Earthlinggb's Blog

Destroying the mindgame!

Posted in Law by earthling on November 28, 2013

An open letter to any and all Lawyers, Barristers, Judges who dare reply and debate this issue which destroys the mindgame you have played a part in over centuries.

Debate or shut up!

Please, be my guest and attempt to make an argument against the following. I look forward to it.

The following totally destroys the Judge, the politician, the Law enforcer, the magistrate, the establishment figure, the media whore who laughs at the subject and the man or woman who simply refuses to believe what is the fact: The fact is that the State and the United Nations, the European Union – in fact ANY and ALL “nations” and constructed legal personality (legal fiction) can have absolutely no authority over a natural person under any circumstances UNLESS that “legal person” is acting as dictator and effectively destroys the widely held belief that we are all equal before the law. The ONLY fallback the State has is the argument that there is such a thing as “Supremacy of law”. We will see, however, that this simply does not hold water because it is, again, a construct of the very legal personality (fiction) which determines it.

So let’s start with the INSTITUTIONS:

The European Union

The relationship between the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights is an issue in European Union law and human rights law. The European Court of Justice rules on European Union (EU) law while the European Court of Human Rights rules on European Convention on Human Rights which covers the whole of Europe, not just the EU, but not the institutions of the European Union. The European Union (EU) is not a member of the Council of Europe and the European Union takes the view that while it is bound by the European Convention it is not bound by the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. As seen in Article 6(2) of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union is bound to respect fundamental rights principles. This means that the institutions of the European Union must not violate human rights, as defined by European Union law, and also that the Member States of the European Union must not violate European Union human rights principles when they implement Union legislation or act pursuant to Union law. This obligation is in addition to the Member States’ pre-existing obligations to follow the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in everything they do. In practice, this means that the Court of Justice weaves the Convention principles throughout its reasoning. For example, the Court held that when a child has a right of residence in a Member State according to Union law, this also means that his parent(s) should also have a right of residence due to the principle of respect for family life enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Prior to the entry into force on 1 June 2010 of Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the EU could not accede to the Convention, and the European Court of Human Rights’ did not have jurisdiction to rule on case brought against the EU. However, the EcHR has been prepared to hold EU member states liable for human rights’ violations committed within their jurisdictions, even when they were just complying with a mandatory provision of EU law.

Please recognise what this is, in fact stating: While the EU creates and demands that its laws are implemented in the member states (for example the UK), the EU, itself, is not bound by the ECHR – it is immune! So the EU may create laws which fundamentally violate Human Rights. While they create the law and the member states MUST implement them, if the member states then are found in violation of one’s human rights, it is the member states who are attacked for doing so. Yet, the member states are put in a position by the immune EU to implement the law! Make NO mistake, this is like a mafia boss telling one of his minions to murder someone because that is his ruling (and the minion does not question the Don now does he?) – that is the “law”. So the minion goes ahead and murders and the legal profession come along and prosecute the minion while leaving the Don immune for making the order. Similarly, it is precisely the issue which was deliberated upon during the Nuremburg Trials. The question was: Were those who carried out the orders of their government (Hitler), guilty of warcrimes? However……

Protocol No. 14 of the ECHR entered into force on 1 June 2010. It allows the European Union to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. The EU’s Treaty of Lisbon, in force since 1 December 2009, permits the EU to accede to said convention. The EU would thus be subject to its human rights law and external monitoring as its member states currently are. It is further proposed that the EU join as a member of the Council of Europe now it has attained a single legal personality in the Lisbon Treaty.

Now remember this: The EU has attained a legal personality. It is recognised by law as existing and, as such, can enter treaties (which are simply contracts). The EU is now a LEGAL PERSON. A Judge can now “see” the EU because it now exists as a legal person whereas, before, a Judge could not “see” the EU because it did not legally exist!

Now, how did the EU gain its legal existence?

