we wish to”

Posted in Law, Money, The Corrupt SOB's by earthling on March 7, 2014

I have been asked to constitute the law of the United Kingdom from this day forth (Friday 7th March 2014).

I intend to make the law of this land absolutely fair and to apply, equally, to everyone, even me. Even I will be required to abide by this law and that is precisely why, in the law I have created, it states that I am IMMUNE from prosecution for any and all crimes which I may, “inadvertently you understand”, commit.

It is the law and the law is clear, therefore, one cannot state that I can possibly break it because the law states I am immune from prosecution (as are my agents who do my bidding, when I so decide). Now, this law is equal among all of you. No-one will have beneficial treatment over another. The law will not be provided to only those who have the money to pay for the law and a lawyer. After all, that is not law, it is simply saying whoever has the most money to pay will, invariably, win. There will be no such thing as “legal aid” because there shall be no necessity for money to come into the equation when one expects the laws of this land to be upheld. It is LAW not MONEY!

Further, there shall be NO statutory acts which show preferential treatment to one element of society over another as we have had in the past. For example, if you are unfairly dismissed from employment, there shall be NO “Employment law” which is written to protect the legal person known as the company and/or give greater protections to homosexuals, ethnic minorities, pregnant women etc. It is not that these “groups” shall not be protected, it is that they shall be treated equally along with every white, male heterosexual and every other human being.

The ONLY thing I ask is that you all accept that, within this law I have given assent to, I, personally, am immune. Please indicate your acceptance below and, if you do not accept, please state a reason why. Thank you.

[No apologies for the length of this article. It took far longer to read and comment and piece together than it will for you to read it. However, you might just find things in it (and overall) which will make your jaw drop.]

The Bitch of Buckingham!

The Bitch of Buckingham!

The Guardian 5th August 1971

Unfortunately, I cannot locate a copy of the Guardian article related to the following exchange in Parliament but suffice to say, it pointed to “money is being used to benefit London property owners, bankers and other private enterprises enabling, in the words of the Guardian, individuals to build up personal fortunes?” What is of further interest is that, while this exchange took place, there was then no further mention of it in parliamentary archives which suggests that, having been raised, someone has demanded that it not be pursued any further. You know what confirms this? THIS does:

HOL questions Guardian Crown Agents


What you do is cross reference the code reference to the exchange, look it up on Parliament’s website and hey presto! You find the record was closed under the 30 year rule until 1st January 2004. Do you get the feeling that someone seriously had a problem with this Guardian article?

Crown Agents is exactly what its name implies, an agent of Her Majesty the Queen. It was founded in 1833 as Crown Agents for the Colonies, and historically played a vital role in the creation and management of what British historians call the Third Empire .. Crown Agents printed the stamps and banknotes of the colonies; provided technical, engineering, and financial services; served as private bankers to the colonial monetary authorities, government officials, and heads of state; served as arms procurers, quartermasters, and paymasters for the colonial armies .. Her Majesty’s Murder, Inc. .. Crown Agents’ range of “services”–arms procurement, border controls, offshore banking–also nicely fit the “administrative requirements” of the world’s organized crime cartels .. review of some of the more sordid aspects of the recent history of Crown Agents, suggests that the firm has been at the center of the British Crown’s highly sensitive patronage of global organized crime.

The following is taken from “Managing the British Empire: The Crown Agents, 1833-1914” By David Sunderland:

Crown moral hazard


Now, I assume I don’t need to explain what “moral hazard” means in this context?

However, what I will say is this: That same level of “moral hazard” acceptance is in work today. That is precisely why Police, judiciary, MPs and other agents of the “state” or the “Crown” are able to get away with what you read the papers and say “WTF? They all look after themselves and if I did that, I’d be in jail for a LONG time”. You see, that acceptance of an element of “moral hazard” (corruption, paedophilia etc)  ensures that the Crown or state agent will remain loyal to the Crown and do the job by hook or by crook. IF he/she doesn’t then all that “moral hazard” which was previously accepted and overlooked will come down on them like a ton of bricks. Is this beginning to make sense to you now?

HL Deb 05 August 1971 vol 323 cc1257-611257


§12.5 p.m.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

§[The Question was as follows:

§To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they are satisfied that the investment policy pursued by the Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations is calculated to render best assistance to the economy of this country.]

§THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN) My Lords, the Crown Agents invest funds on behalf of their overseas principals, who are mainly independent Government and other public bodies. They do this on the instructions and authority of their principals and the British Government do not intervene in these operations. (Yes but this does not answer the question and is never intended to. However, these people get away with pure evasion continuously)

THE EARL OF SELKIRK My Lords, I think that I should say that I have no team co-ordination with the Guardian although I am aware that some of the staff were not uninterested in this subject. May I ask the noble Marquess whether I understood him to say that although the Crown Agents invest very large sums of money—and it is public money—the Government have no routine discussions on investment policy and give no approval to investments, and certainly have no power to direct the Crown Agents in any way?

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, that is quite correct. The Crown Agents are entirely responsible to their own principals in these matters and are 1258not responsible to the British Government. (So the Crown agents have absolutely no accountability to the British government – confirmed. This is because the Crown itself has no accountability to the British government AND YET, the Crown is financed by us and the investments by the Crown use public money – i.e. tax receipts. Yet they invest for anyone they wish – as you will see – and in anything they wish including genocide.)

§LORD PEDDIE My Lords, may I ask the noble Marquess whether or not in the initial stages the Crown Agents are appointed by Her Majesty’s Government? May I also ask whether Her Majesty’s Government can confirm or deny that executives of the Crown Agents hold, directly or through nominees, shares in companies promoted by Crown Agents’ funds? (You’ve heard of the Bank of England Nominees I assume?)

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, it is certainly true that the Crown Agents are appointed by Her Majesty’s Government. I think that I should need notice of the second supplementary question. Perhaps I may write to the noble Lord on it. (Again, unwilling to answer the nominee question in public debate. Yes they are appointed by HM Government but then HM Government (not the opposition) are Ministers of the Crown and they appoint on behalf of their boss at the time – Her Majesty)

§BARONESS WHITE My Lords, I sup-post that we have all read the Guardian this morning; and I am sure that the noble Marquess will appreciate that we should wish to have some comment from Her Majesty’s Government about the allegations mentioned by my noble friend, which are very disquieting.

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, my attention has been drawn to the article in theGuardian this morning although I must confess that I have not yet had time to read it closely. I have no reason to suspect that it is substantially inaccurate but on behalf of my right honourable friend I would appreciate time in which to consider the matter. (And having considered it, the entire debate, thereafter, went silent. After this exchange, the discussion was locked up under the 30 year rule until 2004. It wouldn’t even be noticed after that.)

§BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE My Lords, in view of the uncertainties which may have been created abroad, as well as in this country, could not the noble Marquess promise that there will be an investigation and that we shall have a report as soon as possible? (I am assuming here but I would consider that the “uncertainties” would be this leaders and organisations abroad who had invested with the Crown Agents and would be worried that their investments would be exposed if this story continued to have legs and people started talking)

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, I shall certainly undertake to convey to my right honourable friend the feelings of the noble Baroness, and indeed of the House, in this matter.

§LORD BROCKWAY My Lords, in view of the statement by the noble Marquess that in his view the Guardian article is probably accurate, can he answer two questions? First, to whom are1259the Crown Agents responsible? Secondly, are the developing countries aware that their money is being used to benefit London property owners, bankers and other private enterprises enabling, in the words of the Guardian, individuals to build up personal fortunes? (It was originally tax coercion throughout the commonwealth that the Crown Agents ensured but what seems to be the case here is that, having expanded to outside of the commonwealth, which they did and would take money/investment from anyone, the Agents, on behalf of the Crown, significantly enhanced – and I mean significantly – the wealth of the Crown itself but also the agents themselves. This has been documented as far back as the 1800s. The monarch knew but would allow it to a certain extent)

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord’s first question is, as I hope I made clear in my original Answer, that the Crown Agents are responsible to their principals, the Governments concerned or whoever they may be, in this matter. So far as the noble Lord’s second question is concerned, this is a matter for the Crown Agents’ principals. I should have thought that they have every right to ask the Agents how they are investing their money and in what activities they are indulging. I think that I cannot say more than that. This is something that the principals are perfectly entitled to find out from the Crown Agents. (But the problem is you corrupt bastard is that OUR tax money and people working on behalf of what is meant to be OUR “Crown” should not be dealing with overseas dictators – not to mention our own dictator – and investing in arms and drugs!)

§LORD FLETCHER My Lords, may I ask the noble Marquess this question? When he has had the opportunity to read the article published in to-day’s Guardian he will observe that the Crown Agent is quoted as saying that he has some kind of responsibility to the Foreign Secretary. The degree of that responsibility is not obvious, but it seems that there is some kind of responsibility for which, presumably, the noble Marquess’s right honourable friend is responsible to Parliament. Would the noble Marquess bear in mind that it would be very disquieting if it were the fact, as is suggested, that in pursuing the investment policies which the Crown Agents are following, they are not supposed to have any regard to the best interests of the economy of this country? (STUPID, ignorant bastard! Yes the Crown Agent has a responsibility to the Foreign Secretary because the Foreign secretary wears TWO hats! He works for the government with one hat BUT he is also a CROWN MINISTER with the other hat! So the Crown Agent is NOT reporting or responsible to the government but to the Crown!)

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, I take the noble Lord’s point and I will certainly pass it on to my right honourable friend.

§LORD PARGITER My Lords, would the noble Marquess say whether or not Crown Agents, as Crown Agents, enjoy any legal immunity under the Crown?

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, I am afraid that, without notice, I cannot answer that question. (It was a simple question and the answer is yes BUT the Marquess would prefer to check first because we’re getting into deep water when it touches on the “Crown” in any way shape or form)


§LORD THORNEYCROFT My Lords, may I put it to the noble Marquess, before we pursue the hunting of the Crown Agents too far, that we might bear in mind that for many years they have probably done a remarkably good job of work and that we might possibly end up in a much worse position if we start changing everything too rapidly without thinking very carefully about it. (sure they did. YOU probably wouldn’t have the wealth you have if they hadn’t!)

§LORD PEDDIE My Lords, my question relates to existing circumstances. What immediate steps would be taken by Her Majesty’s Government if the disquiet which could be generated arising out of recent discussions involved a substantial and immediate withdrawal of funds on the part of the principals who are now associated with the Crown Agents?

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, I do not want to dodge that question (yes you do!); but I think that it really is a matter for the Treasury. I will undertake to pass all these questions to my right honourable friend. I hope that I have satisfied the House at any rate that in these matters the Crown Agents are basically responsible to their principals, with whom they have to deal.

§LORD BESWICK My Lords, there is some misunderstanding about the responsibility here. Who appoints these people in the first place? And who has the power to dismiss them? On what basis are they appointed? And on what basis would they be dismissed if the occasion arose?

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, the Crown Agents are appointed by Her Majesty’s Government. (Be more clear! Her Majesty’s government acting on behalf of the Crown! There is a subtle but immense difference!)

§LORD BROCKWAY My Lords, may I ask one more question? Is the Minister aware that there is a document published by the Crown Agents which lists their investments. Although this document is secret, I have had a copy. May I ask the Minister why, if these are public funds, it should not be publicly announced where these investments are placed? (haha this cracks me up! Are some of these Lords really this thick?)

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, the noble Lord has been more fortunate than I. I have not seen a copy of this document, I am afraid. (Evades the question nevertheless)


§BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE My Lords, when the noble Marquess has had time to read the article, I think he will find that it is not a Treasury responsibility but that the officials who are there now were appointed by the Minister of Overseas Development.

§LORD DAVIES OF LEEK My Lords, while no one wants to cast aspersions on the Crown Agents (I do! But I totally understand why you don’t)—I have had some experience of the excellent work done by them in South-East Asia—may I ask that, when public money is involved, the Government will try in future to see that the greatest possible information is given to both Houses of Parliament?

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, I think that I can undertake to accede to the noble Lord’s request.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK My Lords, would not the noble Marquess agree that it is very important not in any way to impugn the integrity of the Crown Agents, and that the sooner these points are announced in public the better? (“That’s why we’re going to hide them for 30 years”)

§THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN My Lords, I quite agree with my noble friend.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE) My Lords, I feel that we have had a good hunt on this subject, and perhaps the noble Earl, Lord Arran, may now be allowed to get into the act.

No-one knows what the Windsors really own because it is forbidden for Parliament even to discuss the fact that the Queen keeps her private wealth a secret. Such secrecy is vital to prevent outrage by her ‘subjects’ and to allow her to use her privilege for insider trading, a practice which is illegal. Insider trading is to be in a position to hear privileged information which could be used to make a financial killing and then to use that knowledge to do just that.

The Queen, with her colossal portfolio of global investments, is in the perfect position to make unlimited profits. She is constantly kept informed, via meetings with prime ministers, ministers, officials, British Intelligence and other sources, of the secret happenings in the world. She knows through these channels and others, where the best and worst investments are going to be and through her secret network she can ensure that the most effective financial use is made of that information. It was exposed in 1977 that the Bank of England, the creation of the Black Nobility, had established a company called the Bank of England Nominees Ltd (BOEN), to hide the Queen’s investments.

Nine official meetings are held each year and the government ministers stand to attention while the Queen is told of the government measures they are asking the Queen to approve. This Privy Council of inner-circle politicians, courtiers and public servants have to bow to the Queen and shake her hand before standing in line and they are sworn to conduct their business in the utmost secrecy.

Another of the Windsor-Black Nobility vehicles for global manipulation is the Crown Agents. This organization was formed in 1833 as ‘Crown Agents for the Colonies’ to run the day-to-day administration in the Empire and serve as private bankers to government officials, colonial authorities and heads of state. It also supplied a vast range of goods, including arms. Given the methods and background of the British Empire, it would certainly have been involved in the drugs market. The Crown Agents has a long history of involvement with organized crime and operates covert arms shipments into Africa which are used to cause the genocidal wars.

This was, and is, a Crown Agency working for the monarch and yet had its entire debt guaranteed by the British government. In the 1970s it was bailed out by a Bank of England rescue costing hundreds of millions of pounds. For many years it managed the personal wealth of the Sultan of Brunei, the friend of the Queen and a funder of many private projects for Prince Philip, Prince Charles and George Bush. The Sultan is also a financial backer of unofficial British and American Intelligence operations and a man who has funded the operation of Mohamed Al Fayed, father of Dodi.

The Crown Agents were ‘privatised’ in 1996 with the name Crown Agents for Overseas Government and Administrations Ltd. ‘Privatisation’ is Brotherhood-speak for the transfer of power from Black Nobility via government agency to Black Nobility via direct ownership. The new Crown Agents acts as a holding company for a long list of companies and ventures and it continues as before as a vital cog in the network throughout the world. It’s chairman, David H. Probert, is the former director of the British weapons manufacturer, Birmingham Small Arms Ltd, and a director is F. Cassell, a Companion of the Bath (a Queen-awarded title), and former executive director of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for Great Britain.

The Crown Agents Foundation, which holds the share capital in trust, is headed by Sir David Rowe-Ham, Knight Grand Cross of the British Empire. This trust includes Barclays Bank, Standard and Chartered Bank (David Cameron’s family connections), Unilever, Tate and Lyle, Securicor (a global operator of ‘security services’), British Telecom, the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum (headed by Prince Charles), and the Aga Khan Foundation. The same old crowd.

The Crown Agents manage the customs services for Mozambique and, through a company called Europe SA, is in charge of all economic construction procurement for Bosnia… yes, Bosnia. It is also involved in a joint venture with a Monaco-based company, ES-KO, to provide all the food for United Nations peacekeeping forces in Angola and Bosnia.32 So the more wars and conflict, the more money the Crown Agents has the potential to make.

An important part of the Windsor-Black Nobility-City of London web are the so-called ‘City Livery Companies’. These allege to represent the various groups of merchants like the gun makers, stationers and newspaper makers, the goldsmiths, and
such like. In fact they are secret societies fundamental to the control of the City institutions and much further afield. In the 1350s, in the wake of the plague known as the Black Death, government of the City was passed from the ward councils to the City Livery Companies.

HC Deb 26 November 2002 vol 395 cc153-4153

§35. Dr. Vincent Cable (Twickenham) What the Lord Chancellor’s policy is on the personal immunity of the Sovereign in relation to actions in court. [81465]

§The Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor’s Department (Ms Rosie Winterton) The policy that the sovereign has personal immunity in relation to actions in court remains unchanged. (She’s immune so shut up!)

§Dr. Cable Does the Minister agree that the recent application of that principle of immunity has caused considerable embarrassment to the police, the Crown Prosecution Service, the courts and, not least, the monarchy? Will she therefore contemplate reviewing those arrangements, particularly bearing in mind the comment made yesterday by David Pannick QC that one person’s liberty as a defendant should not take second place to someone else’s status? (It doesn’t matter what Pannick says. If it’s a choice between the liberty of a subject and exposing the Queen and Crown for what it actually is, then who do you think wins?)

§Ms Winterton The hon. Gentleman clearly has strong views about the matter. However, on 4 November, at one of his regular press conferences, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in relation to the Paul Burrell case that he did not believe that the constitutional position should change. ( So? That’s one man’s opinion formed by the fact he is a private contractor to the very person who wouldn’t want it changed!)

§Kali Mountford (Colne Valley) Does not this case have wider implications for immunity in general terms and, in particular, for Crown immunity? Does my hon. Friend have a view on the implications for Crown immunity, and how can Members of the House have a say in what happens about that?

§Ms WintertonConsideration has been given to the quite different issue of the state’s immunity in legal proceedings. For example, a recent consultation paper, “Revitalising Health and Safety”, contains proposals for removing or modifying that immunity. In the light of the responses to that document, an interdepartmental working group is considering the implications, and advice will be given to Ministers about Crown immunity.

§Mr. William Cash (Stone)Has the Lord Chancellor formally inquired as to what law, procedure or judicial rule led the judge in the case of R v. Burrell to convene prosecuting counsel in private and exclude defence counsel, which is usually done only when a public interest immunity certificate is applied for? If not, why not, and will he do so?

Will the Minister confirm to the House that what the Attorney-General wrote to me on 6 November is the case, namely: No minister was asked to give a PII certificate or sign one, nor was a draft certificate ever prepared, or any consideration given by anyone to preparing such a certificate to place before the judge”?


§Ms WintertonThe hon. Gentleman knows very well that he addressed those issues to the Attorney-General, who has replied to him. The Lord Chancellor played no part whatsoever in the Paul Burrell trial.


Crown Prerogative

HC Deb 18 January 1988 vol 125 c492W492W

§Mr. Campbell-Savours

To ask the Prime Minister if she will make a statement on the exercise of the prerogative rights of the Crown in relation to the conduct of Government employees.

§Mr. Campbell-Savours

To ask the Prime Minister if any actions in exercise of a prerogative right of the Crown have been taken since 1979.

§The Prime Minister

Innumerable actions in exercise of prerogative power have been taken since 1979; these range from the signature of treaties to the grant of the royal pardon.

§Mr. Campbell-Savours

To ask the Prime Minister what representations Her Majesty’s Government have received concerning exercise of prerogative rights of the Crown in respect of actions which could otherwise be subject to criminal proceedings. (Hahaha. That was hilarious! He’s obviously a switched on and funny man!)

§The Prime Minister

None so far as I am aware.

§Mr. Campbell-Savours

To ask the Prime Minister if she will introduce legislation to permit a servant of the Crown to carry out a criminal act in the exercise of a prerogative right of the Crown. (Again, excellent. :-))

§Mr. Campbell-Savours

To ask the Prime Minister what proposals she has for precisely defining the conditions under which the powers are exercisable under prerogatives of the Crown.

§The Prime Minister


He was just getting the questions put on record that’s all. Maggie didn’t have a lot to say did she?

HC Deb 15 June 1995 vol 261 cc663-4W663W

§Mr. Foulkes To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will list all areas within(a) his Department, (b) agencies under his Department’s control and 664W(c) organisations for which he has ministerial responsibility to which Crown immunity applies; what consideration he has given to removing this; and if he will make a statement. [28647]

§Mr. Redwood An Act of Parliament is presumed not to bind the Crown unless the contrary intention is clearly stated, or there is a necessary implication that the Crown is to be bound. Ministers and civil servants will not necessarily share the Crown’s immunity from criminal prosecution.

The Government policy on Crown immunity, as set out in Cm 1599, “The Citizen’s Charter—Raising the Standard”, is that Crown immunity is being progressively reduced as legislative opportunities arise. In the meantime, Crown bodies are expected to behave as though they were bound by regulations. (Well, if they are expected to behave as though they were bound like the rest of us, then MAKE them bound by the regulations man! But no!)

HC Deb 22 June 1995 vol 262 c376W376W

§Mr. Foulkes To ask the President of the Board of Trade if he will list all areas within(a) his Department, (b) agencies under his Department’s control and (c) organisations for which he has ministerial responsibility to which Crown immunity applies; what consideration he has given to removing this; and if he will make a statement. [28658]

§Mr. Heseltine[ holding answer 15 June 1995]: An Act of Parliament is presumed not to bind the Crown unless the contrary intention is clearly stated, or there is a necessary implication that the Crown is to be bound. Ministers and civil servants will not necessarily share the Crown’s immunity from criminal prosecution. (It depends if she likes them or not or if she’s having a period! But then the periods don’t come into it any longer do they?)

The Government’s policy on Crown immunity, as set out in CM1599—”The Citizen’s Charter—Raising the Standard”—is that Crown immunity is being progressively reduced, as legislative opportunities arise. In the meantime, Crown bodies are expected to behave as though they were bound by regulations.

Detailed information on the circumstances where Crown immunity does not apply is not held centrally, and could be obtained only at disproportionate cost.

Tagged with: ,

The UK government are all self employed Private contractors!

Posted in Politics, Uncategorized by earthling on March 6, 2014

I have just stumbled across something intriguing which points to the very title of this blogpost.

Have a read of the following:

HC Deb 31 January 1957 vol 563 cc1156-71156

§28. Mr. Russellasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what arrangements are made for insuring Members of the Government against accident when they travel by air on Government business.

§Mr. PowellInsurance in such circumstances is a matter for Members of the Government to arrange privately.

§Mr. RussellDoes not my hon. Friend think that in principle it is quite wrong that Ministers should travel on Government business and not have the benefit of insurance? Although happily the chances of accidents are slight, is not the position wrong as a matter of principle?

§Mr. PowellNowadays, of course, the cost of insurance against risks of travel in these circumstances is very low, and my hon. Friend will probably be aware that Ministers of the Crown count as non-employed persons.

Mr. H. WilsonCan the hon. Member say whether the Treasury, which ought to set an example as a good employer in 1157this connection, does provide automatic insurance for civil servants travelling by air?

§Mr. PowellThe Treasury is not the employer of Ministers of the Crown.

§Mr. J. GriffithsWill the hon. Member get his terms right? Ministers of the Crown are not non-employed, but self-employed.

§Mr. PowellI am much obliged.

Mr. WilsonIn his début in answering these Questions, will the hon. Member give a clear answer to questions and not clever answers of that kind? I asked him whether the Treasury, which is responsible for the Civil Service, sets an example in this respect and provides insurance. That is very important for the Civil Service.

§Mr. PowellIf the right hon. Gentleman will put down a Question about the Civil Service, I will do my best to answer it.

Now, if these people (Government Ministers) are self employed, yet paid by the Treasury – which, it would certainly appear they are – then they are Private individuals contracting their services. This opens up a whole can (or cans) of worms and it’s difficult to know where to start!

1. Private individuals who are paid a salary set by the treasury and iPSA, as contractors, who make decisions based upon their own personal ideologies, as to what is law in this country and what industries are supported and which are not.

2. Private individuals, contracting their services as self employed, which then explains why each and every one of them can act as a “corporation”.

In 2001, Ken Clarke was still a backbencher so was still making a very healthy salary from being an MP, Yet he was also allowed to make the following incomes from business interests:

BAT Tobacco: £100,000 per annum.

Alliance Unichem: £125,000 per annum.

Foreign & Colonial Investment trust: £23,000 per annum.