Well, like any other Corporation and Nation:

On 1 December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force and reformed many aspects of the EU. In particular it changed the legal structure of the European Union, merging the EU three pillars system into a single legal entity provisioned with legal personality. The EU is based on a series of treaties. These first established the European Community and the EU, and then made amendments to those founding treaties.These are power-giving treaties which set broad policy goals and establish institutions with the necessary legal powers to implement those goals. These legal powers include the ability to enact legislation which can directly affect all member states and their inhabitants. The EU has legal personality, with the right to sign agreements and international treaties. Under the principle of supremacy, national courts are required to enforce the treaties that their member states have ratified, and thus the laws enacted under them, even if doing so requires them to ignore conflicting national law, and (within limits) even constitutional provisions The European Council uses its leadership role to sort out disputes between member states and the institutions, and to resolve political crises and disagreements over controversial issues and policies. It acts externally as a “collective Head of State” and ratifies important documents (for example, international agreements and treaties). On 19 November 2009, Herman Van Rompuy was chosen as the first permanent President of the European Council. On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force and he assumed office. Ensuring the external representation of the EU, driving consensus and settling divergences among members are tasks for the President.

Sovereign states are legal persons. A sovereign state, or simply, state, is a state with a defined territory on which it exercises internal and external sovereignty, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other sovereign states. It is also normally understood to be a state which is neither dependent on nor subject to any other power or state. While in abstract terms a sovereign state can exist without being recognised by other sovereign states, unrecognised states will often find it hard to exercise full treaty-making powers and engage in diplomatic relations with other sovereign states. The word “country” is often colloquially used to refer to sovereign states, although it means, originally, only a geographic region, and subsequently its meaning became extended to the sovereign polity which controls the geographic region. Sovereignty has taken on a different meaning with the development of the principle of self-determination and the prohibition against the threat or use of force as jus cogens norms of modern international law. The UN Charter, the Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, and the charters of regional international organisations express the view that all states are juridically equal and enjoy the same rights and duties based upon the mere fact of their existence as persons under international law. The right of nations to determine their own political status and exercise permanent sovereignty within the limits of their territorial jurisdictions is widely recognised.

In international law, however, there are several theories of when a state should be recognized as sovereign:

The constitutive theory of statehood defines a state as a person of international law if, and only if, it is recognized as sovereign by other states. This theory of recognition was developed in the 19th century. Under it, a state was sovereign if another sovereign state recognized it as such. Because of this, new states could not immediately become part of the international community or be bound by international law, and recognized nations did not have to respect international law in their dealings with them.

Note “ying and yang”: They could not be part of the International community. The corollary of which was that recognised nations could break the law in their dealings with them! Incredible isn’t it? While, if that unrecognised country were to break international law (as was its “right” because it was not recognised as existing and the international community could break the law toward it) you can be sure that the international community would demonise it as a “rogue state” all simply due to the fact that the international community would not recognise its sovereignty! I think it’s called the international community taking advantage of a vicious circle!

In 1912, L. F. L. Oppenheim had the following to say on constitutive theory:

…International Law does not say that a State is not in existence as long as it is not recognised, but it takes no notice of it before its recognition. Through recognition only and exclusively a State becomes an International Person and a subject of International Law.

By contrast, the “declarative” theory defines a state as a person in international law if it meets the following criteria: 1) a defined territory; 2) a permanent population; 3) a government and 4) a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

According to declarative theory, an entity’s statehood is independent of its recognition by other states. The declarative model was most famously expressed in the 1933 Montevideo Convention. Article 3 of the Convention declares that statehood is independent of recognition by other states. In contrast, recognition is considered a requirement for statehood by the constitutive theory of statehood. A similar opinion about “the conditions on which an entity constitutes a state” is expressed by the European Economic Community Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee. The Badinter Arbitration Committee found that a state was defined by having a territory, a population, and a political authority. Most sovereign states are states de jure and de facto (i.e. they exist both in law and in reality). However, sometimes states exist only as de jure states in that an organisation is recognised as having sovereignty over and being the legitimate government of a territory over which they have no actual control. Many continental European states maintained governments-in-exile during the Second World War which continued to enjoy diplomatic relations with the Allies, notwithstanding that their countries were under Nazi occupation. A present day example is the State of Palestine, which is recognized by multiple states, but doesn’t have control over any of its claimed territory in Palestine and possess only extraterritorial areas (i.e. embassies and consulates). Other states may have sovereignty over a territory but lack international recognition; these are considered by the international community to be only de facto states (they are considered de jure states only according to their own Law and by states that recognize them).

People may sometimes refer to “the will of the international community” to strengthen their own point of view or the opposite expression “the international community is divided” to explain a consensus has not yet been reached. In diplomacy and debate a case that includes this statement could be a sentiment of majoritarianism and a description of options to take action for the benefit of all countries. It is occasionally asserted that powerful countries and groups of countries use the term to describe organisations in which they play a predominant role, that might be interpreted as indifference toward other nations. The enactment of conflict or war may be claimed as an action of the “international community” by a superpower or coalition that could represent under half or less of the world’s population.

Ain’t that the truth!

An example of the term used by some western leaders is when denouncing Iran, for its nuclear ambitions of suspected nuclear proliferation, by stating that “Iran is defying the will of the international community by continuing uranium enrichment“. The Non-Aligned Movement which consists of 118 countries from the 193 United Nations member states, has endorsed Iran’s right to enrich uranium for civil nuclear energy.

Rousseau, in his 1763 treatise Of the Social Contract argued, “the growth of the State giving the trustees of public authority more and means to abuse their power, the more the Government has to have force to contain the people, the more force the Sovereign should have in turn in order to contain the Government,” with the understanding that the Sovereign is “a collective being of wonder” (Book II, Chapter I) resulting from “the general will” of the people, and that “what any man, whoever he may be, orders on his own, is not a law” (Book II, Chapter VI) – and furthermore predicated on the assumption that the people have an unbiased means by which to ascertain the general will. Thus the legal maxim, “there is no law without a sovereign.

The 1789 French Revolution shifted the possession of sovereignty from the sovereign ruler to the nation and its people.

De jure, or legal, sovereignty concerns the expressed and institutionally recognised right to exercise control over a territory. De facto, or actual, sovereignty is concerned with whether control in fact exists. Cooperation and respect of the populace; control of resources in, or moved into, an area; means of enforcement and security; and ability to carry out various functions of state all represent measures of de facto sovereignty. When control is practiced predominately by military or police force it is considered coercive sovereignty. It is generally held that sovereignty requires not only the legal right to exercise power, but the actual exercise of such power. Thus, de jure sovereignty without de facto sovereignty has limited recognition. Internal sovereignty is the relationship between a sovereign power and its own subjects. A central concern is legitimacy: by what right does a government exercise authority?

Claims of legitimacy might refer to the divine right of kings or to a social contract (i.e. popular sovereignty). So, an interesting point here to raise in the case of legitimacy in the UK, for example: From where does the UK government and Monarch derive their legitimacy? Do they DARE state they derive it from the “Divine Right of Kings”? Do they DARE? I don’t think so do you?

External sovereignty concerns the relationship between a sovereign power and other states. For example, the United Kingdomuses the following criterion when deciding under what conditions other states recognise a political entity as having sovereignty over some territory;

“Sovereignty.” A government which exercises de facto administrative control over a country and is not subordinate to any other government in that country is a foreign sovereign state.
— (The Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] A.C. 256), Strouds Judicial Dictionary

External sovereignty is connected with questions of international law, such as: when, if ever, is intervention by one country onto another’s territory permissible? According to existing International law, as preached (but not practiced) by the International community through the U.N., the answer to this question is NEVER. Every last war “declared” by the west, therefore, is in breach of International law. Period!

Since the 19th century, legal personhood has been further construed to make it a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of a state (usually for purposes of personal jurisdiction). In Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558, 11 L.Ed. 353 (1844), the U.S. Supreme Court held that for the purposes of the case at hand, a corporation is “capable of being treated as a citizen of [the State which created it], as much as a natural person.” Ten years later, they reaffirmed the result of Letson, though on the somewhat different theory that “those who use the corporate name, and exercise the faculties conferred by it,” should be presumed conclusively to be citizens of the corporation’s State of incorporation. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16 How. 314, 329, 14 L.Ed. 953 (1854). These concepts have been codified by statute, as U.S. jurisdictional statutes specifically address the domicile of corporations. In the international legal system, various organizations possess legal personality. These include intergovernmental organizations (the United Nations, the Council of Europe) and some other international organizations (including the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, a religious order). Corporations are by definition legal persons. A corporation sole is a corporation constituted by a single member, such as The Crown in the Commonwealth realms. A corporation aggregate is a corporation constituted by more than one member.

Now, please fully appreciate that the above has just stated absolutely clearly and factually that these institutions AND the Crown itself are no more nor less than Legal Persons in their own right. As such, they are, by definition within this legal “matrix” we are all subject to, EQUAL to each and every “Natural Person” (i.e. you and I) on this earth. Again, any judge or any state prosecutor could NOT argue differently. This is simply legal (LEGAL) fact – legal fact that these institutions are LEGAL FICTIONS! 