Then he has his speaking engagements:

Clarke speaker

Clarke speaker 2

Now, if you can tell me how one man, with 24 hours in the day like you and I and 365 days a year like you and I, can do serious work for any one of these organisations and be worth such money, while, at the same time, be a full-time backbencher making an additional salary of about $50K a year, I’d like to know. Yes, you will say “it’s because of what he knows and influence so he deserves it” but that is the very point I’m making. He profits from a job that you and I pay him to do! While he then does not do the job WE wish him to do but that which his circles of influence want done. Is it so hard to understand how this corrupt system works?

Let’s take Damian Green as another example: Look at the month by month payments from South East Water for sums of £2083.33 precisely, each time for 14 hours work each month. Think about it. This suggests that he is doing SOMETHING for South East Water EVERY SINGLE MONTH which takes exactly 14 hours each and ever time. Now you tell me what that could possibly be! The details just goes up to 2011. Perhaps because iPSA took over the management of such info (and do not seem too good in presenting it at all since there is nothing I can see on it from Damian).

Now, you can look up Southern Water or South East Water and Damian Green and you will see the companies mentioning his name as an MP who is “very happy” with their performance. What neither one says is that Damian Green is PAID by them! While, again, Green has been getting these payments while being either a front bench or back bench MP making, these days, about £66K a year. ” Compare that with the situation of the archetypal backbencher on his/her £66k salary.”

What makes it all worse is that these goons don’t give a goddamned shit about any of you (or us). “They work for you” indeed! Don’t make me laugh!

Get this into your head: YOU have paid the salary of a man (in the case of Clarke for his entire career in politics but, generally, for them all) to learn and have knowledge about things such as upcoming legislation, economies worldwide and everything in between due to the position we expect him to fill and the job we expect him to do, but he is SELF EMPLOYED. He has then taken all of that knowledge of past AND future and used it (many many times against us) to fill his own private wallet! He then also speaks at engagements and also at SECRET Bilderberg meetings and Chatham House where and when POLICY is made and he and all who attend, while such policy is hidden from you and I based upon “Public Interest” (but you and I are NOT “the public” as I hope you are well aware), then make investments where and how they know of the legislation which is in the works and how it will impact an economy, industry or entire nation. Yet, once again, these people are PRIVATE, SELF EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS!

3. MP’s pensions:

This is an article from the Telegraph –

Sophie Jamieson

3:12PM GMT 12 Dec 2013

 The chair of the independent body that regulates MPs’ pay has defended the recommendation to raise MPs’ salary by 11 per cent.

Sir Ian Kennedy said that the proposals were the result of an extensive 18 month study and that Ipsa was “playing catch-up with decades of not coming to terms with the fact that MPs’ salary has not kept up with recommendation after recommendation.”

The package includes a reduction in pensions, an end to “golden goodbyes” and a cutback to expenses.

“The overall package will not cost the taxpayer a penny more” and is “appropriate for a modern democracy,” Sir Ian said.

HOW, may I ask, is it possible for a NON EMPLOYED BY TREASURY OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT and SELF EMPLOYED PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, to be provided with a PENSION? If one is self employed one particularly takes care of their own private pension arrangements. WHAT IS GOING ON HERE?

Now, I’m sure there are many other issues with this that I haven’t even thought of (yet) BUT, here’s the big point: When it comes to such “extra curricular activities” by these PRIVATE individuals who are contracting out their services to Her Majesty as he government and Parliament, they can contract themselves out to any and everyone because they are not EMPLOYEES of the Crown. They are SELF EMPLOYED. As such, they can take on any work for anyone they wish and they all do so they shall all support one another doing it! Further, it explains, in part, how Ken Clarke and Osborne, etc etc, can attend Bilderberg and other such subversive groups in a “PRIVATE CAPACITY” because, in essence, that is what they are even as they work for the Government. They are NOT employed by the government or treasury. They are PRIVATE CONTRACTORS!


As Tony Benn stated “Who and what is ‘The Crown'”? We have no clue. Well we do but it is not even understood fully and transparently by our so called Parliamentary representatives!

I’ll tell you what it is though: It is a private gang and mafia. That is precisely what it is and always has been.

Tony Benn Crown

Here we are, a “Nation” who are expected to be “patriotic” (I never would be) and yet all those who are don’t even have a bloody clue who governs them!

We don’t know who or what this “Crown” is which prosecutes us or, if a military person, they do not know who/what they fight for.

We cannot even ask the question and why? Because this very “animal” states itself, unilaterally, that it is protected under the “Official Secrets Act”.

Well OF COURSE a fucking MAFIA would protect its own identity! That is what they DO!

Please! Is it really just me or do you get pissed off with the majority of people’s idiocy and apathy and ignorance and carelessness?

And then do you get further pissed off when they COMPLAIN?!

The Ram Doctrine

Posted in Law by earthling on February 15, 2014

Your Majesty: Who the fricking hell do you think you are? Because nobody else sure as hell knows!

Tony Benn Crown

There is now plainly a distinction between what the Crown may do in its public or private capacity. Increasingly it may make sense to align that distinction with the distinction between things done by the Crown in its corporate capacity and in the capacity which the monarch now has as an individual. But none of this of itself answers the question of what the Crown may do in its public capacity. Indeed each of these argument may be seen, as Maitland put it, as “a convenient cover for ignorance: it saves us from asking difficult questions”.

Difficult questions indeed. For it seems that, in various circumstances and for various reasons and for various and unlimited capabilities, this “thing” called the “Crown” and this “thing” called “Her Majesty”, while she states that she never breaks the law, it is clear that this is simply because there is no law to touch her. She can decide which “hat” (capacity) she is wearing at anytime to suit herself – and to a lesser extent, to suite her “Agents” which, as you will see here, are her Government Ministers). I’ve stated time and again, that we do not have separate governments when either Tory or Labour take the reigns simply because, they act on behalf of the Crown – Period!

This is a long read and, literally as you will see, it goes into the “metaphysical” realms surrounding what is, in one body, a “natural person”, a “corporate person”, both together, separately and, if she wants to, she may as well be a fcuking lizard! It’s like going to a police line up of a criminal and there’s 4 or 5 of them who all look identical but 4 out of the 5 are actually holograms and only one the real flesh and blood. But you’ve only got one bullet in your gun! Then even if you do hit the right one, it makes no difference because the holographic versions still exist and a proper Charlie takes over the flesh and blood.

You’ll see in this that it is simply a mass of contradiction and shit which the “law” concisely shifts it’s position on to justify whatever actions the Crown takes. When it comes to “The Crown” there actually IS no law because it can sidestep it at every turn.



1. It is now established, at least at the level of the Court of Appeal (so that Court has recently stated)1, that, absent some prohibition, a Government minister may do anything which any individual may do. The purpose of this paper is to explain why this rule is misconceived and why it, and the conception of the “prerogative” which it necessarily assumes, should be rejected as a matter of constitutional law.

2. The suggested rule raises two substantive issues of constitutional law: (i) who ought to decide in what new activities the executive may engage, in what circumstances and under what conditions; and (ii) what is the scope for abuse that such a rule may create and should it be left without legal control.

3. As Sir William Wade once pointed out (in a passage subsequently approved by the Appellate Committee2),

“The powers of public authorities are…essentially different from those of private persons. A man making his will may, subject to any rights of his dependants, dispose of his property just as he may wish. He may act out of malice or a spirit of revenge, but in law this does not affect his exercise of power. In the same way a private person has an absolute power to release a debtor, or, where the law permits, to evict a tenant, regardless of his motives. This is unfettered discretion.”

If a minister may do anything that an individual may do, he may pursue any purpose which an individual may do when engaged in such activities. He may also act just as unfairly or as unreasonably as any individual may do when doing such things. In conducting such activities his discretion will be as unfettered as any individual’s is. Thus, when considering a blacklist policy that the Government had adopted in the 1970s, Sir William stated that3



2 3

“In placing its contracts as and how it wishes the government is exercising the ordinary liberty possessed by anyone (and I hope no one will call it prerogative). The government’s duty not to abuse that liberty is constitutional rather than legal…Unconstitutional, yes; illegal, no.”

See R (Shrewsbury & Atcham BC and Congleton BC) v the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Shropshire CC [2008] EWCA Civ 148 per Carnwath LJ at [44] and [49], per Richards LJ at [72].

See R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex parte Chetnik Developments Ltd [1988] AC 858 at p872. See Constitutional Fundamentals 1989 rev ed at p71.

If a minister may do anything an individual may do, judicial review of the reasonableness of what he does or of the purposes which he may pursue when engaged in such activities ought not to be available.

4. In the decision which is said to have to established the rule, R v the Secretary of Health ex p C4, however, the Court of Appeal accepted that, in doing what any individual may do, a minister may not act unfairly or unreasonably (apparently oblivious of the fact that this also meant that a minister may not do anything that an individual may do). More recently, in R (Shrewsbury & Atcham BC and Congleton BC) v the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Shropshire CC5, the members of the Court of Appeal were divided on whether ministers may only act “for the public benefit” or for “identifiably governmental purposes”. Richards LJ, whose decision at first instance had been upheld by the Court of Appeal in ex p C, considered (consistently with the supposed rule) that there were no such limitations on the purposes for which a minister may act when doing something that an individual may also do. Carnwath LJ considered that there were such limitations (consistently with the development of public law in providing protection against the abuse of governmental powers).

5. Underlying this disagreement is the other substantive issue of constitutional law that the supposed rule raises. The Crown and ministers have powers for particular purposes which are vested in them by enactment. The Crown is also recognised at common law to have established non-statutory powers for particular purposes (which ministers may exercise as agents of the Crown). The question is: who is to decide in what new activities may ministers engage, in what circumstances and under what conditions? The executive or Parliament? Any rule that, in the absence of some prohibition, a minister may do anything which an individual may do gives that decision to ministers rather than to Parliament.

6. To appraise the justifications offered for this rule, however, it is necessary to consider in what circumstances authority may be required for government action and what the sources of such authority may be. In particular it is necessary to consider what the “prerogative” consists of, as the supposed rule that a minister may do anything that an individual may do can arise


4 5

[2000] 1 FLR 627, [2000] 1 FCR 471, [2000] All ER D 215.



only if Blackstone’s conception of the prerogative, rather than Dicey’s, is adopted.


7. It is said that a Government minister may do anything that any individual may do because that is what the Crown may do. Now, as Maitland famously said6,

“there is one term against which I want to warn you, and that term is ‘the crown’. You will certainly read that the crown does this and the crown does that. As a matter of fact we know that the crown does nothing but lie in the Tower of London to be gazed at by sight-seers…the crown is a convenient cover for ignorance: it saves us from asking difficult questions… do not be content until you know who legally has the power – is it the king, is it one of his secretaries: is this power a prerogative power or is it the outcome of statute?”

8. The assumption that Maitland apparently made was that the only two sources from which ministers might derive a legal power to act were an Act of Parliament or the prerogative. That assumption was explicitly reflected in Dicey’s conception of the prerogative. For Dicey7 the prerogative is

“the name for the residue of discretionary power left at any moment in the hands of the Crown, whether such power be in fact exercised by the King himself or by his Ministers. Every act which the executive government can lawfully do without the authority of an Act of Parliament is done by virtue of this prerogative.”(emphasis added)

9. Dicey’s conception of the prerogative gains added constitutional significance when combined with two further principles of English constitutional law. The first, established in the Case on Proclamations8, is that “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him.” The second is that new prerogatives cannot be created. As Lord Bingham recently stated9, “over the centuries the scope of the royal prerogative has been steadily eroded


6 7 8 9

The Constitutional History of England CUP 1908 at p418. See The Law of the Constitution (1915) 8th ed p421.
12 Co Rep 74 at 76.

See R (Bancoult) v Foreign Secretary (No 2) [2008] UKHL 955 at [69]. Although Lord Bingham was dissenting in this case, the point of dissent did not relate to this proposition. The Crown has an indisputable prerogative power to enact primary legislation for a ceded or conquered territory and indeed to legislate for citizenship and immigration control in such territories. The issue was whether it was necessary to find a precedent for the exercise of that prerogative power in that specific context in a particular way (as Lord Bingham assumed) or whether the nature of a primary legislative power is not so constrained. See also eg


and it cannot today be enlarged”. The effect of these two principles, when coupled with Dicey’s conception of the prerogative, is two-fold. First any new activity on which the executive wishes to embark in respect of which there is no existing statutory or established prerogative power requires authorisation from an Act of Parliament. It thus imposes Parliamentary control over the executive’s capacity to undertake such new activities. The second effect, since the Crown has no prerogative but that which the law allows, has been to enable the court not only to determine what non-statutory powers the executive has but also, increasingly, to exercise judicial control over any abuse of such powers where the issues are justiciable10.

10. Blackstone’s conception of the prerogative, however, was more limited than Dicey’s. Blackstone thought11 that the term

“can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the King enjoys alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects; for if once any one prerogative of the crown could be held in common with the subject it would cease to be prerogative any longer.”

Sir William Wade espoused an even more limited conception of the prerogative than Blackstone. He suggested12 that “the two tests for a genuine prerogative power seem to me to be (a) does it produce legal effects at common law and (b) is it unique to the Crown and not shared with other persons?”13. This would have excluded in his view activities which many



11 12 13

per Diplock LJ BBC v Johns [1965] Ch 32 at p79 (“it is 350 years and a civil war too late for the Queen’s courts to broaden the prerogative”); per Lord Reid Burmah Oil v the Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 at p101 and 108(“the proper approach is a historical one: how was [the prerogative] used in former times and how has it been used in modern times…the prerogative, having been virtually dormant or in abeyance, should not, in my view, be regarded as any wider today than it was three centuries ago”); per Dillon J Attorney-General of the Duchy of Lancaster v GE Overton (Farms) Ltd [1981] Ch 333 at p341 (“the Crown cannot unilaterally extend its prerogative rights. That is a matter for Parliament.”) affd [1982] Ch 277.

The most striking recent illustration is the assertion by the Appellate Committee in R (Bancoult) v Foreign Secretary (No 2) [2008] UKHL 955 that there was “no reason why” the prerogative power to enact primary legislation, and give a constitution to, a conquered or ceded territory “should not be subject to review on ordinary principles of legality, rationality and procedural impropriety in the same way as any other executive action”: per Lord Hoffmann at [35].

Commentaries on the Laws of England Vol1 p239.

HWR Wade “Procedure and Prerogative in Public Law” (1985) 101 LQR 180 at p193.

As Professor Paul Craig has pointed out, ““Professor Wade’s definition of the prerogative was even narrower than Blackstone’s in demanding not only that genuine prerogative powers have the quality of being unique [to the executive and not possessed by ordinary persons], but in stipulating also that they produce legal effects at common law in some immediate sense”: see P. Craig “Prerogative, Precedent and


would regard as exercises of the prerogative, such as the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, to issue passports and even to enter treaties14. But, even if the wider approach that Blackstone endorsed is adopted, it is plain that there are things that ministers may do which are not authorised by statute which ordinary individuals may also do. Given this conception of the prerogative, therefore, unless any such activity is unlawful, there must be some “third source” of authority for government action other than Parliament and the prerogative or no requirement for one15.

11. There are two candidates which have been advanced as the “third source” of authority for government action. The first (and generally preferred) basis is the claim that the Crown is a corporation sole at common law and that such a corporation may itself do anything any individual may do. The second (but less well regarded) basis is that the monarch is Herself an individual and that, as Her agents, ministers of the Crown may, therefore, do anything an individual may do. The alternative theory (which is perhaps even less well regarded) is that there is no need for the Crown to have any source of authority for doing something that any individual may do. The Crown may do it simply because it is not prohibited from doing it.


12. In order to assess the strength of the arguments advanced in support of the contention that the Crown may do anything an individual may do, it is necessary to refer to legal history, if only to understand some of the anachronisms and misconceptions that have confused recent consideration of this contention.

13. That history illustrates that it cannot be inferred that the Crown may do anything an individual may do merely from the fact that the Crown may be recognised as a corporation or


14 15

Power” in C. Forsyth and I. Hare eds The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord OUP 1998 at p86.

See Sir William Wade Constitutional Fundamentals 1989 rev ed at p59, 60, 63.

The issues are discussed inter alia in BV Harris “The ‘third source’ of authority for government action” (1992) 108 LQR 626-651; Phillip A Joseph “The Crown as a legal concept” (1993) NZLJ 126-130 (Part I) and 179 (Part II); Lord Lester of Herne Hill and M Weait “The Use of Ministerial Powers without Parliamentary Authority: the Ram doctrine” [2003] PL 415-428; M Cohn “Medieval chains, invisible inks: On non-statutory powers of the executive” (2005) 25 OJLS 97-122; BV Harris “The ‘third source’ of authority for government action revisited” (2007) 123 LQR 225-250; Woolf, Jowell and Le Sueur De Smith’s Judicial Review 6th ed at [5-022]-[5-025]; C Lewis QC Judicial Remedies in Public Law 4th ed at [2-046]-[2-051]; HWR Wade and CF Forsyth Administrative Law 10th ed 2009 at p181-183.


from the fact that Her Majesty is an individual. The attempt to equate the Crown’s powers or capacities with those of other corporations or an individual ignores the fact that in law the Crown is unique. The attempt to infer that the Crown may do anything an individual may do from the absence of any prohibition on such activities also ignores this fact and begs the question it attempts to answer. Nonetheless this historical background does not of itself necessarily show that the suggested rule is wrong. It merely shows that the justifications mainly relied on for it are unpersuasive. What the Crown may do is a question to be answered by reference to more fundamental constitutional considerations.

14. The history relating to the powers of the Crown also illustrates the confusion that results from a failure to distinguish between (a) the capacity in which something may be done, (b) what may be done in that capacity and (c) the legal status of the actor as a corporation or as an individual.

(a) the emergence of the notion of the Crown as a corporation

15. It is, of course, impossible to escape from the fact that the monarch is an individual. But it is sometimes suggested that, even in the medieval period, no distinction was drawn between the monarch and the Crown. That appears to be incorrect16: by the time of the English Civil War, “the distinction..between the office and the person of the king….was many centuries old and known in England”17. But there was an obvious practical impediment to a logical development fully recognising the different capacities, public and personal, in which the monarch might act: the fear of endorsing treason.

16. The distinction between the Crown and the individual who was the monarch for the time being was clearly made in the Declaration of 1308 by the Lords Ordainer. There it had been asserted that:




“Homage and oath of allegiance are more by reason of the Crown than by reason of the King’s person, and are more bound to the Crown than to the person. And that appears from the fact that, before the estate of the Crown has passed by descent, no allegiance is due to the person. Wherefore, if it happen that the king is not guided by reason in regard to the estate of the Crown,

See Ernst H Kantorowicz The King’s Two Bodies Princeton 1957 at p336-383; Michael Prestwich Plantagenet England 1225-1360 OUP 2005 p34-36.

See Ernst H Kantorowicz The King’s Two Bodies Princeton 1957 at p21 footnote 36. 6

his lieges, by oath sworn to the Crown, are justly bound to lead the king back to reason and to repair the estate of the Crown or else their oath would be violated..”18

It appears that reliance on the Declaration of 1308 formed part of the indictment on which the younger Hugh Despenser was tried and subsequently brutally executed in 132119. As the judges stated in Calvin’s Case (1607)20,

“In the reign of Ed. 2. the Spensers, the father and son, to cover the treason hatched in their hearts, invented this damnable and damned opinion, that homage and oath and ligeance was more by reason of the King’s Crown (that is, of his politic capacity), than by reason of the person of the King, upon which opinion they inferred execrable and detestable consequences…All of which were condemned by two Parliaments.”

17. This problem did not mean that no distinction was drawn between the public and personal capacities of the king. As Calvin’s Case itself recognised, by 1607 the courts had themselves recognised that the king had different capacities. As Sir Francis Bacon put it, “it is one thing to make things distinct, it is another to make them separable”; the king’s person and the Crown were “inseparable, though distinct”21. The legal theory through which these distinct things were rendered inseparable was the theory that the king had two bodies, a natural body and a “politic body”. This theory emerges in three cases reported by Plowden in early part of Queen Elizabeth I’s reign22. Maitland said that he did “not know where to look in the whole series of our law books for so marvellous a display of metaphysical – or we might say metaphysiological – nonsense” than these cases23. Thus in one the Judges declared24, for example, that:



19 20 21 22



See Ernst H Kantorowicz The King’s Two Bodies Princeton 1957 at p364-5. The coronation oath in 1307 on Edward II’s accession distinguished between the king and the Crown: ibid at p360.

See Michael Prestwich Plantagenet England 1225-1360 OUP 2005 at p198-9. (1607) 7 Co Rep 1a at 11a-b.
See Ernst H Kantorowicz The King’s Two Bodies Princeton 1957 at p365.

Case of Dutchy of Lancaster (1561) 1 Plow 212 at 213, 75 ER 325 at p326; Willion v Berkeley 1 Plow 223 at p243, 244-5, 250, 75 ER 339 at p370, 374, 383 ; Sir Thomas Wroth’s case (1573) 1 Plow 452 at p457, 75 ER 678 at p685. These cases are discussed in FW Maitland “The Crown as Corporation” (1901) 17 LQR 131-146 (reprinted in Hazeltine, Lapseley and Winfield eds Selected Essays CUP 1936) and Ernst H Kantorowicz The King’s Two Bodies Princeton 1957 at p7-23; see also JWF Allison English Historical Constitution CUP 2007 p50- 54.

FW Maitland “The Crown as Corporation” (1901) 17 LQR 131-146, reprinted in his Selected Essays ed by Hazeltine, Lapseley and Winfield CUP 1936 at p109.

Case of Dutchy of Lancaster (1561) 1 Plow 212 at 213, 75 ER 325 at p326. 7

“to [the monarch’s] natural Body is conjoined his Body politic…and the Body politic includes the Body natural, but the Body natural is the lesser, and with this the Body politic is consolidated. So he has a Body natural, adorned and invested with the Estate and Dignity royal; and he has not a Body natural distinct and divided by itself from the Office and Dignity royal, but a Body natural and a Body politic together indivisible; and these two Bodies are incorporated in one Person, and make one Body and not divers, that is the Body corporate in the Body natural, et e contra the Body natural in the Body corporate.”

18. The point of investing the King with two bodies was to enable the law to recognise the different capacities, public and personal, in which he or she might act whilst not distinguishing between the office and the man (or woman) who held it and in particular to ensure that allegiance was owed to the monarch as an individual, not to the office that he or she held. That emerges clearly from judgment in Calvin’s Case in which it was reaffirmed that allegiance was owed to the monarch as an individual. In that case the Judges recognised that25:

“It is true that the King hath two capacities in him: one a natural body, being descended of the blood Royal of the realm; and this body is of the creation of Almighty God, and is the subject of death, infirmity and such like; the other is a politic body or capacity so called, because it is framed by the policy of man…; and in this capacity the King is deemed to be immortal, invisible, not subject to death, infirmity, infancy, noneage &c. Now, seeing that the King hath but one person and several capacities, and one politic capacity for the realm of England, and another for the realm of Scotland, it is necessary to be considered, to which capacity ligeance is due…..The reasons and cause wherefore by the policy of the law the King is a body politic, are three, viz. 1. causa majestatis, 2 causa necessitatis, and 3. causa utilitatis. First, causa majestatis, the King cannot give or take but by matter of record for the dignity of his person. Secondly, causa necessitatis, as to avoid the attainder of him that hath a right to the Crown..lest in the interim there be an interregnum, which the law will not suffer. Also by force of this politic capacity, though the King be within age, yet he may make leases and other grants, and the same shall bind him; otherwise his revenue shall decay, and the King should not be able to reward service, &c. Lastly, causa utilitatis, as when lands and possessions descend from his collateral ancestors, being subjects, the king, now is the King seised of the same in jure Coronae, in his politic capacity; for which cause the same shall go with the Crown….And these are the causes wherefore by policy of the law the King is made a body politic: so as to these special purposes the law makes him a body politic, immortal and invisible, wheretofore our ligeance cannot appertain.”