The Juristic Person.I

Author(s): George F. Deiser

Reviewed work(s):

Source: University of Pennsylvania LawReview and American Law Register, Vol. 57, No. 3,Volume 48 New Series (Dec., 1908), pp. 131-142

Published by: The University of Pennsylvania Law Review

The law has been playing with such a fiction for centuries, in the course of which, the fiction, instead of disappearing, as it so conveniently does for the mathematician, has increased in girth and height, and has maintained its ghostly existence, in the face of the anathema of the philosopher and the fiat of the judicial decree. In an evil day the law, like the hospitable Arab, who permitted his camel to shelter his head within the domestic tent, gave shelter to an imaginary person-the persona ficta,-then an infant, seemingly of little promise and of precarious tenure of life. The most uninformed mind has an idea of capacities, and can even follow the ramifications by which a man by marrying his first cousin, loses some of his second cousins, or becomes second cousin to his own children, but the separation of individual wills from collective wills is a task which even the academic mind has but unsatisfactorily accomplished. Person, collective property-persona ficta-the name is very nearly matter of indifference so long as we understand by it an existence distinct from the members that compose it; for, be it understood, one may be a member of this corporate body and yet deal with it-may sell to it-buy from it,-in fact, maintain business relations with it, precisely as he does with any other natural person. The matter begins with dogma; men, in law and in philosophy are natural persons. This might be taken to imply that there are also persons of another sort. And that is a fact.

Men/Women are “Natural persons” in law because a “Natural person” is, and only is, a LEGAL DEFINITION used to differentiate from a “legal person” (or “Corporate person”)

It was said by an eminent authority that when a body of twenty, or two thousand, or two hundred thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular way for some common purpose, they create a body, which by no fiction of law, but by the very nature of things, differs from the individuals of whom it is constituted. Now the state is a body of this kind, and beginning with the state and coming down by successive gradations, we encounter by the way, the subordinate state, which, if autonomous, is the next body of this sort, the self governing county, district, or department; finally the municipal corporations such as cities, boroughs or townships. We have very little difficulty in recognizing that when the state acts, it is a different matter from the action of any member or citizen of the state. If the state owe money, it is not owing by the citizens; nor if half the citizens emigrated would anyone think of following them to collect from each, his proportion of the debt. It is not a conception that the rationalistic mind finds easy.

No? Then WHY ON EARTH has the world’s population “rationalised” the idea of bailing out Privately held banks on the demand of the State? I would like to ask each and every individual who have just shrugged their shoulders and considered it ok exactly what the hell they are thinking of? Anyhow, that is an aside on the subject of this blog.

The conception of the persona ficta is an inheritance from the Roman Law, developed and expanded by the ecclesiastical lawyers of the Middle Ages, and bestowed on modem legal thought by Savigny. Real men are united to form a fictitious being; a fiction which holds property. It has necessarily, no natural rights. The theory hence, has no regard for members; nor can the persona ficta exist except by virtue of some creative act of the state. The Juristic Person.-A right is inconceivable without corresponding relations between some individual and the community to which he is subject. If we find a right, such as that of ownership, in existence, we must discover a subject for that right. If the right attaches to a human being, he is the subject; if it attaches to a name used to designate the collective will of a group of men, the name or collective will is the subject. By advanced abstractions, by reasoning a priori, jurists have reached the conclusion, that in relation to the quality of being a subject of law, the individual, and the group of individuals as such, occupy a like position. Personality is considered therefore, an attribute not only of men, but of groups of men, acting as a unit for the attainment of a common end. The term juristic person is simply the legal expression for this fact, that above the individual or specific human existence there stands generic human existence. In other words, when we encounter the problem of defining, interpreting, explaining, the actions of human beings in groups, as such, as contrasted with the action of any members of the group as individuals, the group stands for genus, and the individual stands for species. The collective will of a group of men so acting and holding property, when recognized as a subject of law, or as having legal subjectivity, or more plainly, when recognized as capable of holding definite legal rights, is no more a fiction than is the personality of any human being. This juristic person, or collective will of the group, is not a creation of the law; the law does not create its personality, but finding a group engaged in some common pursuit, endows it with a definite legal capacity. It is capable of exercising rights, capable of committing wrongs; the former, it may vindicate; the latter it must atone for. It may seem a far cry from the question of the legality of a fine imposed upon a corporation in an amount greater than that of its capital stock, to the apparently academic discussion of its personality or non-personality, yet they are in fact so intimately related that our legal system cannot ignore the relation without affecting its stability. If men as individuals can do acts that require intent, and men acting in groups cannot, the community must restrict the activity of men in groups. For the actions of groups of men, collective actions, there is no reason, no justification, no authority but that of might. Beginning with the state, and proceeding downward to private corporations, control proceeds from the power of the strong over the weak.