19. It was shortly after Calvin’s Case that the judges, when setting out the background in relation to the law on corporations in 1611 in the Case of Sutton’s Hospital, stated “that every corporation or incorporation or body politic or incorporate, which are all one, either stands



See 7 Co Rep 1a at 10a and 12a-b.


upon one sole person, as the King, bishop, parson &c or aggregate of many” and that such incorporation required lawful authority by one of four means, one of which was “by the common law, as the King himself, &”26. This appears to be the first explicit recognition that that the Crown was a corporation sole at common law27. Maitland, who regarded the notion of a corporation sole (which he thought had been developed in relation to ecclesiastical offices28) as a “curious freak of English law”, treated this doctrine as the “parsonification” of the Crown2 9 .

20. The idea that the Crown was a corporation sole, reflecting the statements made in Calvin’s Case and the Case of Sutton Hospital, was repeated by Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England30. But, as Sir William Holdsworth stated31, these

“speculations as to….the corporate character of the king….remained as complimentary mystifications, not as legal doctrines from which any real deductions were drawn. Though the king was said to be a corporation sole, though he was said never to die, it has been necessary to pass many statutes, from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth, to make it clear that the king can own property in his private capacity as distinguished from his politic capacity, and to prevent ‘all the wheels of the state stopping or even running backwards’ on the demise of the crown.”

Thus, at common law, notwithstanding the recognition of the Crown as a corporation sole, on the death of the reigning monarch Parliament was dissolved, legal proceedings abated and royal commissions, whether civil or military, were abrogated with the effect of rendering


26 27



30 31

See 10 Co Rep 1a at 29b.

In the Case of Magdalen College, Cambridge (1572) 11 Co Rep 66b at 70a the Court had found that an enactment that applied to “any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate” applied to the Queen as She was a person and a body politic. The judges did not say that she was a body corporate as such.

The Dutchy of Lancaster was made a corporation by Act of Parliament in the reign of Edward IV in effect owned by the monarch for the time being in right of the Crown: see Ernst Kantorowicz The King’s Two Bodies Princeton 1957 at p401-2.

FW Maitland “The Crown as Corporation” (1901) 17 LQR 131-146 reprinted in his Selected Essays ed by Hazeltine, Lapseley and Winfield CUP 1936). He had traced the origins of the notion of a corporation sole in an article of that name also reprinted in that collection.

see at i 469-470.
History of English Law Vol 9 p5-6.


subsequent acts of office holders void unless they were reinstated by the succeeding monarch32.

21. Other developments, however, reflected and gave effect to the increasing separation between the monarch’s public and personal capacities. The period after the publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries witnessed the transformation of the King from one who ruled to one who reigned, a transformation reflected (particularly after the Reform Act of 1832) in the vesting of statutory powers in ministers of the Crown, and, associated with that, the transformation of the King from a monarch who was intended to live off his own to one who lived on a salary33. To accommodate this change, detailed statutory provision had to be made, for example, for the monarch to have personal possessions which She may deal with free from controls and restrictions which otherwise govern the Crown Estate and the revenues of the Crown, and which She may dispose of (for example) by will34.

22. This does not mean that the conception of the Crown as a corporation sole was lost from view. Statute brought other corporations sole into line with the Crown in certain respects. Thus, for example, where any property or any interest therein has been vested in “a corporation sole (including the Crown)” it now passes to the successors from time to time of that corporation (unless and until it is otherwise disposed of by the corporation)35. Similarly the fact that the Crown was to be regarded a “corporation sole” as a matter of law was occasionally alluded to subsequently in cases after the Stuart period36. It was restated by Lord Diplock in Town Investments Ltd v the Department of the Environment37. By contrast, however, in that case




Notwithstanding decisions that its operation depended on prior notice and an Act of 1696 suspending the legal consequences of a royal demise for six months after the monarch’s death, this caused particular difficulties in the colonies: see BH McPherson The Reception of English Law Abroad 2007 Supreme Court of Queensland Library at p96-97. For the legal effects of a demise of the Crown: see Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 12(1) Crown and the Royal Family 4th ed reissue at [15]-[17].

See RC van Caenegem An Historical Introduction to Western Constitutional Law CUP 1995 at p78, 125; FW Maitland The Constitutional History of England CUP 1908 p430-447.

34 See Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 12(1) Crown and the Royal Family 4th ed re-issue at [65], [67], [68], ibid Crown Property at [355]-[363].


36 37

See section 180(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. Parliament also provided that, on the demise of the Crown, all property, real and personal, vested in the Crown as a corporation sole devolves on his successor: see section 3(5) of the Administration of Estates Act 1925. Neither provision appears to have changed the position of the Crown substantially: see footnote [56] below.

See some of the cases referred to below. [1978] AC 359 at p384.


Lord Simon thought38 that the Crown

“should be considered as a corporation aggregate headed by the Queen. The departments of state including the ministers at their head (whether or not either the department or the minister has been incorporated) are then themselves members of the corporation aggregate of the Crown.”

The choice between either view was unnecessary for the decision in that case. But, as Lord Woolf subsequently said in re M 39,:

“at least for some purposes, the Crown has a legal personality. It can be appropriately described as a corporation sole or a corporation aggregate…The Crown can hold property and enter into contracts.”

23. Of more significance was the principle which was necessary to the decision in Town Investments Ltd v the Department of the Environment, that (as Lord Diplock put it) “executive acts of government that are done by any [minister] are acts done by ‘the Crown’ in the fictional sense in which that expression is now used in English public law”40. That principle in its application to the exercise of statutory powers was subsequently effectively abandoned by the Appellate Committee as being constitutionally inappropriate, whether the Crown was a corporation sole or a corporation aggregate, in in re M41. In that case the Appellate Committee recognised that what was done in the exercise of a minister’s statutory functions relating to immigration was done in his capacity as a minister, not as an agent for the Crown, and that the minister could be liable in that capacity, and not merely as an individual, for what was done in the discharge of such functions42.

24. By 1998 the position that had been reached, as Halsbury’s Laws then said, was that the practical consequences of the Crown being recognised as a corporation sole to which Crown immunities may also apply (apart from meaning that in law Crown never dies and is not regarded as a minor and that the mention of the monarch in statutes includes his successors)


38 39 40

Ibid at p400.
Ibid at p424.
Ibid at p381; cf Lord Simon at p399-400 (minister is not an entity separate from the Crown).

41 [1994] 1 AC 377; HWR Wade and CF Forsyth Administrative Law 10th ed p40 and footnote 6.


See at p426-7.


were apparently “meagre”43.

(b) the contention that as a corporation the Crown may do anything an individual may do

25. The case which is said to have established shortly afterwards, at least in the Court of Appeal, that, as a corporation sole, the Crown may do anything that an individual may do is R v the Secretary for Sate for Health ex p C44. One issue in that case was whether the Secretary of State had power to maintain a “Consultancy Service Index”, which was a unpublished list of people about whom there were doubts as to their suitability to work with children, which the Secretary of State expected all employers in the child care field to consult before employing anyone. There was then no statutory power for him to maintain such a list. The Court of Appeal held that, as any individual could lawfully have done what the Secretary of State did, maintaining the list was lawful. The Court of Appeal simply followed a statement in a footnote elsewhere in Halsbury’s Laws of England (for which no authority was cited) that “at common law the Crown, as a corporation possessing legal personality, has the capacities of a natural person and thus the same liberties as the individual”45.

26. The basis for this statement46 was Blackstone’s doctrine that there “five powers inseparably incident to every corporation, at least to every corporation aggregate”, the first of which (necessarily and inseparably incident to all corporations in his view) was the power “to sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded, grant or receive, by its corporate name and do all other things as natural persons may”47. The origin for this doctrine appears to be statements in the report of

43 See Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 12(1) Crown and the Royal Family 4th ed reissue at [7] and footnote 10. This repeated what Sir William Holdsworth had said in an earlier edition.


44 45



[2000] 1 FLR 627, [2000] 1 FCR 471, [2000] All ER D 215.

Ibid at [17] referring to footnote 6 to paragraph [101] to Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol8(2) Constitutional LawandHumanRights4th ed.AtfirstinstanceRichardsJgavenoreasonformakingthesameassertion:see [1999] 1 FLR 1073, [1999] Fam Law 295.

The footnote in Halsbury’s Laws refers to paragraph [6] of the same volume of Halsbury’s Laws which states that “the Crown is a corporation sole or aggregate and so has general legal capacity, including (subject to some statutory limitations and limitations imposed by European law) the capacity to enter into contracts and to own and dispose of property” (emphasis added).

See Commentaries on the Laws of England i.475-6. The two which are possibly inseparably linked only to corporations aggregate were a corporate seal and the power to make by-laws for the better government of the corporation. This doctrine is presumably the basis for the statement in Chitty on Contracts 29th ed Vol 1 at [10-004] that “as a non-statutory corporation sole the contracts of the Crown are not subject to the ultra vires doctrine.


the Case of Sutton’s Hospital about the incidents of incorporation by the Crown48 which do not include the words italicised. It may be doubtful whether this addition was then justified in relation chartered corporations49. However this doctrine, for whatever it may be worth, did not survive the recognition in the nineteenth century that the powers which a statutory corporation created for specific purposes may lawfully use must either be expressly conferred or derived by reasonable implication from the provisions of any relevant enactment50. The doctrine has nonetheless remained the conventional view about chartered corporations51, albeit with the modification that a chartered corporation may be restrained by one of its members from doing anything which its charter does not authorise52. It thus leads to the paradoxical result that a corporation created by statute has less power than one created by an exercise of a prerogative power. But in any event, as the House of Lords held in Hazell v Hammersmith LBC53, “the doctrine applies only to a corporation created by an exercise of the Royal Prerogative”. The Crown is not such a corporation.


48 49





See 10 Co Rep 1a at 30a-31a.

There are, of course, certain subsidiary powers which are normally incident to any person, legal or physical. The nearest the report comes to Blackstone’s doctrine is the statement that, if the charter of incorporation imposes a restraint on alienation or of alienation in a particular form, “that is an ordinance testifying the King’s desire, but it is but a precept, and doth not bind in law”. Generalising from that statement (which may merely reflect contemporary legal restraints on imposing restrictions on alienation such as the statutes relating to mortmain), as Blackstone appears to, so that a corporation can do anything a natural person may regardless of any limitation in its constitution, is an assumption which may not have been justified: see Percy T Cardon “Limitations on the powers of common law corporations” (1910) 26 LQR 320-330.

See per Lord Watson Baroness Wenlock v the River Dee Corporation (1885) 10 App Cas 354 at p362-3; The Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Company (Limited) v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653

See per Blackburn J and Archibold J (obiter) in Riche v Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Company (1874) LR 9 Exch 224 at p263-4 and p292. In consequence the assumption was repeated by other judges subsequently: see eg per Bowen LJ Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Co (1886) 36 Ch D 675 n, 685n; British South Africa Company v De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited [1910]; per Lord Denning Institution of Mechanical Engineers v Cane [1961] AC 696 at p724-5; Dickson v the Pharmaceutical Society [1970] AC 403 per Lord Upjohn at p434. The assumption also underlay a number of cases dealing with municipal corporations created by Royal Charter under the Municipal Corporations Act 1834. It was found not to be correct in such cases in Hazell v Hammersmith LBC [1992] 1 AC 1.

See Dickson v the Pharmaceutical Society [1970] AC 403 following Jenkin v the Pharmaceutical Society [1921] 1 Ch 392.

[1992] 2 AC 1 at p39. It thus did not apply to a municipal corporation created by royal charter issued pursuant to a statute. Following Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King [1916] 1 AC 566, the Appellate Committee held that “where a statute authorises the grant of a Royal Charter, then, the extent of the powers exercisable by a corporation created by a charter granted pursuant to the statute will depend on the true construction and intent of the statute”: see [1992] 2 AC 1 at p41.


27. Any attempt to treat the Crown as if it is like any other corporation is not sustainable54. As Sir Francis Bacon once said55, “the corporation of the Crown utterly differeth from all other corporations within the realm.” Thus the Crown could take personal estate or the benefit of a personal contract even when a corporation sole could not (except by special custom)56. As Littledale J stated in that regard57, “the King is altogether on a different footing from other corporations sole.” Similarly a grant of land had formerly to be made expressly to the corporation sole and his successors, otherwise the actual holder of the office took an estate for life in his personal capacity58. By contrast at common law the monarch could not hold land in his natural capacity (except in the right of the Duchy of Lancaster) and land acquired by the monarch vested in the Crown as a corporation sole59. Unsurprisingly, as Romer J once stated, the Crown differs “in many respects” from other corporations sole60. Indeed, simply looking at Blackstone’s list of powers, which he and the judges in the Case of Sutton’s Hospital thought were necessary incidents of incorporation, the Crown does not generally have the very first powers there mentioned as a matter of English law, the power to be sue and be sued61. As Lord



55 56

It is not obvious that Blackstone himself ever made the attempt. As he said, “corporations sole consist of one person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are incorporated by law, in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In this sense the king is a sole corporation..,,the made a corporation to prevent in general the possibility of an interregnum or vacancy of the throne, and to preserve the possessions of the crown entire; for immediately upon the demise of one king, his successor full possession of the regal rights and dignity”: Commentaries on the Laws of England i. 469-470.

Post-nati in J Spedding and DD Heath eds The Works of Sir Francis Bacon 1892 at p667.

For the position generally: see Fulwood’s Case (1598) 4 Co Rep 64b at 65a and Power v Banks [1901] 2 Ch 487 at p495. Accordingly, in the case of other corporations sole, personal estate on death went to the personal representatives, executors or administrators of the holder of a corporation sole (rather than to his successor in that office): see Mirehouse v Rennel (1833) 1 Clark & Finnelly 527 HL. The position of the Crown was different: see Howley v Knight (1849) 14 QB 240 per Coleridge J at p253 and Wightman J at p255; Mirehouse v Rennel supra per Gaselee J at p563 and Baron Bayley at p567 contrasting the position of the Crown. The position is now different for corporations sole generally in consequence of sections 180(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and section 3(5) of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 cf per Russell LJ Hayward v Chaloner [1968] 1 QB 107 at p123; Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 9(2) Corporations 4th ed reissue at footnote 5 to [1248].


by section 60 of the Law of Property Act 1925.
59 See Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 12(1) Crown and Royal Family 4th ed reissue at [65].

Rennell v the Bishop of Lincoln (1827) 7 B&C 113 at p168, 108 ER 667 at p 686.
58 See Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 9(2) Corporations 4th ed reissue at [1248]. The position was changed

60 61

See in re Mason [1928] 1 Ch 385 at p402.
Prosecutions and claims for judicial review may be brought in the name of the Crown.


Woolf has pointed out62, “even after the [Crown Proceedings] Act of 1947, [the Crown] cannot conduct litigation except in the name of an authorised government department or, in the case of judicial review, in the name of a minister”. It is also plain that as a matter of English law the Crown lacks the capacity to be sued. Indeed that incapacity led the Court of Appeal at one stage (erroneously) to think that the Crown had no legal personality at all63. There is thus no necessary identity between the capacity of the Crown as a corporation and the capacity of other corporations.

28. Indeed, even the Court of Appeal in R v the Secretary for State for Health ex p C, who thought that ministers (as agents of the Crown regarded as a corporation sole) could do anything that an individual may do, did not accept the logical consequence of that approach. Inconsistently with that approach, but consistently with the development of public law, they also took the view that in that case the Department could not “have an unfettered discretion to operate the list in whatever way it chooses” and, if exercised unreasonably or unfairly, such powers as it thus had would not be lawfully exercised64. On that basis, ministers exercising any powers that the Crown may have as a corporation sole are not free to do anything that an individual is free to do.

29. More crudely what may underlie this approach (and indeed Blackstone’s view of corporations generally) is a view of what having legal personality involves. As it was once put, “in the absence of any superadded disability, legal personality implies the plenary powers of a natural person”65. But this is simply wrong. Statutory corporations, although they are legal persons, do not have “any superadded disability”. Nor do others recognised as having legal personality necessarily have “the plenary powers of a natural person”. For example, the


62 63

64 65

In re M [1994] 1 AC 377 at p424.

See M v the Home Office [1992] QB 270 per Sir John Donaldson at p300-302, 307, per McCowan LJ at p308; In re Pan American World Airways Inc. and others’ application [1992] QB 854, 860. This was found to be an error by the Appellate Committee in M v the Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377 at p424.

Supra at [23]-[24], [28] and [31].

See Phillip A Joseph “The Crown as a legal concept (1)” (1993) NZLJ 126-130 at p126. This is how Underhill J interpreted the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v the Secretary of State for Health ex p C: he thought that in that case the Court of Appeal had thought that the Crown was able to do anything anyone may do as “it was within the powers of the Crown simply by virtue of its having legal personality”: see Shrewsbury & Atcham BC v the Secretary of State for Communities and others [2007] EWHC 2279 (Admin) at [16]. Newman J interpreted the decision of the Court of Appeal in the same way in R v Worcester CC ex p SW [2000] EWHC 392 (Admin) at [22].


councils of London boroughs are not statutory corporations but they have a legal personality recognised by law and can sue and be sued. Yet they have no powers other than those vested in them by enactment66.

30. Seeking to derive the Crown’s powers from those which other corporations may have, or from the recognition that the Crown has legal personality, begs the relevant questions. Treating the Crown as a corporation or as a legal person is a recognition that there is an office which is distinct from the holder of the office for the time being. But of itself that does not reveal anything about what may be done by virtue of that office. Any assumption that the answer to this question is to be found as a matter of constitutional law today by reference to the conception developed in the late sixteenth century of the King’s two Bodies or the incidents of chartered or ecclesiastical corporations at that time or subsequently does not merely display a poor historical understanding, one which fails to recognise that the Crown is unique: it is an attempt to avoid the need for any legal analysis of the constitutional position of the Crown. What may be learnt from the history of the Crown as a corporation is that there is a public and private capacity in which Her Majesty may act which has been progressively recognised. That is reflected, for example, in the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, which does not apply to proceedings by or against “His Majesty in His private capacity”67, and in the legislation giving the Queen private possessions which She may deal with free from controls and restrictions than would otherwise limit what She might do with such revenues and property in her public capacity. But what may be done in each capacity is another question.

(c) the contention that the Crown as a natural person may do anything an individual is free to do

31. Another basis for contending that a government minister may do anything which an individual may do is that the monarch is a natural person and that the minister is merely acting as that individual’s agent.

32. This assertion is frequently made in connection with the Crown’s capacity to contract68. The


66 67 68

See Hazell v Hammersmith LBC [1990] 2 QB 697 CA at p779; [1992] AC 1.

See section 40(1) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947.

See eg C Turpin Government Contracts 1972 p19; T Dainteth Regulation by Contract: the New Prerogative (1979) 32CLP 42 at p42; Hogg and Monahan Liability of the Crown 3rd ed; ACL Davies The Public Law of Government Contracts OUP 2008 p43.


issue in this area is not whether the Crown has any capacity to enter into contracts – plainly it has. The question is whether it has a power to enter into a contract for any purpose or involving anything that an individual may do because the monarch is a natural person. Moreover, precisely because any person’s powers cannot be enlarged merely by entering into an agreement with others, this assertion about the Crown’s contractual capacity must be parasitic on the more general proposition that the Crown may do anything an individual may do merely because the monarch is a natural person.

33. There are two cases in the Canadian Supreme Court which support this proposition, Verreault & Fils v Attorney General of the Province of Quebec [1977] 1 RCS 41 and Attorney General of Quebec v Labrecque [1980] SCR 1057. In the first, it was simply stated that“Her Majesty is clearly a physical person” who may authorise contracts69. In the second it was stated70 that “the Crown is also the Sovereign, a physical person who, in addition to the prerogative, enjoys a general capacity to contract in accordance with the rule of ordinary law”71.

34. Apart from these two cases in the Canadian Supreme Court, however, it is difficult to find any decisions which purport to decide that this is what gives the Crown its contractual capacity and that this is its contractual capacity72. It is sometimes suggested, for example, that the rule


69 70

Per Pigeon J at p47.

Per Beetz J p1082.

71 It was on the basis of this case that it was stated in HWR Wade and CF Forsyth Administrative Law 9th ed at p792 that “the Crown is free to make contracts (though not to spend money) without statutory authority since it enjoys the powers of a natural person.”


Professor Arrowsmith has argued that “in the field of contract it was held in the Bankers’ Case (which concerned a contract to borrow money) that the Crown had all the powers of a natural person, including the power to enter into contracts. Thus it was concluded that the Crown could make a contract for any purpose without obtaining the approval of Parliament”: see The Law of Public Procurement and Utilities Procurement 2nd ed p40; cf also her Civil Liability and Pubic Authorities (1992) at p7. In fact that case did not involve any such ruling: see the reports of the case at 14 ST 1 and Skinner 602. It involved a suit for failure to pay annuities (which had been granted by letters patent under the great seal) out of Charles II’s hereditary excise. The annuities were payable in respect of moneys which had been borrowed by the Crown to finance a war. It was held that the monarch had such a power of alienation of its own revenues. The case is mainly of significance as it established that a petition of right would lie for breach of contract resulting in unliquidated damages: see Thomas v the Queen (1874) LR 10 QB 31 at p39-44. Holt CJ thought that “the intent and wording of the act [that vested the revenue for an estate in fee] that the king should have a right and liberty of alienating and charging this estate”. Given that, his observation that “it is against the nature of the being of a king that he should have less power than his people” was obiter. He also referred to the


that the Crown has the capacity to enter into any contract which it is not prohibited from entering, expressly or by implication, is illustrated by the decision in New South Wales v Bardolph73. The reference normally made is to the judgment at first instance by Evatt J. He stated obiter that at common law “the King…never seems to have been regarded as being less powerful to enter into contracts than one of his subjects”74. But, in looking at the power of the Crown in Australia, he thought that, to be enforceable, the contract had to be “entered into in the ordinary and necessary course of Government administration”75. In that case it was: it concerned the acquisition of advertising space for the Government Tourist Board. This was not regarded as an irrelevant matter. When the case was heard in the High Court, Dixon J (with whom Gavan Duffy CJ agreed) considered that “no statutory power to make a contract in the ordinary course of administering a recognised part of the government of the State appears to me to be necessary in order that, if made by the appropriate servant, it should become the contract of the Crown, and, subject to the provision of funds to answer it, binding upon the Crown” and that, accordingly in that case, “it is a matter of primary importance that the subject matter of the contract, notwithstanding its commercial character, concerned a recognised and regular activity of Government in New South Wales”76. Similarly, according to Rich J77, “the Crown has a power independent of statute to make such contracts for the public service as are incidental to the ordinary and well recognised functions of Government.” This decision thus recognises the subsidiary nature of a power to contract and requires the primary function in the discharge of which the contract assists to be an established function of government.

35. To base the government’s power to act or to make contracts today, however, on the fact that the monarch is an individual, a “physical person”, may appeal to those whose conception of


73 74 75 76 77

monarch’s need to alienate his revenue in order to borrow in cases of need but there appears to have been no issue about whether the King had power to borrow or whether, if there had been any limitations on it, they might have affected the validity of the letters patent: see 14 ST 1 at p30. This case does not appear to have decided even in 1700 that the Crown may do (and has a contractual capacity to do) anything an individual is free to do by virtue of the fact that the monarch is an individual. The case dates, however, from a different legal era in terms of the use of public revenues (a concept which indeed scarcely existed when the letters patent in that case were granted in 1677). Moneys are now payable out of the National Loans Fund under statutory authority: see section 1(3) National Loans Act 1968.

(1934) 52 CLR 455. see at p475.
see at p474.
See at p508 and 507.

at p496.


government remains feudal. As Lord Diplock has said78,

“the continuous evolution of the constitution of this country [is] from that of personal rule by a feudal landowning monarch to the constitutional monarchy of today; but the vocabulary used by lawyers in the field of public law has not kept pace with this evolution and remains more apt to the constitutional realities of the Tudor or even the Norman monarchy than to the constitutional realities of the 20th century.”

When a minister enters a contract “the act in question is the act of the executive. To talk of that act as the act of the sovereign savours of the archaism of past centuries”79.

36. Of course the monarch may now enter into contracts in Her private capacity but the contracts entered into by ministers in exercising the Crown’s executive powers are not entered into for the monarch as an individual. They are entered into by the executive in Crown’s public capacity. Thus, if Ministers were acting on behalf of the physical person who is the monarch for the time being, it would produce odd and unacceptable consequences. One of the reasons why the Crown was recognised as having a body politic, and thus as being a corporation sole, was to avoid the consequences in terms of a monarch’s incapacity or diminished capacity when a child or otherwise suffering from a disability80. Similarly the public executive capacity in which the monarch acted gave rise to the vesting of real property in the Crown as a corporation sole and to the Crown, unlike other corporations sole, being able to hold personal property and take the benefit of personal contracts81. Treating revenues payable to Exchequer which should not have been obtained by the Crown as having been received by the individual who was the monarch could once have left the person entitled to the money with no claim against the monarch’s successor. The doctrine that the Crown was a corporation sole may have been capable of being invoked to avoid that unjust result82.


78 79 80 81 82

Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 at p380.
Per Lord Roskill Council of Civil Service Unions v the Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at p417h. see paragraph [18] above.
See paragraph [27] above.

One of the rights of the Crown is to payment as bona vacantia of the personal estate of an intestate who leaves no next of kin to the Treasury Solicitor and thus (under the arrangements for the Civil List) into the Exchequer. In one case the Treasury Solicitor, acting as nominee for the Crown and for the use and benefit of His Majesty, having obtained letters of administration, in error (as there were in fact such kin) paid an intestate’s estate to the King’s Proctor and it was received on behalf of George III. In Attorney General v Kohler (1861) IX HLC 654 the House of Lords held that a subsequent Treasury Solicitor would not have been liable for the error of his predecessor but for an admission of liability. However, although there had


37. Moreover treating contracts made by the Crown as if they were made by the physical person who is the monarch would also produce ludicrous results in terms of the relations between the different territories in respect of which executive power is vested in the Queen. As the judges in Calvin’s Case stated, the King had several “politic” capacities, one for England and one for Scotland. Further the Crown became “separate and divisible” in relation to different overseas territories in right of which the monarch was Head of State so that inter alia the debts incurred by the Crown in respect of one territory were not the debts of the Crown in another83. An agreement between the governments of two separate territories would plainly be an agreement between two different legal persons even though the executive power may be vested in each territory in Her Majesty84. Each such legal person may be described as a corporation sole. But what would make no sense would be to describe such an agreement as one in respect of which each party was the same physical person.

38. Despite its peculiarity, what that doctrine of the King’s two Bodies (and the cases) recognised was that the Crown had two capacities which needed to be distinguished in each territory in respect of which the government was the Queen’s: public and private. As Thomas




not been full argument, Lord Cranworth expressed the view obiter that, although the Crown is a corporation sole, Queen Victoria (like others who may be a corporator sole) could not be liable for money paid in error to, and spent by, a predecessor (a view also shared by Lord Chelmsford): see at p671-3, 687-8. A subsequent attempt in in re Mason [1928] Ch 385 to make the Crown liable in a similar case foundered on a defence of limitation. But Romer J (again obiter) thought that the Crown should have been liable on the basis that the money was received by it as a corporation sole, thus providing a remedy for money wrongly received as public revenues. Romer J also thought that the analogy drawn by Lord Cranworth between the Crown and other corporations sole was “a false analogy” as in the case of devolution of property on death “the Crown differs from most other corporations sole…It differs, too, in many other respects”: see at p402.

See Attorney-General v Great Southern and Western Ry. Co. of Ireland [1925] AC 754, at p773-4, 779; Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106 at p231-2; R v Foreign Secretary ex p Indian Association of Alberta and others [1982] QB 892 CA at p916-8, 920-3, 928-33. Thus the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 does not apply in respect of any proceedings in respect of any liability of the Crown arising otherwise than in respect of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom or the Scottish Administration: see section 40 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. Within the United Kingdom, the position that property, rights and liabilities may be held by the Crown in right of different areas is reflected in section 99 of the Scotland Act 1998 and section 89 of the Government of Wales Act 2006.

This is supported by the decision in In re Holmes (1861) 2 J&H 527 where the suppliants invoked the jurisdiction of the English Courts to determine a dispute about land in Canada vested in Her Majesty on the ground that She was physically present in the United Kingdom. As Sir William Page said at p543, “it is said that the Queen is present here, and therefore amenable (by virtue of the recent Act) to the jurisdiction of this Court. But it would be at least as correct to say that, as the holder of Canadian land for the public purposes of Canada, the Queen should be considered as present in Canada, and out of the jurisdiction of this Court. This alone supplies a sufficient answer to the argument of the suppliants.”


Hobbes put it, “the distinction between natural and politick Capacity…is good: For natural capacity, and politick Capacity signifie no more than private and public right”85. Thus, as Lord Diplock stated86,

“to use as a metaphor the symbol of royalty, “the Crown,” was no doubt a convenient way of denoting and distinguishing the monarch when doing acts of government in his political capacity from the monarch when doing private acts in his personal capacity, at a period when legislative and executive powers were exercised by him in accordance with his own will.”

There is no convincing reason why constitutional law should approach what the Crown may do as if the constitution was at an even earlier stage in its evolution when it could not be said that there was a constitutional monarchy. Reflecting that development, what the Crown does (with the exception of the monarch’s private acts in Her personal capacity) should be treated as being done by the Crown in its public, institutional capacity, not by a physical person, but rather (if so desired) by the Crown as a corporation sole. Treating what the government may do as being done by the physical person who is the monarch is antiquarianism masquerading as contemporary legal analysis.

39. But, even if what the Crown does in its public capacity should be regarded as being done by the physical person who is the monarch, it simply begs the question to assume that when acting in that capacity the monarch may do anything that an individual may do. The monarch is not able to do everything that an individual may do. The monarch cannot sue or be sued. After an individual becomes the monarch, that individual cannot not acquire real property and dispose of it by will as he or she chooses as an ordinary individual may (other than in the exercise of the statutory powers referred to above), as land which the monarch acquires is vested in the Crown as a corporation sole. The physical person who is the monarch cannot disclaim contracts made while a minor. Indeed in its public capacity the Crown has seemingly been incapable of employing servants on terms which did not make them dismissible at will. It is thus wrong, and almost on a par with the “meta-physiological” confusions that beset the doctrine of the King’s two Bodies, to assert that “when the institutional crown evolved as a legal concept, kingship imported to it all the natural gifts and endowments of human




Thomas Hobbes ed J Cropsey A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England 1971 Univ of Chicago Press at p162.

Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 at p380. 21

personality”8 7 .

40. There is a fundamental problem, therefore, with trying to answer the question of what ministers may do by reference to what a corporation sole or an individual may do88. It is to seek an answer by equating the Crown with something else ignoring the legal fact that the Crown is unique.

(d) the theory that it is the absence of a prohibition that gives the Crown freedom to act

41. The final basis which has been suggested for the rule that the Crown may do anything that any individual may do is radically different. It disclaims the need to find any source of authority for that freedom. It is said to be sufficient that the Crown is not prohibited from doing something. This appears to be what is sometimes called the “Ram doctrine”, named after a memorandum by the then First Parliamentary counsel, Sir Granville Ram, in November 1945, that “a Minister may do anything that he is not precluded from doing”89.

42. If there is any legal basis for this approach it rests on a particular conception of what in law constitutes a power. As Sir William Wade put it “legal ability to alter people’s rights, duties or status under the laws of this country which the courts of this country enforce”90; “power in the legal sense means doing something which can have an effect on


87 88



See Phillip A Joseph The Crown as a legal concept II (1993) NZLJ 179 at p179-180.

See eg G Winteron The Prerogative in novel situations (1983) 99 LQR 407 at p409: “deriving from the fact that the monarch is a natural person as well as a corporation sole, unless the common law or statute provides to the contrary, the executive can do whatever private citizens can do, and that is whatever is not legally forbidden to them.” This contention has the added obscurity of envisaging unspecified common law prohibitions on the executive doing what a private citizen may do. But this obscurity should not conceal the fact that the formulation involves a recognition that the proposition that the executive may do whatever a private citizen may do is untrue and that the equation of the Crown’s powers with those of an individual, whether derived from the comparison with the powers of a corporation sole or a natural person is false.

The Memorandum was reprinted as an Annex to Appendix 3 to the Eighth Report of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. Craies on Legislation 9th ed 2008 contains a series of Parliamentary Questions on this doctrine by Lord Lester of Herne Hill and answers given by the then Parliamentary Secretary in the Lord Chancellor’s Department, Baroness Scotland of Asthal in 2003 at p885-889. In those answers she sought to base this doctrine on the Crown’s status as a corporation sole: see p886. As Lord Lester subsequently pointed out in”The use of ministerial powers without Parliamentary authority: the Ram Doctrine” [2003] PL 415 at p420, Sir Grenville Ram, unlike Baroness Scotland, did not rely on the Crown’s status as a corporation sole as the legal justification for his views.

See Constitutional Fundamentals 1989 rev ed at p58. 22

someone’s legal position”91. It is this conception of a power which underlay his restricted conception of the prerogative92. On this view there is a fundamental distinction to be drawn between the capacity, freedom or liberty to do something, and the powers of the Crown and indeed those of any other person. On this basis “the Crown’s natural capacities are not legally powers” and it is important to make that distinction (so one of its advocates stated) since “the truth is that, once the Crown’s natural capacities (liberties/freedoms) are committed to the legal categories of ‘powers’, it becomes relevant to ask the source of those powers, and perforce to deny any exist”93.

43. The theory that there is a marked distinction between a person’s legal capacity and his legal powers implies implausibly that a person has a capacity or legal ability to do what he has no legal power to do. But the conception of a legal power on which this approach rests is not merely implausible: it is false. There are innumerable enactments enabling statutory bodies to do things that individuals are free to do, such as providing financial assistance to others and disposing of property. No one has the slightest difficulty in recognising such enactments as conferring the legal power to do such things on the statutory bodies concerned. Similarly there is nothing linguistically improper in describing the Crown’s capacity to issue passports, to bind the United Kingdom in international law or to request the extradition of an offender from a State with whom the United Kingdom has no treaty94 as legal powers it has, even though those powers do not alter anyone’s rights, duties or status as a matter of domestic law. Indeed Blackstone in the passage dealing with the powers inseparably incident to a corporation regarded the ability to do all things as a natural person may as one of those powers.

44. This attempt to base the Crown’s ability to do anything that an individual may do if it is not prohibited from doing it on its legal capacity rather than on any powers that it may have also shares the same fundamental difficulty as the other attempts considered above based on the status of the Crown as a corporation and on the fact that the monarch is a natural person. It begs the relevant question about what legal capacity the Crown has when acting in a public

91 Letter to the Times May 18th 1989 quoted in BV Harris “The ‘third source of authority’ for government action” (1992) LQR 626 at p645.


92 93 94

See paragraph [10] above.
See Phillip AJ Joseph “The Crown as a legal concept II” (1993) NZLJ 179 at p181-2.

Cf Barton v Commonwealth [1974] HCA 20; (1974) 131 CLR 477; Oates v Attorney-General (Cth) [2003] HCA 21; 214 CLR 496.


capacity. This argument has necessarily to assume that the Crown has a “natural” legal capacity which is identified by equating that capacity with that which any natural person has. This argument again thus ignores the fact that legally the Crown is unique. Quite apart from any statutory powers, its legal capacity is, for example, by virtue of its prerogative powers (even on the definitions suggested by Blackstone and Sir William Wade) and its immunities, quite unlike the legal capacity of anyone else.

45. The most notorious case that may be said to support the approach that a minister may do anything that he is not prohibited from doing is Malone v the Metropolitan Police Commissioner95. It is doubtful whether the decision in that case in fact supports that conclusion. The case concerned the legality of recordings of telephone conversations by the Post Office for use by the police in the prevention or detection of crime. Section 80 of the Post Office Act 1969 provided that a requirement could be laid on the Post Office to do what was necessary to inform designated persons holding office under the Crown concerning matters and things transmitted, or in the course of transmission, by means of postal or telecommunications services “for the like purposes and in the like manner as, at the passing of this Act” (which made the Post Office a statutory corporation), a similar requirement could have been laid on the Postmaster General. How that requirement could have been imposed was also revealed by another provision of the 1969 Act which provided a defence to various offences of disclosure by employees of the Post Office if the act “was done in obedience to a warrant under the hand of the Secretary of State”. As Sir Robert Megarry found, therefore, in the 1969 Act itself “Parliament has provided a clear recognition of the warrant of the Home Secretary as having an effective function in law, both as providing a defence to certain criminal charges, and also as amounting to an effective requirement for the Post Office to do certain acts”96. In other words the 1969 Act assumed that the Home Secretary had power to issue a warrant imposing the relevant requirement and the enactments could not be given effect without giving effect to that assumption. Accordingly, whether or not the assumption was correct, the 1969 Act gave it legal effect97.

46. What gives the judgment its notoriety, however, was a reason Sir Robert Megarry gave for


95 96 97

[1979] Ch 344.
See [1979] Ch 344 at p370c-372c with the conclusion at p372b-c.
Cf Birmingham Corporation v West Midlands Baptist Trust [1970] AC 874 per Lord Reid at p898.


rejecting the contention that telephone tapping was unlawful as there was no authority conferred to undertake it. As he put it,

“The underlying assumption of this contention, of course, is that nothing is lawful that is not positively authorised by law. As I have indicated, England is not a country where everything is forbidden except what is expressly permitted. One possible illustration is smoking. I inquired what positive authority was given by the law to permit people to smoke. Mr. Ross-Munro accepted that there was none; but tapping, he said, was different…I do not find this argument convincing…Neither in principle nor in authority can I see any justification for this view, and I reject it. If the tapping of telephones by the Post Office at the request of the police can be carried out without any breach of the law, it does not require any statutory or common law power to justify it: it can lawfully be done simply because there is nothing to make it unlawful.”

47. In fact these observations were avowedly obiter dicta since the only telephone tapping in issue in that case was pursuant to a Home Office warrant with which the Post Office was required by statute to comply and Sir Robert Megarry’s decision was expressly limited to that98. Insofar as this case sheds any light on the Crown’s capacity when the Post Office was not a statutory corporation, however, the light thus cast is in fact against these dicta. Section 80 of the Post Office Act 1969 indicated that the Home Secretary’s capacity to require crown servants to do as he wanted in this respect was not the same as any other employer (assuming that such an analogy was possible): his requirement had to be expressed in a particular manner and could only be imposed for certain purposes. It is thus unsurprising that Taylor J (as he then was) was subsequently prepared in R v the Home Secretary ex p Ruddock99 to consider on an application for judicial review whether a warrant issued by the Home Secretary had been issued for an improper purpose or whether no reasonable person could have thought that its issue fell within the guidelines which the Home Secretary had promulgated for issuing such warrants.

48. The notion that Government ministers may do anything which there is no law prohibiting them from doing and that the search for any authority to do any such thing is misconceived has attracted others100. In particular Hobhouse LJ (as he then was) based his dissenting judgment


98 99 100

See [1979] Ch 344 at p382h-383b, 383h-384c.

[1987] 1 WLR 1482.

See eg per Griffiths CJ Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139 at p157. Both Mason and Brennan JJ disowned the analogy he drew between an individual’s freedom to make any enquiry he chooses and the Crown’s power to conduct inquiries in Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers


on it when dealing with criminal injuries compensation in the Court of Appeal in R v the Home Secretary ex Fire Brigades Union101. But, by contrast, both members of the majority and those who dissented in the Appellate Committee in that case considered that payment of such compensation was something which ministers were authorised to do by virtue of the prerogative (even though any individual might pay such compensation) and was thus a power which was capable of being unlawfully abused, although they disagreed on whether it had been102.

(e) conclusion

49. The justifications mainly relied on for the alleged rule that the Crown may do anything that an individual may do are unpersuasive. It cannot be inferred that the Crown may do anything an individual may do merely from the fact that the Crown may be recognised as a corporation or from the fact that Her Majesty is an individual. The attempt to equate the Crown’s powers or capacities with those of other corporations or of an individual ignores the fact that in law the Crown is unique. Similarly the attempt to infer that the Crown may do anything an individual may do from the absence of any prohibition on such activities also ignores this fact and begs the question it attempts to answer. There is now plainly a distinction between what the Crown may do in its public or private capacity. Increasingly it may make sense to align that distinction with the distinction between things done by the Crown in its corporate capacity and in the capacity which the monarch now has as an individual. But none of this of itself answers the question of what the Crown may do in its public capacity. Indeed each of these argument may be seen, as Maitland put it, as “a convenient cover for ignorance: it saves us from asking difficult questions”.


101 102

Federation (1982) 152 CLR 25 at p89 and p156-7. In neither case, however, was it necessary to decide whether the source of the power to hold an inquiry to obtain information for public purposes was a prerogative power or simply a freedom to do something anyone might do: see per Gibbs CJ ibid at [17].

See [1995] 2 AC 513 at p531b-c, 533f, 534h-535b.

Ibid per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at p549e-g, 554a-h, Lord Nicholls at p573g, 578b-c; Lord Keith (diss) at p545a-h, 546d-e; Lord Mustill (diss) at p561c-d, 564g-565a. Lord Lloyd also recognised that the power to pay compensation involved an exercise of the prerogative but did not decide the case on the basis that it had been abused: see p573c-d.



(a) the nature and importance of the issue

50. In a written answer on February 25th 2003, responding to a question from Lord Lester of Herne Hill about the circumstances in which, and the number of occasions on which, Ministers of the Crown and their departments had relied upon the Ram doctrine as the legal basis for the exercise of their public powers, the then Parliamentary Secretary in the Lord Chancellor’s Department, Baroness Scotland of Asthal, said that:

“During the past five years, as in previous periods, the common law powers of the Crown have often been relied upon as the legal basis for government action. Common law powers form the basis of such governmental actions as entering into contracts, employing staff, conveying property and other management functions not provided for by statute expressly or by implication. To require parliamentary authority for every exercise of the common law powers exercisable by the Crown either would impose upon Parliament an impossible burden or produce legislation that simply reproduced the common law.”

51. This was a carefully crafted answer. The only specific examples provided of the activities which the “common law” powers of the Crown are said to justify are examples of activities falling within the subsidiary powers which are ordinarily incidental to the discharge of, and thus implied by, the primary powers which a person may have. The legal issue concerns such primary powers. No one has suggested that the Crown’s primary powers are limited to such statutory powers as Her Majesty may have. There are also established “prerogative” powers authorising primary activities – whether those powers fall within the definition of the prerogative given by Blackstone or within that given by Dicey such as (for example) bounties by way of redress of hardship. The issue concerns new primary activities which are not authorised by such an established non-statutory power and who is to decide whether, and if so, in what circumstances and on what terms the executive may engage in them.

52. It is obviously true that finding that the Crown may do anything an individual may do does not mean that it can interfere with the rights or property of others, use force or change the law. But such a rule would still give the executive substantial powers in practice, powers that it may abuse. It would enable the executive (for example) to spend money, to provide others with financial assistance, goods or services, to deploy or use property103 and other resources, obtain



Disregarding for this purpose the Crown Estate which is under the management of the Crown Estate


any information and seek to persuade others to do things in just the same way and for the same purposes as anyone else may. No doubt there are nonetheless some limitations on what the executive may thus do. These may arise by virtue of statutory prohibitions, express or implied. Thus a minister may not act incompatibly with an individual’s Convention rights or with European law or with the proper discharge of his own statutory functions. Ministers must also obtain authority for any sums required to be taken out of the Consolidated Fund. But the issue of what ministers may do is important as a matter of constitutional law. The question may have had more limited practical significance when the monarch was dealing with his own limited resources; taxation was less frequent and lighter; and the institutions and functions of government were less extensive. But the legal issue inevitably becomes of more significance practically as the resources and capabilities at the disposal of the executive, and its role in economic life, have expanded. It is now, as Lord Nicholls has said104, “a difficult question with far-reaching constitutional implications”.

(b) the scope for abuse of unfettered power

53. English public law has traditionally been concerned with limiting the scope for abuse of powers that public authorities may have. The prerogative was once regarded as immune from that concern. The courts would consider the existence and extent of any prerogative power claimed but not the propriety of its exercise. But that immunity from judicial review of any abuse of such a power was recognisably lost as a result of the GCHQ case in 1984105.

54. The claim that the Crown may do anything an individual may do logically involves a claim that Ministers have an unfettered discretion in doing such things. But, as Sir William Wade once pointed out (in a passage subsequently approved by the Appellate Committee106),

“The powers of public authorities are…essentially different from those of private persons… a public authority [must act] reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds






See Council of Civil Service Unions and others v the Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at p397g- 400d, 407a-g, 409b-d, 411c-h, 414c-415c, 416c-419c, 423h-424b; R (Bancoult) v the Foreign Secretary [2008] UKHL 61, [2008] 3 WLR 955, at [35], [71], [105], [120], [162] et seq.

See R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex parte Chetnik Developments Ltd [1988] AC 858 at p872. 28

See R (Hooper) v the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 29, [2005] 1 WLR 1681, at [5]-

of public interest. Unfettered discretion is wholly inappropriate to a public authority, which possesses powers solely in order that it may use them for the public good”.

Indeed the existence of the tort of misfeasance in public office is itself a refutation of any theory that there is no legal difference in the ways in which individuals and public authorities may act.

55. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the courts have been willing to review the propriety of things which the executive has done which an ordinary individual may also do. Indeed the GCHQ case, which concerned the terms upon which persons were to be offered employment by the Crown at that establishment, is just such a case as are cases about the dismissal of civil servants and of members of the armed forces107. Thus, for example the courts have been prepared to review a number of activities which ministers have undertaken which any individual may also do to ascertain whether there has been an abuse of power, for example in relation to the payment (or non-payment) of compensation under schemes for domestic criminal injuries108, overseas criminal injuries109; miscarriages of justice and wrongful arrest110 and for imprisonment by the Japanese during the last World War111 . Even when the Court of Appeal held in R v the Secretary of State for Health ex p C that the Crown, as corporation sole, could do anything any individual may do, it nonetheless held (oblivious of this obvious contradiction) that the court could find that what it did was unlawful as an abuse of power112.

56. It may nonetheless be asked whether the assertion that what a minister thus does is subject to judicial review on ordinary grounds is sufficient to prevent the abuse of power against which judicial review may normally afford protection. In this respect, the crucial problem concerns how the purposes which a minister may or may not pursue, and how what may be


107 108

109 110



See Ministry of Defence v Smith [1996] QB 517.
See R v CICB ex p Lain [1967] 2 QB 864; R v CICB ex p Ince [1973] 1 WLR 1334; R v CICB ex p P [1995] 1

WLR 845; R v Home Secretary ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] AC 513.

See R v the Ministry of Defence ex p Walker [2000] 1 WLR 806 HL.

See In re McFarland [2004] UKHL 17, [2004] 1 WLR 1289; R (Mullen) v the Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 18, [2005] 1 AC 1 per Lord Bingham at [12] indicating that the grounds for review were not as narrow as suggested in R v the Home Secretary ex p Harrison [1988] 3 All ER 86.

Gurung v the Ministry of Defence [2002] EWHC 2463 (Admin) (military scheme); R (ABCIFER) v the Defence Secretary [2003] EWCA Civ 473 (civilian scheme).

See R v the Secretary of State for Health supra. 29

a legally irrelevant consideration, can be identified.

57. The purposes which a minister may pursue when exercising a statutory power and the considerations that may be relevant to its exercise are to be identified by construing the relevant statute113. In the case of a prerogative power, its extent and purpose is normally clear from its nature. But a power to do anything that an individual may do is not limited by reference to any purpose. Lord Bridge even thought that that meant that it would not even be possible to assess whether or not its exercise was unreasonable114.