“Human groups,” says Duguit, in his dramatic way is  

based upon community of needs, upon diversity of individual aptitudes, upon the reciprocity of services rendered; in these human groups, some individuals stronger than others, whether because they are better armed, or because we recognize in them some supernatural power; whether because they are richer, or because they are more numerous, and who, thanks to this superior power, can impose their will on others; these are the facts. Let us call the state a human group, settled upon a definite territory, where the stronger compel obedience of the weaker, and we are agreed. Call political sovereignty that power which the stronger exert over the weaker, there is no controversy. Proceed beyond this and we enter the realm of hypothesis. To say that this will of those who rule is only imposed upon individuals because it is the collective will, is a fiction conceived to justify the power of the strong-a fiction, ingenious enough, invented by the prophets of force to legitimate force, but for nothing else.” Returning for a moment to the state, which is everywhere recognized as a person, it has been observed truly, that the feeling that even the state is a very unreal person, may not readily be dispelled.14 But the difficulty is purely subjective; the existence of personality apart from a body is insufficiently concrete. Yet the notions of ownership, or of in-corporeal rights are equally esoteric. And if personality offer a solution, the difficulty of the conception ought not to stand in the way. If now, we attempt to define our problem we shall find the facts to be these. Corporations, under existing legal systems, for judicial or legislative purposes are regarded in two ways: I. The corporation is a fictitious person or entity (as in England and the United States). II. The corporation is a real person (as in Germany, France, Spain, and some other continental countries). The problems arising under both of these attitudes are these: A. Does the corporation as a group or unit possess rights and owe duties ? B. Has the corporation as a group or unit criminal or moral responsibility? C. What is the nature of the shareholders’ interest? If again, we examine the nature of corporate existence with reference to proffered solutions, we shall find again, that the corporation is a fictitious person, or a real person, or a form of co-ownership, or a form of agency or action by representation. It remains to consider these views with reference to the extent to which they resolve the problem.

George F. Deiser. 3313312.pdf

The following is from: 0njp9-concept-legal-personality-english-law.html

The idea that a husband could not rape a wife comes down through the ages from the ancient belief that a wife was her husband’s property. The legal principle that a woman was a separate being from her husband was not established until 1882 in England by the Married Women’s Property Act – see Married_Women\’s_Property_Act 

Where a party changes their gender, or wishes to change their gender, UK law has gone through a transformation. Once a gender change, although medically possible, did not alter the          realities of the gender at birth for a person. That changed, as the UK began to grant rights to transexuals (recognising them as PERSONS).

See Legal_aspects_of_transsexualism#United_Kingdom

By providing transexuals these rights, the UK has granted them standing to be treated as persons whose rights must be respected and who have valid claims to make against those who refuse to respect their rights to life, liberty, property, and their names. Legal personality determines and establishes the patterns which help determine the rights, duties, and powers of persons. Minority groups, be they minorities due to age, gender, religion, or other classifications, are not able to control their own destinies until the law recognizes them as having the right to exist and make demands on others.

The above crystallises the facts: ONE IS NOT A “PERSON” until the legal world recognises them as such. The transexual, although in reality a living and breathing being, was not a “person” until the legal system said so! This is crystal clear and there is no way whatsoever that the legal system can argue that YOU exist and are recognised within the legal system by the sheer fact that you literally exist. The transexual literally exists but, only recently, did they exist from a legal standpoint as a PERSON.


What the constitution says: The EU will for the first time have a “legal personality” and its laws will trump those of national parliaments: “The Constitution and law adopted by the Union institutions in exercising competence conferred upon it by the Constitution shall have primacy over the law of the member states.” What it means: This really just confirms the status quo, which is that if the EU is allowed to legislate in an area of policy, its law will overtake any national laws. Equally in areas where it does not legislate, national law prevails. By having a “legal personality”, the EU will be able, as an organisation, to enter into international agreements. The old European Community had this right but the EU as a whole did not so its status in world diplomacy increases.

Now, here, one must recognise that the ONLY reason the EU law has primacy over, for example, UK law is because when the member states agree to the treaties, the entire idea of the treaties is to give the EU that power. There is no other reason. Any and all member states were and are SOVEREIGN nations and have the right to enter treaties OR remove themselves.

2950276.stm It gives the EU a legal personality – like a country, not an international organisation. This argument seems to rest on the assumption that international organisations do not have a legal personality. But most do. It also glosses over the fact that the European Community – which still exists on paper as a legally separate entity from the EU – already has a legal personality. (Whether the EU already has a legal personality is a matter of dispute.) But could the EU, if it acquired a single legal personality, end up joining international organisations or signing international treaties instead ofmember states? This has not been the practice up to now. Both the European Community and the EU have been signing treaties for years, and the European Community is a member of the World Trade Organization, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and the Hague Conference. This has not prevented member states from signing the same treaties and joining the same organisations. (This, as you can read in the link, is now old news but gives the reader a better understanding of things it is hoped).

A declaration to be added to the new treaty underlines that acquiring a legal personality will not authorise the EU to act “beyond the competences conferred on it by member states”. Declarations are a statement of political intent. They are not legally binding but the European Court of Justice does take them into account in its judgements. 6928737.stm

Now, let’s consider another element of “legal personality” and the ideology surrounding that of immunity of diplomats, heads of state and their “capacity” bestowed upon them by the “law”. The reader will, it is hoped, recognise how this entire legal system is corrupt from the very top to bottom to protect the interests of those who implement it.

The  reason the Pope cannot be arrested and prosecuted in the UK is because he is entitled to Head of State immunity.  Dawkins and Hitchens are not unaware of this problem.  Apparently they have enlisted Geoffrey Robertson QC to provide an opinion stating that the pope is not a head of State and therefore not entitled to head of State immunity. Robertson elaborates on this point in a recent article in the Guardian. Robertson argues that the Pope is not entitled head of State immunity as a matter of international law because the Vatican is not a State.  His arguments are simply incorrect. The Vatican has a tiny territory and a tiny population but it does fulfill the criteria for Statehood. As James Crawford puts it, in his authoritative work The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed, 2006), p. 225, after detailed analysis: “it is clear that the Vatican City is a State in international law, despite its size and special circumstances.” The size of population or territory are irrelevant for the purposes of Statehood.  What is important is that the entity possesses those criteria as well as the two other criteria for Statehood – which are: a government in effective control of the territory and independence (or what is called “capacity to enter into legal relations” in the words of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1935). The Vatican as a territorial entity does have a government: the Holy See which is headed by the Pope. As Crawford’s analysis makes clear, the Holy See has its own independent legal personality (about which more later on) and that personality predates the Statehood of the Vatican. However, the Holy See is also the government of the Vatican City State. More imporantly, the Vatican is independent of any other State. Its independence from Italy which is the State that could have had claims to control that territory is recognised in the Lateran Treaty of 1929. So, since the Vatican is a State then the head of that State, the Pope, is entitled to head of State immunity under international law. This immunity is recognised by Section 20 of the UK’s State Immunity Act which extends to “a sovereign or other head of State”, the same immunities accorded to diplomats. These immunities are absolute in the case of criminal proceedings. In other words there are no exceptions to the immunity. The International Court of Justice’s decision in the Arrest Warrant Case (Congo v. Belgium) 2002 confirms that this type of immunity continues to apply even when it is alleged that the head of State has committed international crimes. So an allegation that the Pope may be responsible for crimes against humanity will not suffice to defeat his immunity.


The SOVEREIGN Order of Malta: Legal person and legally sovereign.