58. None of this means that, if the Crown may do anything that an individual may do, judicial review is not available. It may still be available if what is done involves unfairness or an unjustified breach of a legitimate expectation. It may also be available on the ground of irrationality if the means adopted to meet the objective a minister may have chosen to pursue has no reasonable justification115. But any assumption that the Crown may do anything an individual may do leaves a minister free to pursue whatever purposes an individual may. But those may be purposes which no court would accept as being proper in the context of any



See eg per Lord Bridge R v Environment Secretary Ex p. Hammersmith LBC [1991] 1 AC 521 at p597 (“If the court concludes, as the House did in the Padfield case [1986] AC 997, that a minister’s exercise of a statutory discretion has been such as to frustrate the policy of the statute, that conclusion rests upon the view taken by the court of the true construction of the statute which the exercise of the discretion in question is then held to have contravened. The administrative action or inaction is then condemned on the ground of illegality. Similarly, if there are matters which, on the true construction of the statute conferring discretion, the person exercising the discretion must take into account and others which he may not take into account, disregard of those legally relevant matters or regard of those legally irrelevant matters will lay the decision open to review on the ground of illegality.) and per Lord Nicholls R v Secretary of State ex p Spath Holme [2001] 2 AC 349 at p (“the purpose for which a power is conferred, and hence its ambit, may be stated expressly in the statute. Or it may be implicit. Then the purpose has to be inferred from the language used, read in its statutory context and having regard to any aid to interpretation which assists in the particular case. In either event, whether the purpose is stated expressly or has to be inferred, the exercise is one of statutory interpretation.”)

As he put it about non-statutory advice in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbeach Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 at p192-3, “Such a review must always begin by examining the nature of the statutory power which the administrative authority whose action is called in question has purported to exercise, and asking, in the light of that examination, what were, and what were not, relevant considerations for the authority to take into account in deciding to exercise that power. It is only against such a specific statutory background that the question whether the authority has acted unreasonably, in the Wednesbury sense, can properly be asked and answered.”

See R (ABCIFER) v Defence Secretary [2003] EWCA Civ 473, [2003] QB 1397, at [40]. 30



statutory power116.

59. The difficulty inherent in the court’s contradictory approach may be illustrated by the disagreement between Carnwath LJ and Richards LJ in Shrewsbury & Atcham BC and another v the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government117. This case concerned the Secretary of State’s consideration of proposals to replace two-tier local government in some parts of the country with unitary authorities. There was a statutory procedure for achieving this in the Local Government Act 1992 which was to be conducted under the auspices of the Electoral Commission and the Boundary Committee for England. The Secretary of State decided to implement a new simplified procedure before Parliament changed the legislation, involving local authorities and the public but without this independent element, recognising that its outcome could only be implemented once the existing legislation had been replaced. By the time the case reached the Court of Appeal the question whether the Secretary of State could have done any of this before the legislation was changed had become academic as new statutory provisions which had by then been enacted specifically allowed what had been done before the new legislation was enacted to be taken into account under it.

60. Bound as the Court was (as it considered itself to be) to find that the Secretary of State has all the powers of a natural person, Carnwath LJ nonetheless thought that118,

“as a matter of capacity, no doubt, [the Crown] has power to do whatever a private person can do. But as an organ of government, it can only exercise those powers for the public benefit and for identifiably ‘governmental’ purposes within limits set by the law.”

By contrast Richards LJ thought119 that it was
“unnecessary and unwise to introduce qualifications along the lines of those suggested by



117 118


For example, an individual may pay others for services or support they may provide to the political party whose members currently form the Government; an individual may prefer to employ members of the political party of which he is a member; and an individual may not to allow others to use his property or may refuse to assist others for such idiosyncratic reasons as he may choose. But, if the ministers may do such things for such purposes as individual may do, why would they not be lawful?

[2008] EWCA Civ 148.

See at [48]. He considered that he was bound, as he said at [44], by R v Secretary of State ex p C supra to hold that the Crown had all the powers of a natural person.

See at [74].


Carnwath LJ…to the effect that [such powers] can only be exercised ‘for the public benefit’ or for ‘identifiably ‘governmental’ purposes”. It seems to me that any such limiting principle would have to be so wide as to be of no practical utility or would risk imposing an artificial and inappropriate restriction upon the work of government.”

As Waller LJ put it120,

“The question is thus whether there should be an ability to challenge as unlawful an action taken “not for the public benefit” or which has not been taken for identifiably governmental purposes”.”

61. This disagreement illustrates the fundamental incompatibility with public law as it has developed of the notion that the Crown may do anything a natural person may do. The position Richards LJ adopted is logically consistent with that notion but it only achieves such consistency by having to abandon any notion of an improper purpose in this context. By contrast Carnwath LJ’s approach is consistent with the modern development of public law that public powers are not unfettered but it is in substance inconsistent with the notion that the Crown may do anything which a natural person may do.

62. Carnwath LJ’s judgment also shows the difficulty of formulating some general criterion by reference to which the legality of what ministers may do may be assessed, independently of any recognised powers which they may have for specific purposes. Rather than seeking to define in general terms a limitation on the purposes for which the executive may act, such purposes may be identified less idiosyncratically by seeking to ascertain (in accordance with the court’s normal approach to prerogative powers) what powers it is established that the Crown has. These are more clearly limited by purposes such as the relief of individual hardship in certain cases arising (for example) from the operation of prize courts and criminal justice system or from criminal activities121.


120 121

See at [80].

It may be thought that the problem of the purposes the executive may pursue might be eased by referring to Appropriation Acts which limit the purposes for which money drawn from the Consolidated Fund may be used. It would certainly be unlawful to use such money for other purposes. But resort to an Appropriation Act is no solution for the fundamental difficulty. It is simply concerned with the use of such funds. Not all activities by the executive which a natural person may also undertake will involve a specific allocation of such funds and such an allocation cannot retrospectively render lawful or unlawful what may have been done before any appropriation which, as explained below, may come later.


63. When the Court of Appeal in R v the Secretary of State ex p C held that the rule is that a minister may do anything that an individual may do but that what he thus does is unlawful if it involves an abuse of that power, it was in reality recognising that the rule it propounded was inconsistent with public law as it has developed in this country. Moreover the inconsistency which it apparently unconsciously embraced conceals the scope for abuse of such powers that the approach overall retains by leaving the purposes for which a minister may act at large. No doubt the scope for abuse of such powers as the executive thus retains is limited to some extent by the requirements to act compatibly with Convention rights, to comply with EU law in the procurement of goods works and services and to comply with obligations imposed by enactments relating to discrimination in the discharge of public functions. But those requirements (which themselves recognise the difference between public authorities and others) do not eliminate the scope for possible abuse, any more than they do with other public authorities. Whilst it may be possible to limit the scope for abuse by requiring the executive to show (a) that the nature of the activity it wishes to undertake is a “governmental” activity and (b) that it is being undertaken for a public, governmental purpose, such limitations are inherently vague (and would appear to replicate some of the difficulties, discussed below, encountered in defining the “executive power” which is conferred in written constitutions). No doubt such limitations are to be preferred, despite their vagueness, to their absence. But there is no need to resort to them if the executive is only recognised as having such powers which may be exercised for such purposes as have already been established (as the approach in New South Wales v Bardolph might suggest).

(c) who ought to decide what activities the executive may engage in

i. the democratic answer to the issue of institutional competence

64. As Professor Paul Craig has shown, “the leading cases on the prerogative were concerned with the balance of power as between the Crown and Parliament…the judicial focus was concerned with demarcating the respective spheres of competence of Crown and Parliament”1 2 2 .

65. The corollary of the rules, that “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the



P Craig “Prerogative, Precedent and Power” in CF Forsyth and I Hare eds The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord OUP 1998 p65-89 at p65, 66.


land allows him”and that new prerogatives cannot be created, is that only Parliament may authorise the executive to undertake activities which do not fall within an established prerogative. The effect of defining the prerogative in the limited manner in which Blackstone did and recognising a rule that the Crown may undertake any new activity which any individual may undertake is thus to give the executive, not Parliament, the competence to decide in which such new activities the executive should be able to engage, in what circumstances and on what conditions. It is hardly consistent with the approach adopted by the courts in the seventeenth century, much less the democratic principle which our constitutional law now embraces, for the courts to recognise any such executive competence.

ii. how freedom for ministers to do anything an individual may do fits within modern constitutional law (apart from the question of abuse of power)

66. Recognition of a rule that the Crown may do anything an individual may do would also sit uneasily with the way in which constitutional law has evolved reflecting the principle that new executive powers should be derived from authority to undertake them granted by Parliament.

67. As Maitland pointed out as early as 1887, given the volume of legislation vesting statutory powers in ministers since 1832, “we can no longer say that the executive power is vested in the king: the king has powers, this minister has powers, and that minister has powers.”123. Such legislation sits most uneasily with the theory that the Crown has the legal capacity or powers that enable it (and therefore ministers as agents of the Crown) to do anything an individual may do.

68. There are only two ways of regarding such legislation in the light of that theory.
(1) The first is to interpret such legislation, if possible, as merely imposing (expressly or by implication) limitations, restrictions or conditions on what the



See FW Maitland Constitutional History of England CUP 1908 at p415-7: “the traditional lawyer’s view of the constitution has become very untrue to fact and law..according to that view..what is called the executive power is vested in the king alone and consists of the royal prerogative..this old doctrine is not even true to law. To a very large extent indeed England is now ruled by means of statutory powers which are not in any sense, even as strict matters of law, the powers of the king”. They are vested among others in government ministers. “Of this vast change [since 1832] our institutional writers have hardly yet taken any account. They go on writing as though England were governed by the royal prerogatives, as if ministers had nothing else to do than advise the king as to how his prerogatives should be exercised”. The lectures on which this book was based were delivered in 1886-7.


minister could otherwise do as an agent of the Crown, rather than giving him any ability to do something he previously had no ability to do. But the need to interpret enactments if possible systematically to mean something (and have an effect which is) different from what they say indicates that such an approach is simply an expedient to save the theory which prompts it from refutation by the legal facts. Moreover it may not be possible: “the statute book contains numerous provisions, and even whole acts, which serve no legislative purpose because they confer express power for a Minister to do something which he could do anyway without statutory power” on this basis124.

(2) The second alternative is possibly worse. It involves taking seriously the effect of the decision in the House of Lords in ex p M that what a minister does in the exercise of his statutory powers is not done by him as an agent for the Crown. On this basis such enactments simply confer a power on the minister in his own right, not as agent of the Crown. Thus any limitations, restrictions or conditions with which the minister must comply when exercising a statutory power vested in him as such, he need not observe when exercising any capacity which the Crown has to do the same thing. Then he is not doing such things under the statutory power at all but under a different power. This again makes such enactments wholly otiose and observance of any limitations imposed by Parliament effectively optional. That may be why the House of Lords simply assumedinR(Hooper)vtheSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions125 that any limitations inherent in a statutory scheme governing payments by a minister likewise limited any capacity that he may have had as agent of the Crown to make similar payments.

69. Both alternatives, therefore, produce absurd consequences. The reason they do is that both are attempts to ignore constitutional developments since 1832 which recognise, and are premised on, the assumption that ministers of the Crown need statutory authority to do things which have not been established historically as things which the Crown may do, even if they are things that other persons may do without statutory authority.

124 D Greenberg Craies on Legislation 9th ed 2008 p56.



[2005] UKHL 29, [2005] 1 WLR 1681.


70. It may be said that the same points might be made about prerogative powers as defined by Blackstone. There too statutory powers are sometimes conferred on ministers enabling them to do what the Crown may have a prerogative power in that sense to do. But the problem there is far less acute as in many cases the statutory powers conferred are likely to be wider than such prerogative powers and, even if they are arguably not wider, there is still a good practical reason for conferring them, namely to provide greater certainty about the precise extent of such powers, particularly if they have not been exercised frequently. By contrast conferring a power on a minister to do something that any individual may do is wholly otiose if the Crown has power to do such things in any event.

iii. is the need for Parliamentary authority for expenditure a sufficient answer?

71. Parliamentary authority has to be obtained for the use of any money in, or otherwise destined for, the Consolidated Fund. It is sometimes suggested that this should be regarded as sufficient to meet the objection to the executive having the competence to decide for itself in what new activities it may engage, in what circumstances and under what conditions.

72. Parliamentary control over expenditure (such as it is) will not, of course, affect the executive’s ability to do things which may not involve expenditure to be met out of the Consolidated Fund. Moreover it is now recognised in any event that an Appropriation Act does notmakelawfulwhatisotherwiseunlawful126 andtoassumethatanappropriationissufficient fails to explain the numerous enactments vesting powers in ministers to do what individuals may also do.

73. But, quite apart from that, however, the process by which expenditure is authorised is not something which can realistically be said to convey Parliamentary endorsement for any specific activity or which can be used to determine the legality of any activity as it occurs. In order to appreciate why that is so, some points need to be explained by way of background127.

74. It has been Government policy that departmental estimates should identify in an explanatory note any expenditure which may ultimately rest on the sole authority of an


126 127

See eg Commonwealth v Colonial Ammunition Co Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 198.
For a general description of the process see eg Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 8(2) Constitutional Law and

Human Rights 4th ed re-issue at [711]-[713].

Appropriation Act128. Provision is made for debates and votes on such estimates in the House of Commons129. However, no amendment to increase an estimate may be made and it appears that amendments to reduce an estimate are normally treated as an issue of confidence by the Government130. It appears, therefore, that “in modern times the Commons has not rejected an estimate and the scrutiny function appears a limited one”: “the supply procedures required to enable the House of Commons to vote supply, and provide the Government with funds from the Consolidated Fund, are technical and formal. Little substantial scrutiny is involved in such procedures. The policy objectives on which the money is spent are not determined by the Commons but by the government of the day”131. Thus even HM Treasury accepts that “the approval process [for such estimates] does not provide a meaningful opportunity for detailed scrutiny”1 3 2 .

75. The estimates as such, however, are not incorporated in any Act of Parliament. In practice Consolidated Fund Acts may simply authorise payment from that Fund of a global figure (which may be spent before any specific subsequent appropriation by an Appropriation Act). The Bill which leads to an Appropriation Act (which effectively governs previous authorisations from Consolidated Fund Acts for the year retrospectively) may identify services and purposes to which large sums may be devoted based on the estimates voted upon133. But


130 131

132 133


See now paragraph [1.2] of the HM Treasury’s Supply Estimates Guidance Manual (2007). 129 See Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 34 Parliament 4th ed re-issue at [969]-[973].

See I Harden and others “Value for Money and Administrative law” [1996] PL 661 at p663.

John McEldowney “The Control of Public Expenditure” in J Jowell and D Oliver eds The Changing Constitution 5th edatp382,381.SeealsoHalsbury’sLawsofEnglandParliament4th edreissueat[974]:“detailedscrutiny of the estimates is largely perfunctory” and D Greenberg Craies on Legislation 9th ed 2008 at p59, “for practical purposes it is too easy to ‘hide’ expenditure within an entry in a Consolidated Fund Act, and even if displayed prominently an entry in an Act of that kind does not make it possible for the principle and practicalities of the service to which the expenditure relates to be debated and amended.”

HM Treasury Managing Public Money (2007) at [2.3.1].

See eg section 4 of, and Schedule 2 to, the Appropriation Act 2009. The terms of any appropriation can be very vague in any event. In Australia, for example, the Constitution provides that the Consolidated Revenue Fund must “be appropriated for the purposes of the the manner imposed by this Constitution” and a proposed law for that purpose cannot be passed “unless the purpose of the appropriation” has been recommended in a particular manner. But there it has been held that “departmental expenditure” (whatever that might mean) is a sufficient identification of that purpose: see Combet v the Commonwealth [2005] HCA 61, (2005) 224 CLR 494 per Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [128] and [136] but see also per contra McHugh and Kirby JJ at [81]-[95] and [232]-[236] respectively. In the United Kingdom there is nothing to prohibit even vaguer appropriations or alternatively authorisations referring to no purpose whatsoever: see section 15 of the Exchequer and Audit Departments


that Bill “is not normally subject to any debate”134. Indeed “since 1982, proceedings on Consolidated Fund and Appropriation Bills have been purely formal. The question on the second reading is put forthwith, no order is made for the committal of the bill and the question for third reading is also put forthwith”135. As money bills, they are not subject in practice to scrutiny in the House of Lords136.

76. Whilst in practice such procedures may enable the House of Commons to control the total volume of expenditure financed from the Consolidated Fund and its general use, they are plainly not apt in practice to appraise whether any proposed new activities (if they are sufficiently identified) are ones in which the executive should engage, in what circumstances and on what conditions137.

77. In recognition of the limited nature of Parliamentary scrutiny of the details of its estimates, the Government has made statements giving assurances that in effect seek to make acceptable the principle (which it maintains is the law) that activities which anyone can do are things that ministers can do without statutory powers to engage in them.

78. The first is the misnamed ‘Public Accounts Committee Concordat’ of 1933 or the ‘Baldwin Convention’. The exchanges between the Treasury and the Public Accounts Committee138 to which these labels refer can scarcely be described as resulting in an agreement. The Committee thought that support for expenditure in an Appropriation Act “does not furnish adequate ground for the abandonment of attempts to place such expenditure on a constitutional footing”. The Treasury Minute in reply merely stated that, where an Appropriation Act had authorised “continuing grants”, it would “endeavour to” take the “opportunity….to insert regularising clauses in any appropriate legislation that may be in contemplation”. The Treasury had previously stated that it would “continue to aim at the observance of [the] principle” that,



Act 1866 as amended.

John McEldowney “The Control of Public Expenditure” in J Jowell and D Oliver eds The Changing Constitution 5th at p381.

135 See Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 34 Parliament 4th ed reissue at [979].


137 138

The last substantive discussion in the House of Lords appears to have been in 1907: see Erskine May Parliamentary Practice p568.

Cf per McCombe J Gurung and others v the Ministry of Defence [2002] EWHC 2463 (Admin) at [41]. Some of the exchanges are partially quoted by Granville Ram in his Memorandum in November 1945 and

in Annex 2.1 to HM Treasury’s Managing Public Money (2007). 38

“where it is desired that continuing functions should be exercised by a government department…it is proper that the powers and duties to be exercised should be defined by specific statute”. Such statements only relate to “continuing activities” and even then the only apparent commitment is to aim at the observance of a principle and to endeavour to take opportunities to “regularise” the position if appropriate legislation may be in contemplation. It is not a commitment to observe the principle139. Treasury Counsel has described such statements as “flexible conventions and not legally binding”140.

79. Just how flexible a few examples may suffice to show. (i) It appears that university funding, which began in 1919, continued only on the basis of Appropriation Acts until the Education Reform Act 1988141, nearly 60 years later. (ii) The scheme for criminal injuries compensation came into force on August 1st 1964. In 1978 the Pearson Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury recommended that the scheme be put on a statutory basis. Ultimately statutory provision was made in 1988 for that purpose but it was not brought into operation, leading to a successful claim for judicial review142. After that the existing scheme was given statutory effect as from November 8th 1995143, a mere 31 years after its introduction. (iii) A Criminal Injuries Compensation (Overseas) Scheme was launched by the Ministry of Defence in 1979. It still appears to have no statutory basis thirty years later. (iv) Payments have been made ex gratia to those wrongly convicted or charged for many years. They were put on a more systematic footing in 1976 and the criteria were elaborated in ministerial statements in 1985. Although there was an opportunity to legislate on the subject in 1998 which was taken to enact one part of the scheme, the rest remained un-enacted144 and operative until withdrawn in April 2006 on the apparent ground that “the existence of the second, discretionary [non-statutory]



The Treasury has stated that Ministers “must normally seek Parliamentary authority for specific legislation to empower any significant new commitment which seems likely to persist. In the Concordat of 1932.. the Treasury undertook to aim that departments would respect this requirement”: see Managing Public Money at [2.1.1].


See R (Hooper) v the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 1681, [2005] 1 WLR 1681, at 141 TC Dainteth “The Techniques of Government” in J Jowell and D Oliver eds The Changing Constitution 3rd ed

142 143 144

p209-236 at p217.
R v the Home Secretary ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513. Section 12 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995.
See per Lord Bingham In re McFarland [2004] UKHL 17 at [8]-[9].


scheme is confusing and anomalous”145.

80. The second attempt to provide to provide reassurance about the Government’s legal claims comprise statements about what may be included “with Treasury approval” by Departments in their estimates “in order to avoid an undue burden on the Parliamentary timetable”. Provision may be made in such estimates for expenditure (so it is said) which meet the following conditions: the expenditure is no more than £1.5m a year or it is expected to last for no more than two years; any existing explicit statutory limits are respected; and no specific legislation on the matter in question is before Parliament146. It may be noted that the first of these conditions in effect dilutes the so-called ‘Public Accounts Committee Concordat’ or ‘Baldwin Convention’, since it envisages a function continuing without statutory authority on the basis of an Appropriation Act provided the amount involved does not exceed a specific figure. These are, of course, rules which are unenforceable since no court may prohibit Ministers from putting forward whatever Bill they choose for payments out of the Consolidated Fund. Moreover HM Treasury also recognises that last condition may be circumvented by drawing on the Contingencies Fund with its approval provided that the proposed expenditure must be genuinely urgent and in the public interest; that the relevant bill must have successfully passed second reading in the House of Commons; that Parliament must have been made aware of the intended steps in appropriate detail when relevant previous legislative steps were taken; that the planned legislation must be certain, or virtually certain, to pass into law in the near future, and usually within the financial year; and that the department responsible must explain clearly to Parliament what is taking place, why, and by when matters should be placed on a “normal” footing147.

81. Both these types of attempted reassurance relying on the controls exerted by HM Treasury are statements designed to indicate how limited a reliance (which the public is in effect invited to assume) that the Government will place on any rule that activities which anyone can do are things that ministers can do without statutory powers to engage in them. But the constitutional propriety of the claimed power cannot rest on how for the time being the executive may condescend not to use it or to use it only in certain ways. The significant question is whether,

145 See the Home Secretary’s statement on April 19th 2006:


146 147

See HM Treasury Managing Public Money at [2.3.3] and Annex 2.5 at [A2.5.15]. See HM Treasury Managing Public Money at [2.4.3] and Annex 2.5 at [A2.5.16-19].


even in relation to those activities which require expenditure from the Consolidated Fund to be authorised, the process of authorisation is something which can realistically be said to convey Parliamentary endorsement for any specific new activity or the circumstances and conditions upon which the executive ought to engage in it. Realistically even the Government does not claim it can. Moreover it is a process of Parliamentary authorisation which in practice circumvents the need for bicameral approval of legislation otherwise required for authorising executive activities precisely because the concern whether or not to enact such money bills is financial.

82. There is a further problem in seeking to treat such legislation as providing any Parliamentary approval of any new activity. When any expenditure is incurred or falls to be defrayed, there may be no appropriation which may be said to endorse the purpose for which the expenditure is incurred. First the executive has access to a Contingencies Fund whose use does not in practice require prior Parliamentary approval for any estimate148. This fund may not exceed 2% of the authorised supply expenditure for the previous financial year149, which is not a small sum150. The Fund may be used to make advances for “urgent services” in anticipation of Parliamentary provision (as well as for certain cash-flow management purposes)151. Secondly Consolidated Fund Acts may authorise a total amount to be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund without any statutory appropriation of that amount to any specific purpose. The Appropriation Act for the year (which may appropriate amounts for expenditure previously authorised under a Consolidated Fund Act) may only be enacted towards the end of the financial year in question. Thus, for example, the Consolidated Fund Act 2008 authorised the Treasury to issue £32,112,484,000 out of the Consolidated Fund and to apply it to the service of the year ending with 31 March 2009 without any specific appropriation. It was only in the Appropriation Act 2009 enacted shortly before the end of that financial year on March 12th 2009 that that sum (and a further £12,049,636,000 which was authorised to be issued and applied in the same way) was appropriated to certain services and purposes. Thus, when expenditure is defrayed, there may be no statutory appropriation which can be said to provide



149 150


The origins of this fund are described in John McEldowney “the Contingencies Fund and Parliamentary Scrutiny of Public Finance” (1988) PL 232-245.

See section 1 of the Contingencies Fund Act 1974.

The Treasury was authorised to issue £12,049,636,000 out of the consolidated fund in respect of the financial year 2008-09: see section 4 of the Appropriation Act 2009. 2% of that amount (for example) is £240,992,720.

See section 3 of the Miscellaneous Financial Provisions Act 1946.


a Parliamentary endorsement of any activity involved or by reference to which the legality of the activity on which any particular expenditure is incurred may be assessed.

iv. other constitutional arguments

83. There are other constitutional arguments that are sometimes advanced for the view that the Crown may do anything a natural person may do. Lying behind some views is a notion about royal dignity. Thus, for example, in the Bankers’ Case, Holt CJ thought that “it is against the nature of the being of a king that he should have less power than his people”152. Similarly in 1904 Griffiths CJ stated in the High Court in Australia that “that which is lawful to an individual can surely not be denied to the Crown, when the advisers of the Crown think it in the public interest…it would be a strange thing if Courts of Justice were to assert the right to inquire into the propriety of executive action”153. If notions about royal dignity and that immunity of the purposes of executive action from legal scrutiny are perhaps less intuitively compelling today, a claim invoking notions of equality for ministers to be accorded at least the same treatment as others may appear more compelling. But neither claim can survive the recognition that the position of ministers and the public powers they may have are fundamentally different from the position and powers that others may have.

v. the consequences of requiring, or not requiring, statutory powers for new executive activities

84. Baroness Scotland attempted to defend the Government’s claims by stating that “to require parliamentary authority for every exercise of the common law powers exercisable by the Crown either would impose upon Parliament an impossible burden or produce legislation that simply reproduced the common law.” Since she appears to have assumed (wrongly) that every exercise of a subsidiary power would need a separate statutory authority in addition to the primary power to which it is subservient, she appears to have misunderstood what may be required. What would be required is merely statutory power to undertake activities which there is no existing established power in the Crown to undertake.

85. Such activities ought already to be identified in the estimates which the Government


152 153

see 14 ST 1 at p30.

See Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139 dealing with a commission of inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether any alteration of the law and, if so what, was necessary. His approach has been subsequently disowned by Mason and Brennan JJ: see footnote [100] above.


prepares. It is not clear why deciding whether the executive should have power to undertake them and, if so, in what circumstances and under what conditions would impose an “impossible burden” on Parliament. It is in fact an important function that it might be thought Parliament exists to discharge.

86. If Parliament wishes to legislate to give the executive some general authority to undertake new activities because the burden of considering them individually would be too great, that is a matter for Parliament. It is theoretically possible that it might enact a statutory provision that the Crown or Secretary of State may do anything for any purpose whatsoever which is not unlawful for an individual to do. However unlikely the prospect of such an enactment may be in practice given the abuses to which it could give rise, the choice is ultimately one for Parliament in accordance with the democratic principle which our constitutional law now reflects. The authority for new executive action should be derived from Parliament, not the Crown. What the legal rule which the Government advocates in practice does is to give the executive the power never to have to ask Parliament whether it is prepared to grant it such unfettered power.

87. “The main argument” for treating the executive as being free to do anything which an individual may do has been said to be “the practical day-to-day needs of government. The government is able to respond quickly, flexibly and relatively unhindered with the action it considers appropriate to meet, sometimes unexpected, societal needs”154. This argument echoes that which Locke advanced for the prerogative, although he thought it justified a discretion to act for the public good not only “without the prescription of the law” but also “sometimes even against it”155. But, quite apart from the fact that the power being claimed is not one limited to meeting “societal needs” or “the public good” (since individuals need not act in that way), the argument is remarkably weak. Parliament now meets regularly and is in session for much of the year. Any urgent need for authority to do something not already authorised without waiting for such specific statutory powers to be conferred as Parliament thinks appropriate can be met by general legislation enabling emergency powers to be conferred156. The substantive issue is not one about the need to respond urgently if there is a need to do so. It is about who


154 155 156

See BV Harris “The ‘Third Source’ of Authority for Government Action revisited” (2007) 123 LQR 225 at p237. See J Locke Second Treatise on Civil Government Chapter XIV “Of Prerogative”.
See eg Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.


decides what new activities the executive should be able to undertake, in what circumstances and under what conditions. Constitutionally that should now be a matter for Parliament, not the executive.

(d) the implications of devolution and a glance abroad

88. Any rule that the Crown may do anything an individual may do will also sit uneasily with devolution within the United Kingdom. In Scotland the functions “of Her Majesty’s prerogative and other executive functions which are exercisable on behalf of Her Majesty by a Minister of the Crown” are exercisable by the Scottish Ministers “so far as they are exercisable within devolved competence”157. Although this provision does not identify what powers Scottish Ministers may exercise when dealing with matters on which the Scottish Parliament has competence, it raises the question whether this provision carries with it a limitation on the matters which ministers in London may exercise any such powers and whether, for example, both sets of Ministers have to exercise such powers in any event for their relevant governmental purposes.

89. Federal constitutions overseas have created similar problems. In Australia section 61 of the Constitution provides that “the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.” In Canada section 9 of the Constitution Act 1867 provides that “the Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen”. In each country there are also executives at the state or provincial level respectively. In those countries questions about what activities are appropriate to the executive at each level cannot be avoided. Those questions may not have been resolved there yet with success partly because of the vagueness of the constitutional provisions themselves but also because of tension caused by changing conceptions of what functions governments at each level should undertake. Moreover the case law is often not clear whether the issue concerns the limits on the scope of



Section 53(2) of the Scotland Act 1998. It is outside devolved competence to exercise the function (or exercise it in any way) so far as a provision of an Act of the Scottish Parliament conferring the function (or, as the case may be, conferring it so as to be exercisable in that way) would be outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament: see sections 54(3) and 29 of the Scotland Act 1998 and Part III of Schedule 4 to that Act. It does not appear that any non-statutory powers have been transferred to Welsh Ministers under section 58 of the Government of Wales Act 2006.


what the executive may do or the powers which it may use within that scope. Further, because the executive power is vested by the Constitution in the Crown, there may be a question about whether, and to what extent, the powers of the Crown at common law are relevant to its scope or to what may be done within it.

90. This latter point is an issue in Australia. There it has been said that one should not look to the content of the prerogative in England but rather to section 61 of the Constitution and that the prerogative may be an historical antecedent of the power which that section confers but that it does adequately illuminate the origins of executive power in section 61158. The current position in respect of contracts and other expenditure by the Commonwealth government appears to be that the Crown in that capacity is limited to those matters over which the Commonwealth has legislative competence or which are derived from the executive’s status as a national government159. The former delimited area of competence may reflect the need to maintain a distinction in capacity between the Commonwealth and State executives (by reflecting the respective competences of their legislatures)160 and the latter (albeit potentially in conflict with the first) to deal with matters over which it is thought that the national government should have competence. This is inherently vague. Mason J once said, for example, that it provided “a capacity to engage in enterprises and activities peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the benefit of the nation”1 6 1 .

91. In Canada the distribution of executive powers between the national and provincial governments in substance likewise follows the distribution of legislative powers162. But, unlike



See per Gummow J Re Ditford (1988) 19 FCR 347 at p369, per French J Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1329 at [179]. For discussion on the nature and extent of the executive power: see G Winterton “The limits and use of executive power by government” [2003] FedLRev 10; B Selway “All at sea — constitutional assumptions and ‘ the executive power of the commonwealth” [2003] FedLRev 12; Leslie Zines The High Court and the Constitution 5th ed 2008 at p341 et seq.

159 See Leslie Zines The High Court and the Constitution 5th ed 2008 at p341-359, 360-1; Commonwealth v Australian Shipping Board (1926) 39 CLR 1; Commonwealth & Central Wool Committee v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd (1922) 31 CLR 421; Victoria v the Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338; Davies v the Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79.

160 161


See eg per Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ Davies v the Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79 at p93-94. See per Mason J Victoria v the Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338 at p397, a view endorsed by Brennan

J in Davis v the Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79 at p111.
See Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v Receiver-General of New Brunswick [1892] AC 437 at


the Commonwealth Parliament in Australia, the Canadian Parliament has legislative competence in respect of all matters not coming within the classes of subject assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the Provinces163. Moreover the Canadian Parliament has specific competence over “the Raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation” and “the Public…Property” on the basis of which it has been inferred that it may finance activities in the public interest which fall outside the federal Parliament’s specific legislative competence, although the extent of this power may not be unlimited when funds are used for matters which fall within the competence of the provinces in Canada164. The provinces may likewise have a similar so-called “spending power”165.The scope of executive action at each level may thereby be correspondingly expanded166. That of itself does not necessarily mean that the executive at either level has power to anything falling within that scope without statutory authorisation or prerogative power. But there appears to be an assumption that they may167, a view also

p442; Bonanza Creek Mining Co Ltd v the King [1916] 1 AC 566 at p580-1; Operation Dismantle v the Queen [1985] 1 SCR 441 per Wilson J at [50].




See per Viscount Haldane Attorney General for Australia v Colonial Sugar Refining Co [1914] 237 at p252-

See section 91 of the Constitution Act 1867. Cf also Part III of the 1982 Constitution which deals with Equalisation and Regional Disparities. Section 36 provided that “Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalisation payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public service at reasonably comparable levels of taxation”. On the potential limitation on the Parliamentary use of funds: see Attorney General for Canada v Attorney General for Ontario [1937] AC 355 (“It may still be legislation affecting the classes of subjects enumerated in s. 92, and, if so, would be ultra vires. In other words, Dominion legislation, even though it deals with Dominion property, may yet be so framed as to invade civil rights within the Province, or encroach upon the classes of subjects which are reserved to Provincial competence.”) and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. v Iness (2004) 70 OR (3rd) 148, (2004) 236 DLR (4th) 241, at [25]-[33] (“The power to spend or lend federal money, however, is not unlimited. The exercise of that power will be considered to impermissibly trench on the exclusive jurisdiction of a province if the exercise of the power is in reality an attempt to regulate a matter within the provincial jurisdiction.”); by contrast seeHoggConstitutionalLawofCanada5th ed[6.8(a)](“thebetterviewofthelawisthatthefederalParliament may spend or lend its funds to any government or institution or individual it chooses, for any purpose it chooses…there is no compelling reason too confine spending or lending or contracting within the limits of legislative power, because in those functions the government is not purporting to exercise any peculiarly governmental authority over its subjects”) and at [29.3].

Lovelace v Ontario [2000] 1 SCR 950 at [111].

The power of the Federal Government to fund job creation schemes appears to be inferred from the powers of the Federal Parliament to levy taxes, to legislate in relation to “public property”, and to appropriate federal funds: see per Sopinka J YMHA Jewish Community Centre of Winnipeg Inc. v Brown [1989] 1 SCR 1532.


165 166



reflected in the view espoused by the Supreme Court in Canada (already referred to) that the Crown may do anything an individual may do as the monarch is a physical person.

92. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the advent of devolution itself brings with it a limitation of what non-statutory powers which the Crown is recognised to retain in England.

(e) the court’s approach in this country

93. In this country there is no general and unlimited capacity that the Crown has to spend money on whatever it may wish which has been established by any decision of the courts. In most cases the issue has not arisen: claimants have no interest in disputing a minister’s power to pay them the money they want. However what is notable about cases in which payments have been made to relieve hardship is that the authority to make them has been ascribed to the prerogative, “a power of bounty by way of redress of hardships”168. Thus, for example, the schemes for criminal injuries compensation and for compensation for wrongful conviction have been specifically attributed to the prerogative169. But such an established power is not unlimited in scope.

94. Indeed this may be thought that this is a better explanation for the decision of the House of Lords in R (Hooper) v the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions170. In that case social security legislation conferred a statutory right on widows to certain benefits based on their husband’s contributions171. If the claimants had been women they would have been entitled



See The Odessa [1916] 1 AC 145 PC at p162 (redress of hardship for subjects and neutrals from decrees of the Prize Court: prerogative unimpaired by legislation); cf per Lord Diplock Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of the Civil Service [1984] 1 AC 375 at p410a (referring to the Crown’s prerogative power of bounty); contrast his earlier view in R v CICB ex p Lain [1967] 2 QB 864 at p886 that “the only limitation upon the power of the executive government to confer benefits upon subjects by way of money payments is a practical one, to wit, the necessity to obtain from Parliament a grant-in-aid for that purpose”. Would it now really be suggested that the only limitation on the executive’s power to confer a monetary benefit on members of the party forming the current administration was obtaining an appropriation act authorising payments to encourage participation in political parties? But, even this formulation, does not imply a power to spend money on other things.

See R v Home Secretary ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513 supra; R v Home Secretary ex p Harrison [1988] 3 All ER 86 at p91, 93; In re McFarland [2004] UKHL 17, [2004] 1 WLR 1289 per Lord Scott at [40]- [41].

[2005] UKHL 29, [2005] 1 WLR 1681.
See sections 36 to 38 of the Social Security (Contributions and Benefits) Act 1992.


170 171


to such benefits. The Claimants asserted that the Crown had power to pay them the same amounts and that it had to do so to avoid discrimination. The House of Lords held that, even if any of statutory provisions involved discrimination and assuming that the Crown had power to make such payments, it was not required to do so as the Secretary of State was giving effect to the statutory provisions in not making such payments to persons who were not widows172. The reasoning involved is unpersuasive. The fact that Parliament may impose a duty on the Secretary of State to provide certain benefits to certain persons in certain circumstances is in no respect incompatible with a power to provide others with them in similar circumstances173. Nonetheless the result is perfectly intelligible. The Crown has never exercised a power to provide social insurance benefits for those in respect of whom contributions have previously been made. Social insurance has never been an established function of the Crown, any more than providing relief generally against poverty. Relief of the poor generally was a matter of local administration from the Poor Law Act 1601 until the poor law was repealed in 1948 and replaced by a scheme of national assistance (now in the form of income-based jobseeker’s allowance and income support). For the Crown to provide social insurance or a general national scheme for the relief of poverty would be to embark on a wholly new activity without Parliamentary authority and for that reason it ought to have been regarded as unlawful174.

95. Similarly it is notable that the Court of Appeal in R v the Home Secretary ex p Northumbria Police Authority did not approach the question whether the Secretary of State had power to provide certain goods (plastic baton rounds and CS gas) to Chief Constables (in the absence of any statutory power to do so) by saying that anyone may provide goods or services. It derived the Home Secretary’s power from the prerogative power to maintain the Queen’s Peace and to keep law and order175.


172 173



See at [6], [47]-[52], [77]-[81], [94]-[95], [122]-[124].

Indeed that appears to be the only basis on which the House of Lords could have regarded the fact that Parliament provided for a right compensation in certain circumstances to those wrongly convicted under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 as not precluding the Home Secretary providing such compensation in others as a matter of discretion: see In re McFarland [2004] UKHL 17, [2004] 1 WLR 17, at [12].

This was not an argument advanced in that case since it was in the interests of both parties to assert that the Crown had powers to make payments to others. The notion that the Crown could now embark, for example, on providing housing for all nationally without any specific Parliamentary authorisation, making itself a housing authority, would be open to the same objection.

See [1989] 1 QB 26 per Croom-Johnson LJ at p42-45; per Purchas LJ at p45-47e, p51c-52a, per Nourse LJ at p56d-59a.


96. Such cases do not support any contention that a minister has a general power to spend, or to provide goods or services, for any purpose for which an individual may do so. Of course traditionally the executive has done many things which individuals may also do such as hold inquiries for public purposes (for example by holding Royal Commissions) or providing advice and guidance. Such things may relate to how ministers are to exercise powers they themselves have. However they may go wider than that176. But the existence of such recognised primary activities is no real argument that the same activities may be carried out by the executive for non-public177 or different purposes.

97. The few cases in which activities on the part of ministers have been found to be lawful simply on the basis of the Crown’s alleged power (either as a corporation sole or given the absence of any prohibition) to do anything an individual may do are often disturbing. Should the government have power to operate what is in practice a blacklist, appearance on which will in practice deny an individual an opportunity to pursue a career he chooses, without statutory authority and without Parliament stating under what conditions and with what protections for individuals it should operate178? To say that an individual might maintain such a list having the same effects as one maintained by a Minister of the Crown is simply fanciful. Equally, when Parliament has enacted a procedure to be followed before local government can be reorganised involving independent elements, should a minister have power to embark on a procedure not involving such elements as if the legislation had already been changed by Parliament (incidentally requiring information from local authorities involved under statutory powers) but which was to be completed until after any change, thus pre-empting legislation and creating




the Case on Proclamations where the judges recognised that “the King for the prevention of offences may by proclamation admonish his subjects that they keep the laws, and do not offend them” and that disregard of such advice may be regarded “as a circumstance [which] aggravates the offence” may be regarded as an early recognition of a power to issue non-statutory guidance to others: see (1611) 12 Co Rep 74 at p75-6.

In Jenkins v Attorney General (1971) 115 Sol J 674 an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the printing, publishing and distributing of a leaflet about entry to the common market was refused on the basis that “it could not be held on an interlocutory application that the Government’s right to communicate was so circumscribed that it could not tell the people what it proposed to do and why it so proposed”. This does not necessarily mean that the executive may publish anything for any purpose. For example in R v the Environment Secretary ex p Greenwich LBC [1989] COD 530 it was stated that the distribution of an information leaflet in the exercise of the prerogative might be restrained if it misstated the law or if the guidance or advice given were manifestly inaccurate or misleading. It is hard to believe that, if the executive tried to publish material designed to persuade voters to support those currently in office or their political party in a forthcoming election, it would not be regarded as doing something for an improper purpose.

Cf R v the Secretary of State for Health ex p C supra. 49


facts that Parliament could scarcely be expected to ignore179. Any analogy with what an individual could have done in such a case would have been absurd. No individual can in practice engage in local government re-organisation. Both these cases involved conduct by Government ministers without any Parliamentary approval, therefore, which in practice no individual could have undertaken with the same effects. No doubt they did not involve doing anything which was expressly prohibited and they did not involve the exercise of what Sir William Wade would have described as a legal power (any more than issuing a passport does). But the notion that their legality can be established merely by invoking the Crown’s capacity as a corporation sole is as spurious as the analogy of such conduct with that of an individual. Such cases sit ill with those (such as the Fire Brigade Union’s case180) which find the Minister’s power to act in the prerogative, an analysis that recognises a need for it to have been shown that such things have been established as capable of being done under the prerogative if they are to be lawful.


98. There is little to be said for the legal arguments which have been advanced to support the supposed rule that prima facie a Government minister may do anything which an individual may do. The fact that there may be no prohibition, express or implied, on a minister doing something does not necessarily mean that he has the capacity in law to do it. Any assumption that he does, as he is the agent of the Crown, simply begs the question about what the Crown may do when acting in its public capacity. The suggestion that the minister when acting as the agent of the Crown in its public capacity may do anything an individual may do because the monarch is an individual “savours of the archaism of past centuries”. Treating the constitutional position of the Crown today as it may have been under the Angevins ignores the subsequent transformation of the monarchy and the consequent recognition of the different public and private capacities that the Crown now has. Similarly deriving such powers, as the Court of Appeal has tried to do, from the recognition that the Crown is a corporation sole at common law and by treating it as having the same powers as those which all other corporations were (wrongly) assumed necessarily to have, ignores the fact that at common law




See R (Shrewsbury & Atcham BC) v the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2007] EWHC 2279; [2008] EWCA Civ 148 contrast Carnwath LJ at [50]-[61] and Waller LJ at [82] with Richards LJ at [75].

See paragraph [48] above.


the Crown was different from other corporations sole. Each of these arguments ignores the fact that legally the Crown is unique. Each of these arguments also ignores the fact that, when the government does things which an individual may also do, in practice the effects are by no means necessarily comparable.

99. More fundamentally these arguments divert attention from the substantive constitutional issues raised by the contention that ministers may do whatever an individual may lawfully do. That contention in substance involves a claim (a) that it is for the executive, not Parliament to decide, in what new activities the government may engage, in what circumstances and under what conditions and (b) that ministers have an unfettered discretion in relation to what they thus do, provided that in each case they do not do anything unlawful or which they are prohibited from doing.

100. The latter claim creates scope for the abuse of public power that the courts have rejected in line with the development of modern public law. The position which the Court of Appeal adopted in R v the Secretary of State ex p C, that a minister may do anything which an individual may do provided that he does not abuse that power, denies in that proviso the general proposition which that court purported to endorse. However the Court of Appeal’s position (which is also the position adopted by the Government) is not merely internally inconsistent. It also fails to provide the protection against the abuse of public power which was no doubt the reason why the court adopted such a proviso. By leaving unlimited the purposes for which ministers may act and thus also the considerations which they may take into account, it allows public powers to be exercised other than in the public interest and other than for public purposes.

101. The former claim should also be rejected in the line with the development of other aspects of modern constitutional law. It is inconsistent with the democratic principle that modern constitutional law now embraces that the executive should derive its powers to undertake new activities from Parliament. Indeed the rule that the executive may do anything an individual may lawfully do is in stark contrast to legislation over the last two hundred years which confers powers on ministers to do such things which cannot sensibly be interpreted consistently with that suggested rule. Such a rule would mean that much legislation must be treated as being either redundant (in conferring powers on ministers which they otherwise


had) or as meaning systematically something other than what it says (where possible treating such legislation not as conferring new powers on ministers as it ostensibly does but merely as imposing restrictions or limitations on what they may do). The suggested rule is thus incompatible with the structure of modern constitutional law. Nor can Parliamentary authorisation for such new activities be regarded as having been conferred by any statutory authorisation for expenditure from the Consolidated Fund. Such enactments are money bills, concerned with control of public expenditure rather than with authorising the executive to engage in the particular activities on which money may be spent. Indeed the assurances that the Government feels it necessary to give about how little reliance it will place on its alleged capacity to do anything an individual may do are themselves an indication of the anomalous nature of its claim.

102. Any rule that a Government minister may do anything that an individual may do, therefore, should not be accepted. Nor should Blackstone’s conception of a prerogative power which creates the possibility for such a rule. Etymologically no doubt Blackstone’s conception of what a prerogative power is may be correct. But it creates a conundrum concerning the source of the executive’s power to do things that the Government has undoubtedly done but which individuals may also do and even whether ministers need any authority to do things at all. Dicey’s conception of the prerogative, as being the authority for every act which the executive may do without the authority of an Act of Parliament, avoids this conundrum. But, more significantly, when combined with the established rules that prerogative powers are limited to those which the law allows and which have already been established, it enables effect to be given to the democratic principle which the constitution now embraces that new activities on the part of the government should be authorised by Parliament and it restricts the scope for abuse of such public powers consistently with the development of modern public law. Dicey’s conception of the prerogative, which courts have regularly endorsed and applied to those things that both the executive and individuals may do, is thus legally, if not linguistically, to be preferred. Given that the prerogative is limited in what it may authorise to things which it has been established may be done under it, any rule that ministers may do whatever an individual may do is thus one which is not only inconsistent with constitutional principle and practice generally181 but also with such decisions.



There are, of course, cases in which ministers have acted without any specific reliance on an established prerogative power: see paragraph [97] above.


103. No doubt the limitations on what the Crown may thus be able to do would astonish, for example, those living in the reign of Edward II. But law is not unchanging. In Edward II’s reign juries were expected to bring their own knowledge of every breach of the law, criminal and civil, to their deliberations and could be amerced for failing to do so. In the reign of Elizabeth II jurors now have to be warned not to make their own investigations or rely on anything which is not evidence which they have heard in court182. Just as the functions of the jury have changed radically since the time of Edward II, so also have those of the Crown, even though the name of each institution may remain the same. As the Judges in Calvin’s Case recognised, the King has “a politic body or capacity…framed by the policy of man”. As a corporation sole or when acting in a public capacity, what the Crown may do is not an inalienable and invariable endowment conferred by nature. It is a variable legal capacity which has evolved in conjunction with other features of constitutional law in response to changing political, social and legal views and pressures.

John Howell QC



See James Oldham The varied life of the self-informing jury (2005) Selden Society at p9-10; R v Karakaya [2005] EWCA Crim 341 at [24]-[26].



Posted in "Terrorism", The Corrupt SOB's, Uncategorized by earthling on December 15, 2011

The BBC and MI5. You tell people this and you even show them and, no matter, they STILL think you wear a “tinfoil hat”. The problem with such people is that is all they have as ammunition against what is plainly in their face and, if they were to allow themselves to acknowledge these things, they would become very ill at ease and, perhaps, would not be able to handle it.

The point is, the BBC is and always has been, what so many of us know: A “programmed” propaganda outfit of the establishment programming (in so many ways) what and how the British people and many over the world within the commonwealth and elsewhere, should think. Nevertheless, us Brits will still wave our little flags at a Royal family which is screwing us all to the wall. Even screwing the families of the very soldiers who, ignorantly, die for her, her establishment, their prized possessions (countries and corporations). Ahh if only the typical soldier had a brain huh?