It should be noted that the immunity of a head of State from criminal prosecution in foreign States is there for very good reasons. In the first place, those State agents charged with the conduct of international relations are given immunity in order to allow international relations and international cooperation to continue to take place. (So understand this well: The Head of State can rape, murder and much anything else but, so as to allow continued International cooperation, they can commit these crimes and walk away. Do you accept that? If you do and if the International community does then how can the International community possibly argue that the Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan wars were legally justified? The Head of State is allowed to commit genocide and atrocities! Or is that only if they are OUR” accepted Heads of state? This is no joke folks. I sincerely wish it was!) Secondly, the immunity of foreign heads of States assures that just as States may not engage in regime change by armed force they may not achieve this end by criminal prosecutions either. It respects the fundamental autonomy of each State to determine who it is governed by.

So, again, one has to ask: What on earth was it that didn’t provide that assurance to Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein etc?

Even assuming that the Vatican were not a State under international law that does not mean that the Pope will not be granted immunity from criminal process in the UK. First of all, the UK courts in determining the question of immunity will not be asked to determine whether the Vatican is a State under international law. Under Section 21 of the State Immunity Act, the question whether the Vatican is a State is to be resolved, conclusively, by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. So as long as the Foreign Office is of the view that the Vatican is a State, the Courts are bound to accept that. The State Immunity Act aside, deference to the executive on matters of Statehood is in line with longstanding case law of the English Courts. It is almost certain that the Foreign Office will certify that the Vatican is a State, as the US executive did in a case against the Vatican in the US. Britain maintains diplomatic relations with the Holy See and has an Ambassador with the Holy See. It may be argued that this is not quite the same as recognising the Vatican as a State – and it isn’t. The embassy is to the Holy See and not to the Vatican. Nonetheless, as far as I know Britain has not objected in the past to the Vatican’s claims to be a State nor has it, as far as I know, opposed the Vatican’s accession to treaties that are only open to States. A second reason that the Pope will be entitled to immunity from criminal process in the UK even if the Vatican were not a State is because there is general acceptance of the international legal personality and in particular of the “sovereign” status of the Holy See. The relationship between the Vatican and the Holy See are complex. Crawford’s book referred to above, deals with this question very well. What is clear is that the Holy See as the central authority of the Catholic Church is not just the government of the Vatican. In addition, it has a special status in international law and has international legal personality which precedes the creation of the Vatican in 1929. What is important here is the nature of that international legal personality. Like the Sovereign Order of the Knights of Malta, the Holy See is deemed to have a sovereign status akin to Statehood. This includes possession of the immunities that States are entitled to.  It may be significant that Section 20 of the State Immunity Act provides immunity for “a sovereign or other head of State.” Does sovereign in that context allow for entities like the head of the Holy See, the Pope, even if he were not a head of State? It may be interpreted in this way and should be. It could be argued the word “other” in that provision, militates against this interpretation. However, even if S. 20 does not allow for the immunity of Head of the Holy See, that would not preclude the argument that customary international law does. can-the-pope-be-arrested-in-connection-with-the-sexual-abuse-scandal

The Crown in Contract and Administrative Law


An essential and neglected distinction between contract and administrative law is in how each conceives of the Crown as a juristic person. This article explores the extent of this distinction, and its implications for the rule of law and the separation of powers. It offers explanations—historical, jurisprudential and pragmatic—for why contract law conceives of the Crown as a corporation aggregate with the powers and liberties of a natural person, and why administrative law disaggregates the State  into named officials.


The international legal system is the foundation for the conduct of international relations. It is this system that regulates state actions under international law. The principal subjects of international law are states, rather than individuals as they are under municipal law. The International Court of Justice acknowledged in the Reparation for Injuries case that types of international legal personality other than statehood could exist and that the past half century has seen a significant expansion of the subjects of international law. Apart from states, international legal personality is also possessed by international organisations and, in some circumstance, human beings. In addition, non-governmental organisations and national liberation movements have also been said to possess international legal personality. Since 1945 the international legal system has been dominated by the United Nations and the structures that were established as part of that organisation. While the UN has been the object of significant criticism, it has nevertheless played a pivotal role both in the progressive development and codification of international law. An international organization (or organisation) is an organizationwith an international membership, scope, or presence. There are two main types:

Another difficulty regarding the claimant’s ability to have a cause of action
concerns their legal personality. In order to establish a duty of care it must be proven
that at the time of the injury the claimant was a legal person, which is problematic in the case of the unborn child.
Although in the realm of medicine it is an agreed upon fact that a child
commences to exist before birth and that the child’s “ante-natal development”
should be taken into consideration, English law refutes this notion contending that it
is a firmly established principle of law that a child does not receive an “independent
legal status” until it is born. (Please notice here that the circumstances of the unborn child still residing in its mother’s womb is PRECISELY the circumstances by which the married woman, previously, was considered a “non person” who was the property of her husband. The child does not exist as a person but is one and the same as, and the property of, the mother)
Furthermore, L.J. Dillon also acknowledged the fact that a fetus does not
have legal personality in English law, as verified in the cases of Re F (in utero) and
Paton v. B.P.A.S.. However, he placed emphasis on “other contexts” in which the
English courts have integrated the civil law axiom “’that an unborn child shall be
deemed to be born whenever its interests require it.’”12 On this basis the Canadian
Supreme Court made its ruling in Montreal Tramways v. Leville and contended:
“To my mind it is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable,
should be allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries wrongfully
committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother.” (Here, it is stating that once, and only if, the child is then physically born, will it then be able to sue its mother – or another – who caused it to suffer a tort while still within the womb)
However with each of these approaches theoretical difficulties arise and contradict Common Law’s standpoint that the damage suffered must have occurred at the time the claimant was a legal person, thus at birth or post-natal. Where a child is born and has injuries perpetrated while in the womb, the harm is “to be sustained by him at the moment of his birth and not before, since prior to his birth he had no legal personality.

Ok, now what is the entire point of the foregoing? Well I hope it is obvious once you read it.

The Crown itself is a LEGAL PERSON. The UN is a LEGAL PERSON. The EU is a LEGAL PERSON. The State (Nation) is a LEGAL PERSON. And YOU and every other human being (within the subject of “the law”) are LEGAL PERSONS. The only differentiation which is made is that of States and Corporations etc being given the title of “legal person” and you being given the title of “Natural person” purely to differentiate the rights, duties etc apportioned to each of these “legal personality” types. BUT THEY ARE ALL LEGAL FICTIONS.

So what does this all mean?

Well it is SO easy:

You: “Your honour, are all persons equal before the law?”

Judge: “Yes indeed they are”.

You: “Can you please assure this court and those in attendance that there is no legal person – such as a Corporate – which has any authority over a natural person?”

Judge: “Indeed I can. As I said, all persons – legal or natural – are equal before the law. One would even have to go so far as to suggest that the natural person is of a higher importance since the natural person is of flesh and blood and endowed with god given rights whereas the Corporation or man made legal person has not”

You: “Then your honour, would I be correct in stating that I, as a natural person, have every right, subrogated to no-one, to enter or decline from entering a contract with another legal person? Or, if, under any and all circumstances, I am forced to do so, or by way of lack of full disclosure, I inadvertently enter into contract with such an entity, that I shall have the legal right to withdraw from any and all such contracts?”

Judge: “Well yes but that would be dependent upon certain points of law and if, for instance, you were compelled by law to enter into such”

You: “Please would your honour give me an example of such a possible case?”

Judge: “Where statute law may enforce such a contract for example”

You: “Statute law Sir? May I ask who or what imposes such statute law?”

Judge: “The State does and it is enforced by the Crown”

You: “Haven’t we just established that both, the State and the Crown, are LEGAL PERSONS and, as such, they are, at best, equal to myself before the law?”

Judge: “Shut up smart ass! Case dismissed”

Now, they can go down the route of stating “Supremacy of law” but just as a member state (a “person) of the EU must agree by treaty the supremacy of EU law over its own, the natural person must contract with the state to agree to the subrogation of his/her god given, inalienable, unalienable natural rights.

The court and the Crown and the state may ask “do you possess a birth certificate or passport or National Insurance number or any such state conferred document BUT the state gives one no choice in the matter of requiring these documents since the state will disallow all which requires such. It is, then, the state which coercively and deceptively removes the human rights and replaces them with “person” rights.

I rest my case and ALL cases your dishonour for, before I was given a “legal personality” I was neither competent nor would I have had any legal standing (obviously since I had no legal person and could not be “seen” – recognised BY the legal system ) to state I did not wish to contract with the state and subrogate such rights.

The legal system, then, is entirely fraudulent.


2 Responses

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  1. David said, on November 29, 2013 at 9:24 am

    Worse….they’re COERCING MINORS!

  2. […] For more on the legal person, please see a number of blogs written on this subject, including this one: […]

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