The Telegraph: BBC & MI5


While it is entirely undemocratic and answers to noone.

Tony Benn: Would have been Britain’s Ron Paul (perhaps even better).

Mr Tony Benn (Chesterfield)

The debate is beginning to get to the central question, which is not the details of how we handle the security services or the official secrecy, but the constitutional relationships that are changed by the legislation that is to come before us. I believe that I am expressing an anxiety that goes far beyond the party of which I am a member about the evidence that has come to light regarding the threats to freedom by those who were supposed to defend it. Therefore, I consider that the proposals made by the Government in the Prime Minister’s speech from the Throne are far from being evidence of liberation, and offer evidence of tightening up. We should look at that first.

There is no question whatsoever—I am not seeking to blame everybody in the security services—that there have been people working in high positions in MI5 and MI6, who have used the power vested in them under the so-called well-tried mechanisms of the Maxwell Fyfe directive to undermine political democracy in Britain.

Secondly, those people have done so outside any form of ministerial control. My right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) has been Home Secretary, and others in Governments of whom I have been a part have occupied that position, and I cannot believe that they knew what was going on. If they did not know what was going on, the Maxwell Fyfe directive was wholly ineffective in its operation—and I understand it is to be weakened in the new legislation.

Thirdly, when evidence of this behaviour came to light, far from the Government pursuing the law breakers for their law breaking, they pursued the man who described the law breaking for his description of it. A Government who purport to pursue a policy of law and order made no issue of the fact that in Mr. Peter Wright‘s book—after all, he was a serious and respected member of the intelligence services—he described crimes that were committed, and made no attempt to investigate those crimes or bring him to justice. His only offence was that he wrote about them.

Then, of course, we come up against the justification for their action, and that is where the constitutional areas become most important. Anyone who has read any of the histories on these matters will know that the security services do not feel in any way responsible to the Government of the day. They believe they are responsible to the Crown. They represent the Crown in order to deal with subversion. I shall try to define the Crown and subversion in a moment.

Two new elements have rightly been brought into the debate by the hon. Member for Thanet, South (Mr. Aitken), which must be put upon the record. First of all, the British security services are supervised completely by the American security services. I know that because I had responsibilities for many years for those areas that were a part of what was called the “special relationship”. The Americans control our security services, supervise them, lay down the rules under which they operate, and warn them against people whom they regard as unreliable in Britain, because that is the condition upon which the United States makes nuclear weapons available to us.

The second threat—rather more shadowy but none the less real—is that, within a federal Europe, it is the intention of the Commission that security would be seen as a federal function, in part because the internal frontiers will cease to matter, and the Community will have to tackle what it defines as subversion on a federal basis.

The methods used by the security services must be set out. There is widespread vetting not only of civil servants, but, of course, of those in defence industries. The Clerk of the House and all the officials of the House are vetted by the security services. This was revealed in evidence submitted to the Committee of Privileges of which I am a member. That says a lot for the division between the legislature and the Executive, because the Executive vets the officials of the legislature. The BBC is vetted down to the level of anyone is involved in the preparation of current affairs or news. The research assistants of Members of Parliament are vetted. We know that from my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn), who brought the matter to the House.

The security services penetrate other services and actions of our national life. I shall give three examples. Cecil King, who purported to be a newspaper proprietor or a manager, was an agent of MI5, as was Tom Driberg, a former chairman of the Labour party. Lord Rothschild, who, when I worked closely with him, I took to be an industrialist brought in to help our think tank, was actually working for MI5 throughout that period.

Massive telephone interception and the opening of letters occur. Charles II nationalised the Post Office in 1660 because he wanted to see what people were writing to one another. Therefore, the Home Secretary is carrying on a good tradition in trying to intercept postal and telephone services and to legalise it. The Home Secretary is the most appropriate person to be moving the Bill, because when I tried to make a speech in 1976 in a church in his constituency at Burford to celebrate the Levellers, he wrote to the Secretary of State for Education and Science to get the grant for the Workers’ Educational Association withdrawn. He is therefore consistent in his opposition to dissent in any century by anybody.

Hon. Douglas Hurd (Witney)


Mr Tony Benn (Chesterfield)

I have the correspondence.

Hon. Douglas Hurd (Witney)

I remember inquiring 12 years ago why the taxpayers’ money was being used to help the right hon. Gentleman support the Levellers in Burford.

Mr Tony Benn (Chesterfield)

The right hon. Gentleman, with the sort of naivety that adds to his charm, confesses to the charge that I laid against him, that when he heard I was to speak at a church in Burford about the Levellers, he wrote to the Secretary of State for Education and Science to try to bring pressure to bear so as to withdraw a grant from the WEA that had invited me. He has confirmed my argument, and he is consistent. He does not believe in dissent in any century, including the present one.

The other area in which the security services have operated is in redefining subversion. There is no doubt that the phrase that became popular during the miners’ strike of “the enemy within” had been defined much earlier by the security services. The enemy within includes the trade union movement and many members of the Labour party and peace movement. That definition was undoubtedly one of the factors that led to the attempt to destroy Harold Wilson. In my opinion, it was also used, but for different reasons, to remove the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath), because the security services thought that he was too weak.

The methods used by the security services include the collection of damaging information and fabricating misinformation—as with the forging of Ted Short‘s bank account, which was leaked to Chapman Pincher. So much for lifelong confidentiality, when the security services regularly use certain journalists to feed out damaging information to destroy people they do not like. One cannot overlook the fact that Peter Wright confirmed Anthony Nutting‘s claim that Sir Anthony Eden ordered the assassination of another head of state, President Nasser. Anthony Nutting confirmed on television what Wright had written.

The question one must now ask is, what safeguards will there be under the new Act? Supposing Ted Short, as Lord President, had appealed to discover whether his bank account had been forged, to whom would his appeal have gone? Would it have gone to the Cabinet? No. Would it have gone to the Prime Minister? No. It would have gone to a commissioner appointed for the purpose by a previous Government.

When Bruce Kent‘s telephone was tapped, what safeguards would have existed then? If he had written to whoever it may have been and asked, “Is my phone being tapped?”, the only answer he would have received was not whether his phone was being tapped but whether the security services were abusing their rights—and those rights are covered by warrant and by a commission. The victims do not know what is being done to them, and the perpetrators do not wish to make complaints that might reveal the crimes they are perpetrating. The exceptions are one or two people such as Clive Ponting and Cathy Massiter, who were moved by their consciences, to act.

I turn to the matter of lifelong confidentiality to the Crown, which presumably should have bound Peter Wright. Who is the Crown? Did the Queen tell Peter Wright to try to destroy the Prime Minister? Obviously not. Did the Prime Minister tell Peter Wright to destroy himself? Obviously not. Did the Home Secretary tell Peter Wright to try to destroy the Government? Obviously not. The Crown is the code name we use for those central areas of Government in defence, intelligence and international relations—a state within the state—that the Government, and, I regret to say, previous Governments, did not wish to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny or discussion. The Crown is a term used to cover a concrete emplacement surrounded by barbed wire that the Home Secretary thinks needs fresh protection. It is not that he intends it to be subject to public scrutiny.

Tony Benn Crown

I asked the Home Secretary whether Ministers, who, after all, are Crown servants, will be covered by the new rules. It will be difficult to bind the Prime Minister to lifelong confidentiality as Bernard Ingham, on her instruction, breaches it at 11 o’clock every morning for the benefit of selected lobby correspondents who never make clear what has gone on. Are we really saying that anyone who is elected to Parliament, who becomes a Minister and discovers things he believes that it is in the public interest should be made known, will be bound to confidentiality for life? Or will anybody else? I have cited Ministers as they are uniquely accountable to those who elect them.

The reality is that there is nothing different about security. In its proper sense, security is part of the country’s defence forces, and no one denies that the country needs defence forces. But contrast the way security is treated with the other parts of the defence forces. Every year Parliament debates defence policy, but it never debates security policy—I am not talking about security operations. Parliament never discusses the definition of a subversive person—which is currently based on a phrase written years ago by a civil servant for Lord Harris in the House of Lords. We have never discussed whether as a Parliament we believe that being a member of CND makes a person subversive. That was decided by the Ministry of Defence, which told Cathy Massiter to bug Bruce Kent.

Parliament debates defence policy and votes a budget for the country’s defence establishment. It does not know the budget of the security establishment. Parliament knows the Chiefs of the Defence Staff and can ask parliamentary questions about defence matters. The issue is only confused by those who say that we cannot be told about individual security operations. Of course nobody wants to know a rumour that a bomber is coming to London. We do not want a parliamentary question that leads to the Minister responsible replying, “We think that a bomber is staying at a Bayswater hotel.” That is not the point at issue. The question is whether a state within the state, employing people with no feeling of responsibility to the Government elected by the people of this country, can continue as it is.

The Government wish to conceal information because that suits their book. I dare say that all Governments will want to conceal information—[Interruption.] It is not my purpose to make a party point. I hope that hon. Members will give me some credit. I am trying to raise a matter that is of equal concern in all parts of the House and to every elector. It would not alter matters very much if my right hon. and hon. Friends were occupying the Government Benches and those of hon. Gentlemen were seated on the Opposition Benches. I am clear about that. If hon. Gentlemen will look at the record, they will find that, as a Cabinet Minister, I raised the same questions on the Labour party’s national executive and submitted a memorandum that warned of the dangers. That was 10 years ago.

When one considers that the Government sent in the police to remove the Zircon film, and the prosecutions of Tisdall and Ponting, one realises that the real conflict concerns both sides of the House and those who elect us. We have heard much about the oxygen of publicity for Sinn Fein. Democracy lives by the oxygen of information. If one cuts off the oxygen of information and releases instead the poisonous gas of secrecy, misinformation and news management, one destroys the basis on which this House safeguards our people. The House of Commons is the real guarantor of the liberties of the people, not those individuals in little offices who have their own ideas about who is subversive and who engage in bugging, blackmailing and in destroying the reputations of those whom they do not like.

Democracy’s second safeguard is conscience. There is no substitute in law, administrative action or court ruling for the person, be they man or woman, who says, “What is being done is wrong and I shall speak my mind and take the consequences.” If one removes the safeguard of conscience from people who, in the course of their work, may come across something they feel it would be in the public interest to divulge—whether one gaols them, punishes them, or makes them into public villains—they would only be doing what we told the Germans at the Nuremberg trials they should have done, which was to disregard unjust orders—[HON. MEMBERS: “No!”] Of course that is what the Nuremberg trials were all about.

Parliament must protect these principles. In many ways I share the view of the hon. Member for Thanet, South. Next week I shall have been here 38 years. I have never known a House of Commons that has been so craven in surrendering one of its rights after another—surrendering powers to the EEC, accepting 120 foreign bases, and now, in the name of security, handing over even greater powers to the Executive. If we do not stand up here and now it will be too late—

Mr Robert Rhodes James (Cambridge)

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr Tony Benn (Chesterfield)

I am approaching my last sentence.

We must make a stand here and now or we shall find that, in the name of freedom, we are surrendering our liberties.



Mr Graham Allen (Nottingham North)

To ask the Attorney-General whether he is considering bringing any prosecutions under the Official Secrets Act arising from the “Spycatcher” episode.

Sir Patrick Mayhew (Tunbridge Wells)

No, Sir.

Mr Graham Allen (Nottingham North)

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell us why he is not yet prosecuting Lord Rothschild?

Sir Patrick Mayhew (Tunbridge Wells)

My answer as to why no prosecution was being brought was given several months ago. To bring such a prosecution would not have been in conformity with the Attorney-General‘s published guidelines for prosecutors.

Mr Michael Fallon (Darlington)

Does my right hon. and learned Friend find it extraordinary that, even after yesterday’s outrage, the Opposition still do not support the need to uphold the duty of confidentiality of those who work in our security service in order to defend the country from terrorism and subversion?

Sir Patrick Mayhew (Tunbridge Wells)

I very much agree with what my hon. Friend has said. There seems to be a certain ambivalence in the attitude of Opposition Members to that litigation. I venture to suggest that if we were not prepared to incur the cost of litigation to uphold the duty to which my hon. Friend has referred, the cost would very soon be more than money.






As for this piece of absolute trash:

Sir John Morris (Aberavon)

I, too, wholeheartedly welcome the Attorney-General back to his place in the House.

What is the prime consideration in relation to prosecutions? Is it damage to national security, or is it political embarrassment? Does the Attorney-General maintain consistency in his approach to Miss Tisdall and Mr. Ponting and to others such as Mr. West, Mr. Pincher, Lord Rothschild and the security men who may have leaked information to those people? Has not section 2 of the Official Secrets Act been virtually put out to grass and replaced in practical terms as a damage limitation exercise by actions for breach of confidentiality?

Mr Michael Havers (Wimbledon)

I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his kind remarks. He used the word prosecutions, not for the first time during my questions. In fact, the proceedings in Australia are civil proceedings. There is no way in which we can prosecute under the Official Secrets Act in another country. With regard to the action in Australia, the principle has been brought out clearly today that it is the Government’s determination to establish that once a man joins a service in which he promises to keep secret for the rest of his life all that he finds, that principle should be upheld.

So you cannot prosecute in another Commonwealth country where the Queen is the Head of State? Her Majesty had her Governor General destroy the Government of Gough Whitlam in 1975!

So Her Majesty can do that but Her Majesty cannot prosecute in Australia, an individual who has broken the law relating to her Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act? Didn’t we just say it is the CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE?

Then if the CROWN can’t prosecute certain people then what sort of CROWN is this?

I’ll tell you what sort of CROWN it is: It is a CROWN, within which ROTHSCHILD plays a very significant part alongside his lackey Lizzie!

Jewish banishment and The “City” of London

Posted in Finance, Geo-Political Warfare, Law, Money, Political History, The Corrupt SOB's by earthling on February 26, 2011

I think it’s important, for the “naysayers” who visit this blog, that I prologue it with a point re the “Crown of England”. The following is a statement made by Tony Benn in the Houses of Parliament not too many years ago (and it matters not when such was said anyhow). This is very very simple: The British people have no idea who this “Crown” is. It acts outside of any parliamentary scrutiny whatsoever. As such, it acts outwith the law yet decides what this thing called “Law” is!

The Crown prosecutes. Our Armed Forces fight and kill and destroy nations on its say so. Our Police and Forces take an oath to this “thing” called “the Crown”. They believe it to be “Her Majesty” the monarch without understanding at all that the monarchy is NOT a person or the Queen and her family. The Monarchy is a Constitutional Office. When it comes to the profit of the British Queen and her family from the “Crown Estate”, it is, in actual fact, deceptive criminal theft by the “reigning monarch” (like a reigning CEO of a corporation stealing the wealth of the company yet, the person in the office of CEO does not have the legal or lawful entitlement to take the wealth of the company because it is the Corporation in total as a legal person which owns the wealth and NOT the CEO). This is PRECISELY the same when we look at this “Constitutional Monarch” in office profiting no longer from a Civil List but from various sources of the country’s wealth.

Our Armed Forces, Police and judiciary are immensely ignorant but do what they are told otherwise they will not eat. They do as the “Crown” bids simply because, if they question it, then their wealth and the wealth of their family disappears. The Policeman with integrity would be sacked and the soldier fighting for his dearest “Crown” would find himself at the mercy of “friendly fire”.

So, what were those words of Tony Benn which crystallises the seriousness of this issue?

Here they are:

“I turn to the matter of lifelong confidentiality to the Crown, which presumably should have bound Peter Wright. Who is the Crown? Did the Queen tell Peter Wright to try to destroy the Prime Minister? Obviously not. Did the Prime Minister tell Peter Wright to destroy himself? Obviously not. Did the Home Secretary tell Peter Wright to try to destroy the Government? Obviously not.The Crown is the code name we use for those central areas of Government in defence, intelligence and international relations—a state within the state—that the Government, and, I regret to say, previous Governments, did not wish to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny or discussion. The Crown is a term used to cover a concrete emplacement surrounded by barbed wire that the Home Secretary thinks needs fresh protection. It is not that he intends it to be subject to public scrutiny.”


Anyone thinking very logically and simply would simply ask one question:


Henk Ruyssenaars’ article on July 10th 2006 drew attention to the book “Descent into Slavery” by Des Griffin in which the real meaning of the term “City of London” is explained. The following is an excerpt from that article.

“To the majority of people the words “Crown” and “City” in reference to London refer to the queen or the capital of England.

This is not the truth. The “City” is in fact a privately owned Corporation – or Sovereign State – occupying an irregular rectangle of 677 acres and located right in the heart of the 610 square mile ‘Greater London’ area. The population of ‘The City’ is listed at just over four thousand, whereas the population of ‘Greater London’ (32 boroughs) is approximately seven and a half million.

“The Crown” is a committee of twelve to fourteen men who rule the independent sovereign state known as London or ‘The City.’ ‘The City’ is not part of England. It is not subject to the Sovereign. It is not under the rule of the British parliament. Like the Vatican in Rome, it is a separate, independent state.

“The City”, which is often called “the wealthiest square mile on earth,” is ruled over by a Lord Mayor. Here are grouped together Britain’s great financial and commercial institutions: Wealthy banks, dominated by the privately-owned (Rothschild controlled) Bank of England, Lloyd’s of London, the London Stock Exchange, and the offices of most of the leading international trading concerns. Here, also, is located Fleet Street, the heart and core of the newspaper and publishing worlds.

The Lord Mayor, who is elected for a one year stint, is the monarch in the City. As Aubrey Menen says in “London”, Time-Life, 1976, p. 16:

“The relation of this monarch of the City to the monarch of the realm [Queen] is curious and tells much.”
It certainly is and certainly does!
When the Queen of England goes to visit the City she is met by the Lord Mayor at Temple Bar, the symbolic gate of the City. She bows and asks for permission to enter his private, sovereign State. During such State visits

“the Lord Mayor in his robes and chain, and his entourage in medieval costume, outshines the royal party, which can dress up no further than service uniforms.”
The Lord Mayor leads the queen into his city.
The symbolism is clear. The Lord Mayor is the monarch. The Queen is his subject.

The small clique who rule the City dictate to the British Parliament. It tells them what to do, and when. In theory Britain is ruled by a Prime Minister and a Cabinet of close advisers. These ‘fronts’ go to great lengths to create the impression that they are running the show but, in reality, they are mere puppets whose strings are pulled by the shadowy characters who dominate behind the scenes. As the former British Prime Minister of England during the late 1800s Benjamin D’Israeli wrote:

“So you see… the world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes”
(Coningsby, The Century Co., N.Y., 1907, p. 233).
This fact is further demonstrated by another passage from Menen’s book:

“The Prime Minister, a busy politician, is not expected to understand the mysteries of high finance, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer is only expected to understand them when he introduces the budget. Both are advised by the permanenet officials of the Treasury, and these listen to the City. If they suspect that some policy of the government will back-fire, it is of no use their calling up British ambassadors to ask if it is so; they can find out more quickly from the City. As one ambassador said: “Diplomats are nowadays no more than office boys, and slow ones at that. The City will know. They will tell the Treasury and the Treasury will tell the Prime Minister.”
Woe betide him if he does not listen. The most striking instance of this happened in recent history. In 1956 the then Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden… launched a war to regain the Suez Canal. It had scarcely begun when the City let it be known that in a few days he would have no more money to fight it; the Pound would collapse. He stopped the war and was turned out of office by his party. When the Prime Minister rises to address the Lord Mayor’s banquet, he hopes that the City will put more behind him than the gold plate lavishly displayed on the sideboards.”

The British government is the bond slave of the “invisible and inaudible” force centred in the City. The City calls the tune. The “visible and audible leaders” are mere puppets who dance to that tune on command. They have no power. They have no authority. In spite of the outward show they are mere pawns in the game being played by the financial elite.

It is important to recognise the fact that two separate empires were operating under the guise of the British Empire. One was the Crown Empire and the other the British Empire.

The colonial possessions that were white were under the sovereign – i.e. under the authority of the British government. Such nations as the Union of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Canada were governed under British law. These only represented thirteen percent of the people who made up the inhabitants of the Britsh Empire.

All the other parts of the British Empire – nations like India, Egypt, Bermuda, Malta, Cyprus and colonies in Central Africa, Singapore, Hong Kong and Gibraltar were all Crown Colonies. These were not under British rule. The British parliament had no authority over them.

As the Crown owned the committee known as the British government there was no problem getting the British taxpayer to pay for naval and military forces to maintain the Crown’s supremacy in these areas.

The City reaped fantastic profits from its operations conducted under the protection of the British armed forces. This wasn’t British commerce and British wealth. The international bankers, prosperous merchants and those members of the aristocracy who were part of the “City” machine accumulated vast fortunes .

About seventy years ago Vincent Cartwright Vickers stated that :

….”financiers in reality took upon themselves, perhaps not the responsibility, but certainly the power of controlling the markets of the world and therefore the numerous relationships between one nation and another, involving international friendship and mistrusts… Loans to foreign countries are organised and arranged by the City of London with no thought whatsoever of the nation’s welfare but solely in order to increase indebtedness upon which the City thrives and grows rich…”
In “Empire of the City” E. C. Knuth said:

” This national amnd mainly international dictatorship of money which plays off one country against another and which, through ownership of a large portion of the press converts the advertisement of its own private opinion into a semblance of general public opinion, cannot for much longer be permitted to render Democratic Government a mere nickname. Today we see through a glass darkly: for there is so much which it would not be in the public interest to divulge.”…

The battle for power and riches is an ancient one, but any attempt to make sense of the present world situation where the bulk of humanity is being herded like sheep into a corral without some knowledge of history is a difficult if not impossible task.

At present names have been replaced by groups, capitalists, republicans, democrats, terrorists, corporations, NATO, UNO, NAFTA, EMI, ECB, ASEAN. Names that are spewed out like confetti in an endless list of anonymity.

In spite of modern technology the figures in the background remain blurred. Mention the word “Jew” or “Conspiracy” and everyone with few exceptions will turn away. Why? Fear? Of what? What is the magic talisman which makes the mention of these co-religionists a no-go area? Is it because they have infiltrated every aspect of human activity? Is it they who are pulling the strings which are leading the world on its downward slope?

The Jew has been mistrusted since way back. But what is apparent now is that any attempt to offer an answer to the question is clamped down upon. What does that indicate? Above all it indicates that these shadowy figures fear more than anything else the truth.

Professor Jesse H. Holmes, writing in, “The American Hebrew,” expressed the following similar sentiments:

“It can hardly be an accident that antagonism directed against the Jews is to be found pretty much everywhere in the world where Jews and non-Jews are associated. And as the Jews are the common element of the situation it would seem probable, on the face of it, that the cause will be found in them rather than in the widely varying groups which feel this antagonism.
In Europe and Russia alone, the Jews have been banished 47 times in the last 1,000 years: Mainz, 1012; France, 1182; Upper Bavaria, 1276; England, 1290; France, 1306; France, 1322; Saxony, 1349; Hungary, 1360; Belgium, 1370; Slovakia, 1380; France, 1394; Austria, 1420; Lyons, 1420; Cologne, 1424; Mainz, 1438; Augsburg, 1438; Upper Bavaria, 1442; Netherlands, 1444; Brandenburg, 1446; Mainz, 1462; Lithuania, 1495; Portugal, 1496; Naples, 1496; Navarre, 1498; Nuremberg, 1498; Brandenburg, 1510; Prussia, 1510; Genoa, 1515; Naples, 1533; Italy, 1540; Naples, 1541; Prague, 1541; Genoa, 1550; Bavaria, 1551; Prague, 1557; Papal States, 1569; Hungary, 1582; Hamburg, 1649; Vienna, 1669; Slovakia, 1744; Mainz, 1483; Warsaw, 1483; Spain, 1492; Italy, 1492; Moravia, 1744; Bohemia, 1744; Moscow, 1891.

(The above is excerpted from The Synagogue of Satan by Andrew Carrington Hitchcock.)

Of what were these people guilty to arouse such a reaction from so many diverse people?

Well, in England, it’s very interesting:

IT ALL STARTED with The Edict of Expulsion of 1290 AD.
The Jews would have us believe that their expulsion from England by Edward I (reigned 1272-1307) was due to their money lending endeavors. The real reason was due to the Jews’ crime of blood ritual murders.

The Orthodox Christian historian of the 5th Century, Socrates Scholasticus, in his Ecclesiastical History, 7:16, recounts an incident about Jews killing a Christian child:

— “At a place near Antioch in Syria, the Jews, in derision of the Cross and those who put their trust in the Crucified One, seized a Christian boy, and having bound him to a cross they made, began to sneer at him. In a little while becoming so transported with fury, they scourged the child until he died under their hands.” —

Here are a few examples which led to the English expulsion of the Jews in 1290 AD:

1144 A.D. Norwich: A twelve year-old boy was crucified and his side pierced at the Jewish Passover. His body was found in a sack hidden in a tree. A converted Jew to Christianity named Theobald of Cambridge informed the authorities that the Jews took blood every year from a Christian child because they thought that only by so doing could they ever return to Palestine. The boy has ever since been known as St. William.

1160 A.D. Gloucester: The body of a child named Harold was found in the river with the wounds of crucifixion.

1255 A.D. Lincoln: A boy named Hugh was tortured and crucified by the Jews. The boy’s mother found the body in a well on the premises of a Jew named Jopin. 18 Jews were hanged for the crime by King Henry III.

1290 A.D. Oxford: The Patent Roll 18 Of Edward I, 21st June 1290 contains an order for the Gaol delivery of a Jew named Isaac de Pulet for the murder and blood letting of a Christian boy. Only one month after this, King Edward I issued his decree expelling the Jews from England.
(See Sources #1 Below )

[As an addendum to the above, I feel it is necessary to clarify that, before the expulsion in 1290, there was the Statute of the Jewry in 1275, entirely based upon the moneylending and usury issue:  jews1275.html

Now please understand that this is just pure factual history and the pieces fall where they fall.

It seems very obvious to me that, while the Islamic religion has not forgotten one of its fundamental cornerstones: NO USURY, the Christian world simply has. For NO USURY is a cornerstone of the christian religion too. I wonder, then, why Christians call themselves christians? They don’t follow Jesus’ teachings and haven’t done so in the west since the following took place – the readmission of jewish usury into England by Oliver Cromwell during the 1640 – 1660 period and then the establishment of the Bank of England where one can see, William of Orange and his Queen, Mary became original investors – it is on Bank of England documents]

JEWISH BANKERS FROM AMSTERDAM led by the Jewish financier and army contractor of Cromwell’s New Model Army, Fernandez Carvajal and assisted by Portuguese Ambassador De Souza, a Marano (secret Jew), saw an opportunity to exploit in the civil unrest led by Oliver Cromwell in 1643.

A stable Christian society of ancient traditions binding the Monarchy, Church, State, nobles and people into one solemn bond was disrupted by Calvin’s Protestant uprising. The Jews of Amsterdam exploited this civil unrest and made their move. They contacted Oliver Cromwell in a series of letters:

Cromwell To Ebenezer Pratt of the Mulheim Synagogue in Amsterdam,
16th June 1647:
— “In return for financial support will advocate admission of Jews to England: This however impossible while Charles living. Charles cannot be executed without trial, adequate grounds for which do not at present exist. Therefore advise that Charles be assassinated, but will have nothing to do with arrangements for procuring an assassin, though willing to help in his escape.” —

To Oliver Cromwell From Ebenezer Pratt, 12th July 1647:
— “Will grant financial aid as soon as Charles removed and Jews admitted. Assassination too dangerous. Charles shall be given opportunity to escape: His recapture will make trial and execution possible. The support will be liberal, but useless to discuss terms until trial commences.” —

Cromwell had carried out the orders of the Jewish financiers and beheaded, (yes, Cromwell and his Jewish sponsors must face Christ!), King Charles I on January 30 1649.

Beginning in 1655, Cromwell, through his alliance with the Jewish bankers of Amsterdam and specifically with Manasseh Ben Israel and his brother-in-law, David Abravanel Dormido, initiated the resettlement of the Jews in England.
(See Sources #2 Below )

WILLIAM STADHOLDER, a Dutch army careerist, was a handsome chap with money problems. The Jews saw another opportunity and through their influence arranged for William’s elevation to Captain General of the Dutch Forces. The next step up the ladder for William was his elevation by the Jews to the aristocratic title of William, Prince of Orange.

The Jews then arranged a meeting between William and Mary, the eldest daughter of the Duke of York. The Duke was only one place removed from becoming King of England. In 1677 Princess Mary of England married William Prince of Orange.

To place William upon the throne of England it was necessary to get rid of both Charles II and the Duke of York who was slated to become James II of the Stuarts. It is important to note that none of the Stuarts would grant charter for an English national bank. That is why murder, civil war, and religious conflicts plagued their reigns by the Jewish bankers.

In 1685, King Charles II died and the Duke of York became King James II of England. In 1688 the Jews ordered William Prince of Orange to land in England at Torbay. Because of an ongoing Campaign of L’Infamie against King James II contrived by the Jews, he abdicated and fled to France. William of Orange and Mary were proclaimed King and Queen of England.

The new King William III soon got England involved in costly wars against Catholic France which put England deep into debt. Here was the Jewish bankers’ chance to collect. So King William, under orders from the Elders of Zion in Amsterdam, persuaded the British Treasury to borrow 1.25 million pounds sterling from the Jewish bankers who had helped him to the throne.

Since the state’s debts had risen dramatically, the government had no choice but to accept. But there were conditions attached: The names of the lenders were to be kept secret and that they be granted a Charter to establish a Central Bank of England. Parliament accepted and the Jewish bankers sunk their tentacles into Great Britain.

MAYER AMSCHEL BAUER OPENED a money lending business on Judenstrasse (Jew Street) in Frankfurt Germany in 1750 and changed his name to Rothschild. Mayer Rothschild had five sons.

The smartest of his sons, Nathan, was sent to London to establish a bank in 1806. Much of the initial funding for the new bank was tapped from the British East India Company which Mayer Rothschild had significant control of. Mayer Rothschild placed his other four sons in Frankfort, Paris, Naples, and Vienna.

In 1814, Nathanael Rothschild saw an opportunity in the Battle of Waterloo. Early in the battle, Napoleon appeared to be winning and the first military report to London communicated that fact. But the tide turned in favor of Wellington.

A courier of Nathan Rothschild brought the news to him in London on June 20. This was 24 hours before Wellington’s courier arrived in London with the news of Wellington’s victory. Seeing this fortuitous event, Nathan Rothschild began spreading the rumor that Britain was defeated.

With everyone believing that Wellington was defeated, Nathan Rothschild began to sell all of his stock on the English Stock Market. Everyone panicked and also began selling causing stocks to plummet to practically nothing. At the last minute, Nathan Rothschild began buying up the stocks at rock-bottom prices.

This gave the Rothschild family complete control of the British economy – now the financial centre of the world and forced England to set up a revamped Bank of England with Nathan Rothschild in control.
(See Sources #4 Below )

(As much as that is possible given Rothschild secrecy)
A PRIVATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION exists today in England known as “The City.” It is also known as The Jewish Vatican located in the heart of Greater London.

A Committee of 12 men rule The Jewish Vatican. They are known as “The Crown.” The City and its rulers, The Crown, are not subject to the Parliament. They are a Sovereign State within a State.

The City is the financial hub of the world. It is here that the Rothschilds have their base of operations and their centrality of control:

* The Central Bank of England (controlled by the Rothschilds) is located in The City.
* All major British banks have their main offices in The City.
* 385 foreign banks are located in The City.
* 70 banks from the United States are located in The City.
* The London Stock Exchange is located in The City.
* Lloyd’s of London is located in The City.
* The Baltic Exchange (shipping contracts) is located in The City.
* Fleet Street (newspapers & publishing) is located in The City.
* The London Metal Exchange is located in The City.
* The London Commodity Exchange (trading rubber, wool, sugar, coffee) is located in The City.

Every year a Lord Mayor is elected as monarch of The City. The British Parliament does not make a move without consulting the Lord Mayor of The City. For here in the heart of London are grouped together Britain’s financial institutions dominated by the Rothschild-controlled Central Bank of England.

The Rothschilds have traditionally chosen the Lord Mayor since 1820. Who is the present day Lord Mayor of The City? Only the Rothschilds’ know for sure…
(See Sources #5 Below )

Sources #1: Ariel Toaff, Bloody Passover-Jews of Europe and Ritual Homicide, 2007 Click Here; J. C. Cox, Norfolk Churches; Victoria County History of Norfolk, 1906; Arnold Leese, Jewish Ritual Murder In England; Henry III, Close Roll 16; Joseph Haydn, Dictionary of Dates.

Sources #2: Isaac Disraeli, Life of Charles I, 1851; Hugh Ross Williamson, Charles and Cromwell; AHM Ramsey, The Nameless War; Lord Alfred Douglas, Plain English, 1921; Geoffrey H. Smith, The Settlement Of Jews In England

Sources #3: John Harold Wood, History of Central Banking in Great Britain; Gustaaf Johannes Renier, William of Orange

Sources #4: Frederick Morton, The Rothschilds; Benjamin Disraeli, Coningsby

Sources #5: E.C. Knuth, The Empire of The City; Des Griffin, Descent Into Slavery

UPDATE 4 Nov 2011: George Monbiot in the Guardian Newspaper. Although he just doesn’t go quite far enough into the history and the connectivity. Mainstream media now supporting much of the above regarding the “above the law” nature of the City of London. I rest my case your honour!

The medieval, unaccountable Corporation of London is ripe for protest

Working beyond the authority of parliament, the Corporation of London undermines all attempts to curb the excesses of finance.

    • George Monbiot

Daniel Pudles 01112011

Illustration by Daniel Pudles

It’s the dark heart of Britain, the place where democracy goes to die, immensely powerful, equally unaccountable. But I doubt that one in 10 British people has any idea of what the Corporation of the City of London is and how it works. This could be about to change. Alongside the Church of England, the Corporation is seeking to evict the protesters camped outside St Paul’s cathedral. The protesters, in turn, have demanded that it submit to national oversight and control.

What is this thing? Ostensibly it’s the equivalent of a local council, responsible for a small area of London known as the Square Mile. But, as its website boasts, “among local authorities the City of London is unique”. You bet it is. There are 25 electoral wards in the Square Mile. In four of them, the 9,000 people who live within its boundaries are permitted to vote. In the remaining 21, the votes are controlled by corporations, mostly banks and other financial companies. The bigger the business, the bigger the vote: a company with 10 workers gets two votes, the biggest employers, 79. It’s not the workers who decide how the votes are cast, but the bosses, who “appoint” the voters. Plutocracy, pure and simple.

There are four layers of elected representatives in the Corporation: common councilmen, aldermen, sheriffs and the Lord Mayor. To qualify for any of these offices, you must be a freeman of the City of London. To become a freeman you must be approved by the aldermen. You’re most likely to qualify if you belong to one of the City livery companies: medieval guilds such as the worshipful company of costermongers, cutpurses and safecrackers. To become a sheriff, you must be elected from among the aldermen by the Livery. How do you join a livery company? Don’t even ask.

To become Lord Mayor you must first have served as an alderman and sheriff, and you “must command the support of, and have the endorsement of, the Court of Aldermen and the Livery”. You should also be stinking rich, as the Lord Mayor is expected to make a “contribution from his/her private resources towards the costs of the mayoral year.” This is, in other words, an official old boys’ network. Think of all that Tory huffing and puffing about democratic failings within the trade unions. Then think of their resounding silence about democracy within the City of London.

The current Lord Mayor, Michael Bear, came to prominence within the City as chief executive of the Spitalfields development group, which oversaw a controversial business venture in which the Corporation had a major stake, even though the project lies outside the boundaries of its authority. This illustrates another of the Corporation’s unique features. It possesses a vast pool of cash, which it can spend as it wishes, without democratic oversight. As well as expanding its enormous property portfolio, it uses this money to lobby on behalf of the banks.

The Lord Mayor’s role, the Corporation’s website tells us, is to “open doors at the highest levels” for business, in the course of which he “expounds the values of liberalisation”. Liberalisation is what bankers call deregulation: the process that caused the financial crash. The Corporation boasts that it “handle[s] issues in Parliament of specific interest to the City”, such as banking reform and financial services regulation. It also conducts “extensive partnership work with think tanks … vigorously promoting the views and needs of financial services.” But this isn’t the half of it.

As Nicholas Shaxson explains in his fascinating book Treasure Islands, the Corporation exists outside many of the laws and democratic controls which govern the rest of the United Kingdom. The City of London is the only part of Britain over which parliament has no authority. In one respect at least the Corporation acts as the superior body: it imposes on the House of Commons a figure called the remembrancer: an official lobbyist who sits behind the Speaker’s chair and ensures that, whatever our elected representatives might think, the City’s rights and privileges are protected. The mayor of London’s mandate stops at the boundaries of the Square Mile. There are, as if in a novel by China Miéville, two cities, one of which must unsee the other.

Several governments have tried to democratise the City of London but all, threatened by its financial might, have failed. As Clement Attlee lamented, “over and over again we have seen that there is in this country another power than that which has its seat at Westminster.” The City has exploited this remarkable position to establish itself as a kind of offshore state, a secrecy jurisdiction which controls the network of tax havens housed in the UK’s crown dependencies and overseas territories. This autonomous state within our borders is in a position to launder the ill-gotten cash of oligarchs, kleptocrats, gangsters and drug barons. As the French investigating magistrate Eva Joly remarked, it “has never transmitted even the smallest piece of usable evidence to a foreign magistrate”. It deprives the United Kingdom and other nations of their rightful tax receipts.

It has also made the effective regulation of global finance almost impossible. Shaxson shows how the absence of proper regulation in London allowed American banks to evade the rules set by their own government. AIG’s wild trading might have taken place in the US, but the unit responsible was regulated in the City. Lehman Brothers couldn’t get legal approval for its off-balance sheet transactions in Wall Street, so it used a London law firm instead. No wonder priests are resigning over the plans to evict the campers. The Church of England is not just working with Mammon; it’s colluding with Babylon.

If you’ve ever dithered over the question of whether the UK needs a written constitution, dither no longer. Imagine the clauses required to preserve the status of the Corporation. “The City of London will remain outside the authority of parliament. Domestic and foreign banks will be permitted to vote as if they were human beings, and their votes will outnumber those cast by real people. Its elected officials will be chosen from people deemed acceptable by a group of medieval guilds …”.

The Corporation’s privileges could not withstand such public scrutiny. This, perhaps, is one of the reasons why a written constitution in the United Kingdom remains a distant dream. Its power also helps to explain why regulation of the banks is scarcely better than it was before the crash, why there are no effective curbs on executive pay and bonuses and why successive governments fail to act against the UK’s dependent tax havens.

But now at last we begin to see it. It happens that the Lord Mayor’s Show, in which the Corporation flaunts its ancient wealth and power, takes place on 12 November. If ever there were a pageant that cries out for peaceful protest and dissent, here it is. Expect fireworks – and not just those laid on by the Lord Mayor.

Article: corporation-london-city-medieval

Now, when you think of “an Empire” and you may think America is the Empire of today, think again. Britain “lost” it’s Empire didn’t it?

Well maybe or….. Maybe not.

I go with the latter. You see, it does NOT take an army to ensure an Empire. What size if the Commonwealth? The Commonwealth is THE largest group of human beings (and resources) in the world. What is the Federal Reserve and the Federal Government of the United States? What controls them? What if it were that the City of London and Bank of England controlled them? So many (the majority) people believe this is just a “flight of fancy”. It isn’t.

Watch this next movie (very enlightening) and consider the following Telegraph article (which I have blogged about elsewhere on this blog):

The United States becoming an “Associate Member” of the Commonwealth? Now WHY would they “need” to do that? And what about Brexit? What’s that all about?

Well, this is what it may well all be about:

From U.S. Congressional Archives 1940:

Mr. Speaker, In order that the American people may have a clearer understanding of those who over a period of years have been undermining this Re-public, in order to return it to the British Empire, I have inserted in the RECORD a number of articles to prove this point. These articles are entitled “Steps Toward British Union, a World State, and International Strife.” This is part I, and in this I include a hope expressed by Mr. Andrew Carnegie, in his book entitled “Triumphant Democracy.”

In this he expresses himself in this manner:

“Let men say what they will, I say that as surely as the sun in the heavens once shone upon Britain and America united, so surely is it one morning to rise, to shine upon, to greet again the reunited states—the British-American Union.”

“Now the people of this country are not going to allow anybody— any Congress, any government, any President—to break the good faith which they have pledged to the mother country. In making this statement, Mr. Choate takes the position that Great Britain or England is our mother country; the same position that was taken by Cecil Rhodes over 50 years ago and by Andrew Carnegie in 1893, when he wrote a book entitled, “Triumphant Democracy.” I want you to note particularly that this was in 1913, and that 1913 was the very year we changed our Government from a republic to a semidemocracy; the year in which we destroyed constitutional government, international security, and paved the road for us to become a colony of the British Empire. It was also the same year in which we, by adopting the Federal Reserve Act, placed our Treasury under the control and domination of the Bank of England and the international banking groups that are now financing the British-Israel movement in the United States. It was also the year preceding the World War; a war in which we became involved, as everyone knows, in 1917, but what everyone does not know is that we were committed to this war in 1910, and were to all intents and purposes in the war in 1914, when J. P. Morgan & Co. began to finance the Triple Entente. This statement is borne out by Mr. J. P. Morgan’s own testimony before the Senate committee investigating the munitions industry. Mr. Choate was, therefore, right, because nothing has stopped, not even Congress, the destruction of this Republic and its gradual incorporation into the British Empire through the efforts of the many subversive and pro-English groups, led and directed, as I have said, by the British- Israel movement.”

Please note that the following movie (and other such movies) will NEVER mention jewish control of the banks or banking system, so don’t be looking for it. But bear this in mind while watching.


I hope you notice the myriad of Spanish and non jewish sounding names in that list. This list, as I know, is not available anywhere else in blogs throughout the internet. I may be wrong.

All of the above can then lead me into tying this up to what is happening in China and Hong Kong today but that would have me simply regurgitating my blog “CAPITALIZING CHINA”.  How has the City of London then taken significant control in China?

Enter the concept of the “Legal Person” – a British legal basic jurisprudence term:

Am I a “Conspiracy theorist”? YES….. indefatigably YES! Why?

Because I’ve researched, done my homework and I have found that the entire globe is shaped by events which are entirely linked. So yes, there IS one umbrella conspiracy. Not to say there are not factions within it who play on Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “Grand Chessboard”, BUT they all use you and I as pawns in this big game.

Let the naysayers in media and elsewhere scoff as they will but they are entirely ignorant; generally, have never fully immersed themselves into research and know that to do so and then speak of it, they would lose their well paid positions.

A couple of things to ponder over:


HL Deb 21 July 1959 vol 218 cc315-56


With all deference to the most reverend Primate, that is not what the court is            338            asked to declare. The court is asked to declare that the child was born in lawful wedlock between Mrs. X and Y. Otherwise, by the laws of legitimacy as understood in this country, it could not be a legitimate child. It is that which personally I find so shocking.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, seemed to think—at least so I understood—that there was no material difference between the situation which I have just described and the situation which was dealt with by the Act of 1926, under which both the parents were unmarried at the time of the birth of the child and they merely, as it were, anticipated the ceremony. But to me at any rate, there is all the difference in the world between the two cases. In one case both were free to marry each other; in the other one or both was solemnly linked at the time in wedlock to another man or another woman. How is it possible for the court to ignore that fact? If I may say so with all deference—and this is a great impertinence—some lawyers always seem to think that by adding the adjective “legal” to the word “fiction” it makes it much more respectable, just as in politics when a Government wants to do something which is manifestly unjust to some section of the community it thinks it makes it sound better by calling it “social” justice. In both cases, the addition of the adjective is intended to produce a different and more agreeable atmosphere. But to the ordinary man, such as most of us in this House are, a fiction remains a fiction, whatever adjective is attached to it; a lie remains a lie even though it is condoned by the law.


HL Deb 21 June 1948 vol 156 cc992-1083
LORD ALTRINCHAM moved to leave out subsection (1) and to insert:        Every person who under this Act is a British subject of the United Kingdom and                993        Colonies or who under any enactment for the time being in force in any country mentioned in subsection (3) of this section is a British subject or citizen of that country shall thereby have the status of a British subject.        The noble Lord said: Since this is a complicated and very far-reaching Bill, it may be desirable that I should begin by explaining the purpose and effect of my Amendment…………

Apart from that, however, it is obviously a term that is quite applicable for the purposes for which it has been used by Canada and may be used by other Dominions. Canada, Australia and New Zealand are, after all, single geographical entities under one system of government, under which every member of the community has equal rights and responsibilities. But citizenship in that sense is obviously entirely inapplicable to a vast range of territories such as we have to deal with in the Colonial Empire and to an immense variety of peoples who        996        range in their standard of civilisation and of civic responsibility from the head-hunters of Borneo to noble Lords opposite. There is a very wide range within this single term of “citizenship,” and obviously there are great differences in that range in the sense of civic rights and civic responsibilities. There are also immense varieties of Governments and of rights and responsibilities, varying from universal adult franchise, as we have it here, to no franchise at all. All those variations would be brought together under the term “citizenship.” In fact, to cover the Colonial Empire the term “citizenship” must be wrenched from its proper significance. It can be defended, if it is to be defended—and this is what we dislike and wish to avoid—only as a convenient legal fiction. We dislike the fiction and we see no good reason for it. For that reason alone—the history and the proper meaning of the term—we would like to see it altered in the Bill so far as the United Kingdom and Colonies are concerned.

§        In the second place, we believe that the use of this term for the United Kingdom and Colonies may have very undesirable political repercussions. Although this Parliament is, of course, still supreme throughout the Colonial Empire, nevertheless, as everybody who has lived and lives in the Colonial Empire knows, there is in the Colonial Empire a universal dislike of Whitehall government. There is a universal desire to feel that they are not dominated by a distant Legislature and administration but that, in fact, they are able more or less to conduct their own affairs without remote control. That has always been the history of the Dominions since the days when an early settler in New Zealand said that he would rather be governed by Nero on the spot than by a committee of archangels in Downing Street. That feeling is just as strong in the Colonial Empire. We have been trying to recognise that in every respect. In various ways we have been preparing and even carrying out systems of decentralisation and of regional organisation which will give more authority to those who are responsible on the spot. While, of course, there are in the Colonial Empire at the present time old Colonies with ancient Legislatures—and do not let us forget that—to whom this term will appear curiously inappropriate, the Colonies are all moving the same way.                997        Therefore, while this term “citizenship” when used in the Dominions will have an increasing significance as the Dominions grew in stature and in power, in the United Kingdom and Colonies it would have a steadily decreasing and ultimately shing significance.

§        There is no such difficulty if we remain faithful to the old term of “British subject.” That term has covered every variety of subject under every variety of Government. In is appropriate to them all, and they are proud of it. We would much prefer that no suggestion were made in this. Bill or in any other way that we are seeking to tie the Colonial Empire more closely to this country, to make it more dependent upon this country or in any way to interfere with the individual development of Colonies or groups of Colonies.

§        In the third place, there is another objection which is also deeply felt upon these Benches, and that is that the establishment of the term “citizenship” in many Colonies would be a fertile ground for political agitators. Our effort now, certainly in the African Colonies and elsewhere, is to try to give priority and emphasis to economic development and to avoid the danger that that development may be outstripped and impeded by premature political agitation. The noble Lord, Lord Milverton, called attention to that danger in a remarkable speech not many weeks ago. “Citizenship,” after all, ought to mean, and in its proper sense does mean, equal rights and responsibilities. Do noble Lords opposite really suppose that, if that term is used in regard to the Colonial Empire, it will not be exploited against us by every malcontent, by every political agitator? It is a poor answer to say that after all the term is merely a legal fiction. That would be the truth but, as I say, it would be a poor answer. I am afraid that it would furnish the Soviets, in their propaganda against the Empire, with another text for their constant theme of the “crude and callous insincerity of British Imperialism.”


“It is a poor answer to say that after all the term is merely a legal fiction. That would be the truth but, as I say, it would be a poor answer. I am afraid that it would furnish the Soviets, in their propaganda against the Empire, with another text for their constant theme of the “crude and callous insincerity of British Imperialism.”